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COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY, 

5^T 



COMPRISING 



LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY 



OR 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 



JiS. 



BY 

Rev. W. H. HILL, S. J., 

Professor of Philosophy in the St. Louis University. 



BALTIMORE: 4 

Published by John Murphy & Company, 

No. 182 Baltimore Street. 

London: R. Washburne, i 8 Paternoster Row. 
1873- 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1873, by 

John Murphy, 

in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington 



PREFACE. 



The following elementary work, though primarily intended 
for learners, will, it is believed, be found by the general reader 
of philosophy to contain things which are new, as regards 
works of the kind published in the English language. 

In order to render the Logic more easy and more practical, 
First, the author has omitted the perplexed, undiscussed and in- 
determinate Greek derivatives, which give vagueness or obscu- 
rity to the matter contained in many popular text books on 
Logic ; and he has aimed to use in their stead the most plain 
and simple terminology. This perpetual multiplication of in- 
definite and unintelligible technicalities, which are devised as 
if to embody new forms of thought, helps much to render the 
study of Logic and Philosophy discouraging, and their very 
names repulsive, even to the most ambitious and the most in- 
telligent young minds that attempt to master the established 
elementary principles of these all-important branches of a good 
education. The introduction of a new term into a book on 
Philosophy, does not necessarily imply the actual discovery of 

a new truth. It is a significant fact that, while eccentric 

iii 



IV PREFACE. 

thought and novel phraseology possess a peculiar charm for 
ill-educated, rambling and superficial minds ; yet, the lan- 
guage which remains in prevailing use, is the embodiment 
of deep and true philosophy ; and the words as well as the con- 
clusions, which convey what is absurd or preposterous, it must 
necessarily repudiate, by the general law of human thought. 

Second: It was judged best, also, for the interests of learn- 
ers in general, to omit the discussion of the modes and figures 
of the syllogism; for, in practice they are not attended to, 
even by those who actually argue in form, the simple rules of 
demonstration sufficing for all practical purposes, and being all 
that is even really useful in the strictest argumentation. On 
the other hand, it was deemed expedient to introduce some 
matters that pertain to branches of Philosophy, whose full 
treatment is appropriate to another volume; e. g., certain sub- 
jects which strictly belong to Psychology, Cosmology and 
Natural Theology. 

The author derived much help from notes taken in private 
study years ago, but which were prepared with no thought of 
ever employing them for any other purpose than his own in- 
struction. It is hoped that the acknowledgment of having 
made a free use of what was then obtained from the best 
works within his reach, will excuse the omission of more fre- 
quent reference to them in the margin. 

In disposing the matter, the method employed in the most 
approved text books used in the schools of Philosophy is 
generally followed. In such works the definitions of terms, 



PREFACE. -V 

many important propositions of Logic and Metaphysics, 
even with the chief arguments for them, are treated as com- 
mon property; as happens, for example, with certain defini- 
tions and theorems of geometry, originally from Euclid, but 
which are now the recognized property of all geometricians. 

In order to secure brevity, after having indicated succinctly, 
but, as he trusts, clearly and comprehensively, the theories and 
the salient points of the matters treated, he has been com- 
pelled, in many instances, to leave their development to the 
instructor, or to the reader for himself. 

The writer flatters himself that the treatises on certainty, 
and its motives and principles; on sensible and intellectual cog- 
nition ; the objective reality of ideas ; the principle of causa- 
tion ;. will, perhaps, be found to possess special value, more 
particularly for those who are not familiar with the language 
of the schools. 

It was deemed expedient to insert on the margin, here and 
there, some suggestive axioms, brief distinctions and explana- 
tions, taken from the Latin authors, among whom they pass for 
established doctrine, and are usually enunciated nearly in the 
same terms. The Latin of the schools, besides being brief, is 
also peculiarly capable of expressing precisely, clearly, and com- 
prehensively, matters which it is difficult to utter through the 
less accurate vernacular, in terms that are neither obscure nor 
ambiguous. Though they are not essential to the text of the 
work, yet, for the convenience of the reader who is not familiar 
with the Latin language, the translation is subjoined to these 



VI PREFACE. 

citations. It was, however, found no easy task, in some in- 
stances, to reproduce them with fidelity in English phraseology, 
as the classic scholar will readily see from the result, and know 
how to judge benignantly. 

If the offering which is herewith respectfully made to the 
cause of education meet with public favor, it is designed to 
complete the philosophical course by adding to the present 
work treatises on Cosmology, Psychology, Theodicea, and 
Ethics or Moral Philosophy. Whether this part of the under- 
taking be well or ill done — and, doubtless, many errors and 
imperfections have escaped notice — it may, nevertheless, fairly 
be taken as a specimen of what the whole is likely to be ; and, 
even if it prove to possess but indifferent merit, still it is the 
fruit of much toil, and the result of the writer's best possible 
effort, done, as it was, during intervals between various daily 
duties. With this candid statement, the work is sent forth 
with the hope that kind suggestions and ingenuous criticism 
may contribute to improve, and perfect it for the object in- 
tended; i. e., an aid for the study of Philosophy. 

St. Louis Univeksity, 
February 10th, 1873. 



INTRODUCTION. 



PHILOSOPHY; ITS OBJECT. 

The word Philosophy, according to the sense in which Pytha- 
goras applied it to his school, means the love, desire and pur- 
suit of wisdom. Philosophy, as a science, is the knowledge 
of things in their highest and most universal causes, so far as 
such knowledge is attainable by the light of natural reason. 
Its object, therefore, includes the world or universe, man, God, 
in their most essential relations to each other.* 

It is not without propriety, then, that Philosophy, when 
compared to the whole collection of human sciences, is pro- 
nounced to be, " as the sun in the planetary system, the light 
of all." Without some adequate acquaintance, at least with 
the body of its established doctrine, even a liberal education 
is incomplete or partial, if, indeed, it be not superficial or un- 
sound. 

The knowledge of a thing, even when it is scientific, stops 
with the immediate or proximate causes of that thing; but 
wisdom, which is philosophical knowledge, refers the same thing 

* ' ' Rerum divinarum atque humanarum causarumque quibus continentur 
cognitio. ' ' The knowledge of human and divine things, and of the causes by 
which they are related to each other. 

vii 



VIII INTRODUCTION. 

to its still higher and more universal causes; that is, it seeks 
to understand and explain it in its essence as it absolutely is, 
and must be. Other science acquaints us with things as they 
are directly and extrinsically known through the senses, or 
other powers of cognition; but philosophy, by means of 
higher scientific knowledge, proceeds further, and explains the 
intri?isic nature of those things, and their relation to still more 
universal truths. For example: Physiology, as a science, ex- 
plains the whole economy of the living human body, its 
organism, the functions of its tissues, the relations and con- 
nexions of its members, and the like ; and that science is 
wholly limited to this positive object, to this view of organic 
beings. Philosophy proceeds much farther; it explains the 
fiature of man as a rational animal, or as consisting of an or- 
ganized body and a living soul in union by composition ; and 
it answers the questions, " what is life ? what is the nature of 
the soul? what essentially constitutes the union of the soul 
and body ? can material organs, by any possibility, elicit acts 
of intelligence?" etc. 

It is manifest, therefore, that Philosophy is superior in its 
aim and objects to all other human sciences. It treats of its 
matter on metaphysical principles; that is, it explains objects in 
their essence, employing for that purpose necessary, immutable 
and absolute truths; which preserve the understanding from 
error, not only in these elevated matters, but also in the study 
of facts, no less than the conclusions from those facts. 

The subjects that are now usually treated in a course of 



INTRODUCTION. IX 

Philosophy, are Logic, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology, 
Natural Theology, and Moral Philosophy or Ethics. 

Logic explains the laws of right reasoning ; it is, when con- 
sidered under different respects, both a natural gift, and the 
result of art. Artificial Logic derives its value from the natu- 
ral, whose principles it aims to express in a few clear and inva- 
riable formulae. Logic, considered as practically directing the 
mind in reasoning, is an art; but inasmuch as it explains and 
proves the precepts of correct argument by their reasons, fur- 
nishes the means and the criteria of certainty, or propounds 
the truth of cognition, it is a science. 

Ontology, or General Metaphysics, has for its object the 
essential predicates of all things ; and it, therefore, deals with 
truths which are strictly absolute and universal. It is the most 
completely generalized system of knowledge which it is possi- 
ble for the human intellect to form by its highest power of 
analysis. 

Cosmology treats of the visible world; its origin by creation, 
the nature of the material substance of which it is made, of 
what constitutes the essence of inorganic, organic, and living 
forms of material substance. 

Psychology has for its end to explain the human soul, con- 
sidered both as the vital principle in the human compound, 
and as a spiritual substance capable of existing per se, or separ- 
ate from the body, together with its nature, operations, its essen- 
tial immateriality, and indestructibility. 

Natural Theology treats of God as the first and unproduced 



X INTRODUCTION. 

cause of all that exists out of him ; his nature, attributes or 
perfections, so far as they can be known by mere reason. 

Moral Philosophy or Ethics has for its object moral good; 
and man as a moral being, his relation to the natural law of 
right and wrong, the ultimate end of his being, what consti- 
tutes his chief good, summum bonu?n. When limited rigor- 
ously to its sphere, Moral Philosophy prescinds from Revela- 
tion ; or, in other words, it presents its subject matter only in 
a philosophical light. But, because there can be no disagree- 
ment between natural and supernatural truth, God being the 
author of both ;* and, also, since the light of revelation perfects 
even the knowledge which is acquired by the light of natural 
reason, it is not wonderful that much of the matter which is 
usually contained in works on Moral Philosophy should really 
be derived, directly or indirectly, from revelation ; for, indeed, 
all human science has been benefited, in one respect or an- 
other, by supernatural truth. 

* ' ' Principiorum naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus indita est, 
cum ipse Deus sit auctor nostras naturae. Quidquid igitur principiis hujusmodi 
contrariura est, divinae sapientise contrarium est, non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea 
igitur quae ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cog- 
nitioni esse contraria." (Div. Th., contr. gent. lib. I. c. 7.) The knowledge 
of principles known naturally is divinely put into us, since God himself is the 
author of our nature. "Whatever, therefore, is contrary to these principles, is 
contrary to the Divine wisdom, and on that account cannot be from God. Those 
things, therefore, from Divine revelation, which are held by faith, cannot be 
contrary to natural knowledge. 



CONTENTS. 



LOGIC: FIEST PAKT. 

CHAPTER I. 

PAGE. 

Article I : Simple Apprehension 16 

Article 2 : Definition of Terms ; Comprehension and Extension 18 

Article 3 : Ideas or Concepts ; Their Objects 19 

Article 4: Genus, Species, Difference, Attribute, Accident.. -. 22 

Article 5 : Division; Rules of 26 

Article 6: Definition; Rules of. 28 

CHAPTER II. 

Article 1 : Judgment 30 

Article 2: Propositions 31 

Article 3 : Opposition. 33 

CHAPTER III. 

Article 1: Reasoning; Specific Act of 35 

Article 2 : The Syllogism ; Its Canons Explained 36 

Article 3: Hypothetical Syllogisms ; Rule of 43 

Article 4 : Other Forms of Argument ; The Dilemma 45 

CHAPTER IV. 
Article I : Scientific Method ; Analysis and Synthesis in their Rela- 
tion both to Particular Scientific Cognitions, and to Systems of such 

Cognitions 48 

Article 2 : Demonstration; Kinds of 50 

Article 3: Induction; Essentially Syllogistic 52 

Article 4 : Probable Argument 53 

Article 5 : Fallacies or Sophisms 55 



LOGIC: SECOND PAET; OE, LOGIC APPLIED. 

CHAPTER I. 

Article 1 : Truth, Error, Falsehood 61 

Article 2 : States of the Mind in Relation to Truth 65 

Article 3: Certainty; Evidence 67 

Article 4 : Criterion of Certainty 78 

Article 5 : Primitive Truths not Demonstrable 80 

xi 



XII CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER II. 

MEANS OR SOURCES OF CERTAINTY. 

PAGE. 

Article I : Consciousness 82 

Article 2 : The Senses, Internal and External ; Their Objects ; Brute 
Soul Material; Human Soul Immaterial; Imagination an Organic 

Power 85 

Article 3: Apprehension, Judgment, Reasoning; Connatural Object 

of Intellect 103 

Article 4 : Objective Reality of Ideas 112 

Article 5: Universals; Their Objects 1 15 

Article 6 : Memory, Organic and Intellectual ; When it Affords Cer- 
tainty 125 

Article 7 : Testimony Affords Certainty 129 

Article 8: Scientific Knowledge ; In What it Specifically Consists 132 

APPENDIX. 

Disputation, or Practical Exercise in Reasoning ; The Fonn or Man- 
ner of Conducting it ; Its Advantages 141 



ONTOLOGY; OE, GENEKAL METAPHYSICS. 

Introduction 149 

CHAPTER I , 

Article 1 : Notion of Being ; What it Includes 151 

Article 2 : Truth, Metaphysical Truth 164 

Article 3 : Good and Evil 165 

Article 4 : Beauty ; In What it consists 1 73 

CHAPTER II. 

Article I : Substance and Accident Defined 1 78 

Article 2: Quantity, Quality, Habit ; Relation 184 

CHAPTER III. 

Article I : Principle of Causation 199 

Article 2 : Different Kinds of Causes ; Efficient, Final 200 

Article 3 : Material Cause ; Formal Cause Explained 206 

Article 4: Perfection of Beings ; The Finite and Infinite ; The Knowl- 
edge of the Infinite is Logically Derived from that of the Finite.. 212 
Article 5 : The Necessary ; The Contingent ; Order 222 



LOGIC: FIRST PART 



OR 



DIALECTICS. 



ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

THEORETICAL AND APPLIED. 



CHAPTER I. 

As the end of Logic is to direct the mind in reasoning, it 
has for its object : ist. To explain the operations of the mind 
so far as they are directly related to that end; 2d. The rules 
and precepts that govern these operations. 

Some of its principles prevent error in the process of reason- 
ing, that is, in the form of argument ; others guard against 
deception in the subject jnatter, that is, in the truths or facts 
that are compared. 

Hence, Logic may be conveniently divided into two parts: 
into Theoretical Logic or Dialectics, and Applied Logic. 

In the first, the operations of the mind in right reasoning are 
described, and the rules are given which direct it in the form of 
reasoning. In the second part of Logic, those principles are 
considered in their practical application to the objects of rea- 
soning, that is, to the matter or the logical truth of propositions. 

Observe, then, that Logic is not limited in its scope or gen- 
eral aim to the mere form of arguments ; for this is, in fact, 
only a part of its proper object. It teaches also the means of 
attaining truth of cognition, since it lays down principles that 
preserve the mind from error in judging and assenting to the 
motives of certainty. By explaining and prescribing the rules 
of definition, division and ratiocination, it gives light and 
method to all the sciences; and, because its true and proper 
end is to expound and direct the acts of reason, it is itself 
correctly styled by philosophers the science of reason. 



16 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

ARTICLE I. 

SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 

There are three acts or operations of the mind which are to 
be treated in the first part of Logic, namely, simple apprehen- 
sion, judgment, and reasoning. 

Apprehension, from the Latin word, apprehendere, to take 
hold of, as with the hand, in its widest sense, includes all those 
acts of cognition which precede judgment. Hence, even the 
senses may be said to apprehend their objects; the fancy appre- 
hends by means of its images ; the intellect apprehends the 
intelligible essence, after the concrete or singular realities of the 
objects which are presented by the sensible organs are dropped. 
The intellect expresses what it thus apprehe?ids or conceives in 
the verbum mentis, or concept, or by these acts it forms its idea 
of the object. All these acts of simple knowledge are included 
under the general name, simple apprehension. We may regard 
the idea, or concept, as the term of all these apprehensive acts, 
since it is their last immediate result. It is manifest that the 
object conceived or apprehended may be either complex or 
incomplex; v. g., "learned man, man," "stone house, stone;" 
but so long as there is no judgment affirmed by the mind, the 
acts all pertain to apprehensive knowledge, or they are acts of 
simple apprehensio7i. When the mind actually compounds or 
divides two concepts, as predicate and subject, it judges or form- 
ally and explicitly affirms truth, and this judgment or explicit 
affirmation, being enunciated or expressed in language, is a 
proposition. The truth contained in this judgment is iniplicitly 
contained in the acts of simple apprehension, but it is explicitly 
in the judgment alone, for, as is manifest, it is only judgment 
that can properly be said to affirm truth. 

Simple apprehension, in the more special sense in which the 
expression is generally used, is an act of the intellect, by which 
it takes notice of an object and acquires some knowledge of 
it, but without any judgment or explicit affirmation; or, in other 
words, by this act it merely perceives or sees the object, with- 
out proceeding to form a judgment 



LOGIC : FIKST PAET. 17 

The object of the apprehension may be either a singular and 
individual thing, or a relation between two or more things. 

The knowledge or cognition acquired by this act is called, 
indiscriminately, a co7icept or an idea, and it is the result or 
fruit of the simple apprehension. Take care not to confound 
idea, which is mental, with the image or phantasma in the 
imagination, which is organic, and which we have in common 
with the brute. The thing apprehended, as it is in itself, with 
its qualities and attributes, is the material object ; the object, 
with its constituent marks or properties as expressed in the 
mind, is the formal object of the apprehension; this formal 
object is also called the mental term of the apprehension, and 
verbum mentis, or mental word. The oral term is the word 
which is employed in language to express orally the name of 
the me?ital term, concept, or idea. 

The formal concept,* is the actual mental word by which 
the intellect formally , i. e., actually, perceives or sees the thing 
known, or it is the intrinsic or formal term of mental concep- 
tion. The concept is so called on account of its being, as 
it were, the offspring of the intellect. The objective concept 
is the thing, whatever it be, which is known or represented by 
means of the formal concept ;t v. g., when we mentally con- 
ceive " man," the act in the intellect by which we do this is 
the formal concept, but "man," as known and represented 
in that act, is the objective concept. The formal concept is 
always a singular and individual thing, because it is an act in 
the intellect ; but the objective concept may be a universal, a 
confused object, a common or general thing; as animal, sub- 
stance ; or, what is the most universal of all objective concepts, 
being. 

*Vide Suarez's Metaphysics, Disp. 2, Sect. 2. 

t * ' Objectum est determinans ; intellectus, determinable ad concipiendum. ' ' 
The object is that which determines; and the intellect is that which can be 
determined to conceive an object. 



18 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 



ARTICLE II. 

terms; comprehension and extension of terms; defini- 
tion OF other terms. 

Oral terms are the names in language for ideas or concepts, 
and, therefore, represent them, or stand for them. 

A term may be considered in connexion with the constituent 
marks or properties contained in its object; v. g., man, as ex- 
pressing intelligence, mortality, stature, complexion, etc.; in this 
case the comprehension of the term man is attended to. The 
comprehension of a term, therefore, expresses all the marks or 
constituent properties of the object for which that term stands. 

If we consider the number of individuals to which' the term 
may be applied, we then regard the extension of that term ; v. 
g., intelligence, extends to more individuals than the term man, 
for it belongs, also, to angels Hence, the extension of a term 
expresses the greater or less number of individuals to which it 
applies. 

The comprehejision of a term decreases as its extension in- 
creases ; and, vice versa, the comprehension increases as the ex- 
tension decreases; v. g., the term substance expresses but one 
mark or attribute of beings, for its comprehension; but its ex- 
tension is very great. Now, if another property or mark be 
added to it its comprehension is increased, but its extension is 
diminished; v. g., corporeal substance has greater comprehension, 
but less extension, than substance without any mark or property 
added to it. 

Atle?itio?i is an act of the mind by which it is directed to 
some object or objects, to which it adheres, for a time. This 
act is either voluntary or spontaneous. There is some degree 
of spo?itaneous atte?ition in every act of cognition which the 
understanding elicits. Voluntary attention may last for a greater 
or a less time, and may consist of one or more acts. 

Abstraction is a species of Attention by which the mind 
separates (withdraws) one thing from others with which it is 
connected, and contemplates that, to the exclusion of the 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 19 

others ; v. g., to think of the eye without attending to the other 
parts of man.* 

Reflexion is also an exercise of attention, by which the mind 
contemplates its own acts, or considers its concepts or ideas of 
objects. 



ARTICLE III. 

THE OBJECTS OF IDEAS OR CONCEPTS; DEFINITION OF OTHER 

TERMS. 

Ill reference to their objects, ideas are divided into concrete 
and abstract^ universal and particular, etc. Concrete ideas are 
those whose objects are conceived as actually or physically 
existing ; as Peter, those books, etc. The abstract idea has for 
its object a form or quality separated from its subject; as white- 
ness, roundness, wisdom, etc. A univervsal idea is one whose 
object is a mark or property which is common to a whole class 
of objects and can be affirmed of each one; as "man, animal," 
etc. The objects included under it are called its subjects or 
inferiors. A particular idea has for its object only a part of 
the objects to which a universal is applicable, or it is a com- 
mon or universal limited to a part only of its extension; as "a 
soldier, some men, some trees," etc. 

A term is singular when it applies to but one concrete and 
actual individual; as "Caesar, this apple," etc. A term is com- 
mon when it may be applied to many ; as " father, substance, 
just," etc. 

* ' ' Abstrahentium non est menclacium. ' ' Abstraction is not falsehood. 

"Id cognoscitur abstractive quod non cognoscitur praesens; intuitive, quando 
cognoscitur praesens. Seu cognitio abstractiva est cognitio rei in alio tanquam 
in medio prius cognito ut quod seu in quo: e. gr. Videre partem in toto; parie- 
tem in domo, objectum representation in speculo, causam in effectu, etc. Cog- 
nitio intuitiva est cognitio immediata seu a tali medio independens . " That is 
known abstractly which is not known as present ; it is known intuitively when 
known as present ; or, abstract knowledge is the knowledge of one thing in an- 
other as in a medium previously known; v. g. , to see a part in the whole, a wall 
in the house, an object imaged in the mirror, cause in the effect, etc. Intuitive 
knowledge is immediate knowledge, or it is independent of such medium. 



20 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

Transcendental ideas are those whose objects transcend all 
classification of genus and species, being the common attributes 
of all things; as "being, essence, one, true, good." 

The idea, considered as expressing its object, is either ade- 
quate or inadequate j the adequate includes not only all that 
is of the essence, but all accidents and relations of its object; 
it is inadequate when it does not include all, absolutely, that 
is true of its object. 

Terms, considered in respect to their objects, are real and 
logical ; of the first and second i?itentio?i ; absolute and conno- 
tative. 

The object of the real term actually exists outside of the 
mind ; it is a real or actual object, or, at least, really possible; 
as " this horse, a star, a planet." The logical term has for its 
object a concept or idea, which, though founded upon real 
objects, does not itself express anything really existing out of 
the mind; v. g., the terms genus, species, and all universals. 
Terms of the first and second intention have the same ob- 
jects, respectively, as real and logical terms; a term of the 
first intention expresses the object as seen by the first and 
direct act of the mind, in which act the object is affirmed by 
its real predicates. A term of the seco?id intention stands for 
another concept which the mind forms by a secofid and reflex 
act, in which second act logical or universal predicates are 
attributed ; v. g., the terms genus, species, transcendentals, are 
terms of the second intetition, because their objects are not real\ 
but logical only. 

A term is absolute when there is not directly implied in the 
idea of its object any dependence on, or relation to, another 
object; e. g., such substantives as gold, apples, etc.; also, adjec- 
tives used absolutely; as the good, the true, etc. 

The connotative term stands for an object, in the very idea 
of which is directly implied an adjacent object on which it 
depends or to which it is related; as white, heavy, living, rapid, 
and all adjectives and adjunctives, as also such substantives as 
professor, musician, artist, etc. 

Signs are either natural, as sighs, groans, laughter ; or sup- 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 21 

positive, as articulate sounds forming words or terms, which 
are conventional signs for things. Supposition here means 
merely the conventional use of a term or sign for a thing. Aris- 
totle observes (Elench. lib. i., c. i.), that since we cannot have 
all objects physically in our presence when arguing, we employ 
in their stead names as signs for them. In the well known 
saying, "words are the counters of wise men; they are the money 
of fools," it is meant that words suppose or stand for different 
objects with two classes of men. 

Terms are univocal or equivocal ; a term is univocal which, 
being applied to different objects, has the same signification or 
expresses the same quality or essence; thus, animal \s univocal 
when applied to man and brute, because, in each case, its 
meaning is the same. 

A term is equivocal when, being applied to different objects, 
it does not express the same quality or essence in each ; thus 
"light is the opposite of darkness; feathers are light." Equiv- 
ocal terms often subserve the designs of sophistry; they are 
also frequently employed for comparison and metaphor, giving 
to style one of its chief ornaments. 

A term is used in a material sense, or the supposition is 
material, when the word is used merely as a word; as "Cicero 
is a word of three syllables." It has a formal supposition, or 
is used in its formal sense, when it is employed to express the 
object for which it stands, as "Cicero was an orator." 

Analogy is a certain agreement or remote relation that one 
object bears to another. Analogy is either that of attribution, 
or that of proportion. 

In the analogy of attribution a predicate that belongs pri- 
marily and properly to one object is attributed to another, owing 
to some relation between them or aptitude of one for the other; 
thus healthy is primarily and properly a predicate of the animal 
body ; but we say healthy food, healthy complexion, healthy cli- 
mate, from the relation which these things have to health in 
its primary meaning. 

Analogy of proportion is founded on a resemblance of pro- 
portion which is in the substance or in a quality of objects that 



22 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

are of a different species. It imports a certain agreement in 
the effects produced by causes which are otherwise quite dis- 
similar, or it is a certain agreement in the manner in which 
objects are related to or referred to other objects. Owing to 
this agreement, the term that expresses the relation in one set 
of objects is applied to the other related objects; v. g., "bread 
is the staff of life ;" " the Scipios were thunderbolts of war." 
The terms "staff" and "thunderbolts" here have an a?ialogical 
sense; they are not used either in a imivocal or an equivocal 
sense, but in a sense that is between them as extremes. This 
analogy of proportion is the basis of tropes and metaphors ; 
" Cicero was a pillar of the state ; " " voice of the waters ; " 
" music of the spheres," etc. 

Analogy must not be confounded with parity or equality of 
ratios in proporiio?ij v. g., "a mile is the third part of a league," 
" four months are the third part of a year;" in real parity of the 
kind the terms expressing it are used univocally ; " third part " 
is univocal in the examples given. 



ARTICLE IV. 

GENUS, SPECIES, DIFFERENCE, ATTRIBUTE, ACCIDENT. 

Species includes all that is necessary to constitute the essence* 
of many individuals, and the essence includes all that is neces- 
sary for a thing to exist or without which it cannot be conceived 

* ' ' Est essentia in ordine ad esse ; natura, prout principium operationis. ' ' 
What we term essence in respect to existence is called nature, when it is regarded 
as operative. 

1 ' Species immediate subjicitur generi, individuum, mediante specie; genus de 
specie immediate praedicatur, et ea mediante de individuo. ' ' Species is imme- 
diately subject to genus; the individual is subject to genus through the medium 
of species; genus is predicated immediately of species, and mediately through 
species of the individual. 

1 ' Est differentia per quam species excedit suum genus. Plus continetur actu 
in specie quam in genere; plus autem continetur potentia in genere quam in 
specie, quia genus poten tia omnem continet inferiorem difterentiam." Differ- 
ence is that by which the species exceeds its genus ; more is actually contained 
in species than in genus; but more is potentially in genus than in species, for 
genus potentially contains every inferior difference in its extension. 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 23 

by the mind. Now. that cannot be conceived by the mind which 
is absolutely false, absurd, or impossible, and the mind can 
really and properly conceive nothing but truth, or that which 
is, and it can form some concept of any real object that is 
presented to it. Therefore, that which cannot be conceived 
by the mind is, more strictly, nothing. Hence, essence is all 
that, without which a thing cannot exist, cannot be the object 
of a co?icept* or is nothing. The species is the answer to the 
question, " what is it ? " " what is man ? " " Man is a rational 
animal ; " this is an answer which assigns the species of man by 
its essential constituents. 

Genus expresses an attribute or essential property which is 
common to many species; v. g., material, animal, which are 
common to many species of bodies and living things. Genus 
does not express determinately the whole essence of its inferiors ; 
while species does express the whole essence of its individuals. 

Difference is an attribute or essential property which, when 
added to the genus, along with it constitutes a species ; v. g., 
rational, being added to animal, constitutes the species ?nan. 
It is here properly called differefice, because animal in general, 
and man in particular, differ by the essential constituent, 
rational. 

The extension of an idea increases as we ascend from indi- 
viduals to their species, or from species to its genus ; while the 
comprehension decreases; but the comprehension increases as we 
pass from genus to species, or species to individuals; while the 
extefision decreases. A genus has more extension than any of 
its species, but the species have more comprehension; that is, 
more essential properties. 

In respect to genera, the species may be treated as individ- 
uals; and similarly genera for still higher genera. 

Aristotle's ten categories, or ten highest genera, that include 
all real things, are "substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, 
passion (action received), place, time, posture, habiliment (cov- 

*Do not confound concept in the understanding with image in the imagination; 
there are many concepts in the intellect of whose objects no real images can be 
formed by the fancy. 



24 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 



ering or clothing, ornament, armor, etc.)" The categories are 
the classification into genera and species of all things, accord- 
ing to their mode of existence; "sunt modi existendi."* 

The five universals or predicables, genus, difference, species, 
property or attribute, and accident, are capable of being 
affirmed, or predicated, of individual inferiors, in all those 
supreme genera. 

The following table, figured as the Porphyrian Tree, exhibits 
to the eye, genus, species and individuals, as they are respect- 
ively related to each other. 




THE PORPHYRIAN TREE. 

. *'.' Categoriae seu praedicamenta sunt ordo seu series generum, specierum et 
indiyiduorum." "Res praedicamentales seu praedicamenta considerantur a 
Logico, prout secundis intentionibus subjacent; spectantur a Metaphvsico auatenua 



reales. 

species and individuals. The things in those categories are considered brS 

Logician as subject to the second intention: *— **■- ■*■-—*— 



The categories or predicaments are the order or series" of thVgenera, 

e categories are considered by the 
by the Metaphysician they are re- 



garded as real. (Vid. p. 20.) 



LOGIC I FIRST PART. 25 

In like manner, each of the ten genera may be resolved into 
its subjects by adding the respective specific differe?ices ; v. g., 

QUANTITY. 

DISCRETE CONTINUOUS. 

CONTINUOUS. 

SURFACE LINE. 

SURFACE. 

CURVED PLANE. 

ETC. 

Attributes or properties, and accidents, are found in all the 
species which are formed out of the genera ; and hence, since 
the five universals are pre 'die -able 'S of all the categories, they are 
properly denominated universals j and, as there is no other 
predicable that applies to all the categories, they are the only 
universals. 

Supreme, or ultwiate genera, are those which are the highest, 
and, therefore, cannot be made the species of other genera ; 
v. g., substance, which has no superior genus. Being (ens) is a 
transcoidental; it is not a genus, but it is common to every 
genus, species, and difference; it is, therefore, a common 
predicate of all things, and for that reason can have no sub- 
species, for it is not univocally predicated of its inferiors, as is 
required for genus or species. 

As above indicated, the ultiniate genera are usually called the 
categories, or predicaments. 

The proximate, or lowest genus, is that which contains species 
whose subjects or inferiors are individuals/ v. g., animal in 
respect to man, for man is one species, whose subjects or in- 
feriors are individual men. 

Attribute* is a property that necessarily results from the 
essence of the object to which it belongs; as "the power of 
rational speech, laughter;" or, what is still more intrinsic, "intel- 
ligence, liberty," etc. 

* " Proprium est quod prsedicatur de pluribus in quale quid sen in quale 
necessario. ' ' Property is that which is predicated of many in what is essential. 

" Proprium sen attributum est quod convenit speciei omni, soli et semper. '-' 
Property or attribute is what pertains always and exclusively to the inferiors ol 
the whole species. 



26 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

Essential attributes, or such as necessarily and always follow 
the essence of every individual belonging to the species of 
objects, are absolutely inseparable from the objects to whose 
essence they belong. All other properties or qualities, though 
they may be necessary in different degrees for the integrity or 
perfection of the objects in which they inhere or to which they 
pertain, are absolutely separable from them, as will be explained 
in another part of this work. 

Accident* is anything whose presence in the object, or absence 
from it, does not destroy, or even change the essence of the 
object; as learning in man, roundness in marble: the essence 
of man is not intrinsically changed by the possession or the 
want of learning, nor that of marble by any particular shape 
of it. 



ARTICLE V. 

DIVISION. 

Division t and Definition are employed to facilitate clear- 
ness of matter and distinctness of thought, by preventing all 
confusion arising from multiplicity in the objects of thought 
and ambiguity in the use of terms. 

Division is the separation of a whole into its component parts ; 
a whole is that which is one, and yet is capable of this resolu- 
tion into parts. A whole is either actual or logical; in the first, 
the parts are physical or real; as " man's soul and body; " in the 
second, they are metaphysical; v. g., the species and difference 
of objects are only metaphysically distinct. 

Again, parts are essential; as body and soul in man; or 
integral; as hands and feet in man. All universals, in respect 

*' 'Accrdtms est quod praedicatur de pluribus in quale contingeuter . Quod adest 
et abest sine interitu subjecti. ' ' Accident is that which is predicated of many in 
what is contingent ; it is what may be present or absent without destroying its 
subject. 

f'Bene docet qui bene distinguit." He teaches well, who distinguishes 
well. 

' ' Per id res constituitur per quod et distinguitur. ' ' That which constitutes 
a thing, is that by which it is also distinguished. 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 27 

to their extension, may be regarded as logical wholes; as also 
genus in respect to the species, which it includes ; and species 
in respect to its individuals. Hence, division is also either 
physical or metaphysical. 

Logical divisions are, first, of genus into its species; as 
animal into rational and irrational; second, species into its 
individuals; as Peter, John, Greeks, Romans, etc.; third, of 
substance into essential constituents, attributes, accidents; or 
into essential properties, and qualities which are not essential. 

An attribute, as already observed, is a property or power 
that flows immediately from the essence of a thing ; as, intelli- 
gence in man, freedom, risibility; an accident is that which 
may or may not exist in the subject, and whose presence or 
absence does not change the essence of its subject, as this 
color, size, etc. 

RULES OF DIVISION. 

First — The division must be adequate, that is, the sum of the 
members or parts must be equal to the whole. This rule may 
be violated by excess, or by defect; by excess, as, v. g., when the 
ancient philosophers divided souls into " rational, irrational and 
vegetable;" by defect, v. g., if we divide the motives of human 
action into " love of glory and love of money." 

Second — No member of a division must equal the whole ; 
still less must it exceed the whole ; for example, to divide ani- 
mals into " those endowed with reason, and those endowed 
with senses," is a violation of this rule ; and still more faulty 
would be a division of trees into " fruit-bearing, and those that 
are not fruit-bearing, and trees that vegetate." 

Third — One member of the division must not include an- 
other ; as, to divide animals into " rational, irrational and mor- 
tal," which is also a violation of the preceding rule. 

Fourth — Division should be made, first, into the proximate 
or immediate members ; then, if necessary, into others by sub- 
division; as in the "porphyrian tree," viz., substance into cor- 
poreal and incorporeal ; then corporeal into organic and inor- 
ganic ; organic into vegetable and animal, etc. Any other 
method would produce confusion rather than clearness. 



28 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

ARTICLE VI. 

DEFINITION. 

Division gives the extension of an idea ; definition its com- 
prehension. Definition, then, is a true and complete notion of 
a thing expressed in words. But definition is twofold — first, 
nominal, that is, of a word ; second, real, that is, of a thing. 
Definition of a word is either by its synonym, or by its deri- 
vatives or components, or by a periphrasis of its import. Gen- 
eral usage determines the signification of- words ; but when 
they are equivocal a distinct meaning may be attributed to 
them arbitrarily. 

A definition is real, first, when it is essential, that is, when it 
expresses the essence or nature of the thing defined ; this is 
done by enumerating the attributes or essential properties of 
the thing. The essential parts of a thing are either physical or 
metaphysical; v. g., man may be defined by his physical essence 
" a being composed of a rational soul and an organized body; " 
and, again, he may be defined by his essence, metaphysically 
considered, to be a rational animal. A logical definition is 
one in which the proximate or nearest genus and the specific 
difference are given ; v. g,, a brute is a?i irrational animal. 
Here brute is the thing defined ; animal is the proximate or 
immediate genus; and irrational 'is the specific difference. 

A descriptive definition is one in which no genus or species is 
assigned, but only some accidental circumstances with a gene- 
ral term as a quasi genus; this is resorted to when the object 
defined transcends all the genera or categories; v. g., being, 
goodness, unity, etc. 

A genetic definitio?i is one in which an effect is explained by 
its cause; v. g., "a lunar eclipse is an occultation of the moon, 
which is caused by the earth directly intervening between the 
moon and the sun ; " '•' brass is a metal produced by the fusion 
of copper and zinc together." 

RULES OF A GOOD DEFINITION.* 

First — It must not be more nor less extensive than the thing 

* c ' Una unius definitio est. ' ' — Of one thing there is Imt one definition. 



LOGIC I FIRST PART. 29 

defined; v. g., if man be defined, "an intelligent being;" the 
definition is too general, for it includes angel ; if he be defined, 
" a rational being who knows how to read," the definition is 
faulty, for it is applicable to some men only. 

Second — The definition must be clearer than the thing 
defined ; hence, the definition must contain no vague, obscure 
or equivocal words; v. g., "logwood is a species of wood; 
life is vitality," are offences against this rule. 

Third — A definition must not be negative; for in such a 
case the definition would not declare what the thing defined 
is, but only what it is not; v. g., " a bird is a creature that is 
not rational." But if two contraries, between which there is 
no medium, are to be defined, when one is positively defined 
the other may be given as its negative or opposite; v. g., " a 
compound is that which consists of parts ; a simple substance 
is that which does not consist of parts." 

Fourth — A substance must be defined in itself; accidents 
may be defined by the substance in which they adhere ; v. g., 
" man is a rational animal ; motion is change of place by a 
body." 

Fifth — Habits and powers must be defined by their acts, or 
by the objects of those acts; v. g., "Meekness is the virtue by 
which we restrain the motions of anger; the will is the power 
of choosing between things that are judged to be good ; sight, 
the power of distinguishing objects by figure and color." 



CHAPTER II. 



ARTICLE I . 

JUDGMENT. 

Judgment is an act of the mind, by which it affirms the 
agreement or disagreement of two concepts or ideas. When 
they are affirmed to agree, the judgment is affirmative; when they 
are affirmed to disagree, the judgment is ?iegative; v. g., " The 
soul is a spirit ; God is not a creature." 

These two judgments by which *he mind affirms the identity 
or diversity of two ideas by conjoming or separating them are 
termed respectively composition and division in respect to the 
ideas, which are the matter or elements ; and they are also 
affirmation or negation, in respect to the identity or diversity of 
the things compared. 

When the identity or diversity of the ideas is self-evident, or 
one is seen to be necessarily included in the other, it is a judg- 
ment a priori; v. g., " the sum of the parts is equal to the 
whole ; a part is not equal to the whole." Such judgments 
are also often termed necessary, metaphysical, pure or analytical 
judgments. But when the identity or diversity in the objects 
of those ideas is learned solely by experience, then it is a 
judgment a posteriori; v. g., "fire gives pain when it burns." 
These judgments are also termed contingent, physical, empyrical 
or synthetical. 

Judgments, both a priori and a posteriori, are sometimes 
7nediate, sometimes immediate, according as they are formed 
with or without the medium of reasoning. A priori judgments 
suppose a necessary identity or diversity in the objects com- 
pared; a posteriori judgments suppose a mere contingent rela- 
tion or connexion, learned only by expedience. 
3° 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 31 

ARTICLE II. 

PROPOSITIONS. 

A proposition is a judgment expressed in words; v. g., "man 
is mortal; prudence is a virtue." A proposition consists of 
three parts : the subject, copula, and predicate or attribute. The 
subject is that of which something is affirmed ; the predicate is 
that which is affirmed ; and the copula is the term that con- 
nects or couples the subject and predicate. For example, in the 
proposition, "diligence is praiseworthy" the subject'^ "diligence-" 
the copula is the verb "is" and the predicate is "praiseworthy." . 

Logic recognizes but one verb, and but one mood and tense, 
viz. : the verb to be in the indicative mood and in the present 
tense. The reason of this is, the affirmation is always indica- 
tive and present; v. g., "Caesar conquered; James writes," 
are equivalent to the affirmation ; that which is expressed by 
" co?iquered" is predicated of Caesar, etc. All that is not ex- 
pressed by this verb belongs to the predicate, for it is attributed 
to the subject. 

Propositions may be considered in respect to their quality 
and their quantity or extension. The two concepts com- 
pared to each other are the -matter; the perceivi?ig of their 
agreement or disagreement is the form of the proposition ; 
since the copula either affirms or denies agreement, the quality 
and form of a proposition are indeed the same. 

Propositions as to their form or quality are either affirmative or 
negative. In an affirmative proposition the predicate is declared 
to agree with the subject. In the negative proposition the pre- 
dicate is denied or declared not to agree with the subject. 

In an affirmative proposition the predicate is taken accord- 
ing to the whole of its comprehension ; but not according to 
the whole of its extension. In the proposition, "air is a body" 
the predicate " body " is taken according to the whole of its 
comprehefision ; that is, all the attributes or essential properties 
included in body, as such, are predicated of air, or said to be 
verified in air; but, as there are many objects besides air 
which are body, the predicate, body, is not taken in its whole 



32 LOGIC : FIKST PART. 

extension; and it is, therefore, said to be particular in affirma- 
tive propositions. 

In such propositions as this, " man is a rational animal," the 
predicate is commensurate in comprehension with the subject; 
not, however, in virtue of the form, but by accidental coin- 
cidence. Good definitions are thus convertible and true. 

In a negative proposition the predicate is taken according 
to the whole of its extension; v. g., "matter is not intelligent;" 
that is, matter is not one of those objects of which intelligence 
can ever be predicated. 

When any term is thus taken, according to the whole of its 
extension, or universally, it is said to be distributed. Therefore, 
in a negative proposition the predicate is always distributed ; 
that is, is taken as universal, or in all its extent. 

In an affirmative proposition, the predicate is particular, as 
already observed. The subject of a proposition is distributed 
if taken as a universal ; as " every man is mortal ; " " no metal 
has sensation." 

Quantity or extension of propositions : quantity or exten- 
sion regards the extent of the propositions; that is, as being 
universal or particular ; when universal, the subject of the 
proposition is taken according to its entire extension; v. g., 
"all men are mortal." It is particular when the subject is 
taken according to a part only of its extension; v. g., "some 
men are learned." 

Universality, in reference to the matter of the proposition, 
may be, first, metaphysical, as when the proposition expresses 
a judgment a priori; v. g., "a part is less than the whole;" 
second, it may he physical, as when it is according to the laws 
of nature, which, however, are contingent; v. g., "the dead 
do not return to life ; " third, it may be a moral universality, 
that is, when it is taken according to the ordinary action of 
moral causes; v. g., "a mother loves her child." In respect 
to the last two, exception is not absolutely impossible. 

A proposition is either categorical or hypothetical. It is cate* 
gorical when it positively and unconditionally affirms the agree- 
ment or disagreement of the predicate with the subject. 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 33 

A hypothetical proposition affirms conditionally ; v. g., "if you 
are virtuous, you will be rewarded." This species of enunciation 
implies an argument/ and under that respect it may be regarded 
as pertaining to the third operation of the intellect; i. e., to 
reasoning. It consists of two propositions ; the first, or ante- 
cedent, which affirms the condition; the second is the conse- 
que?it, whose truth depends on the verification of the a?itecedent. 
A hypothetical proposition is true, if the connexion between the 
antecedent and consequent be true. It is sometimes disjunc- 
tive in form; "every body is either in motion, or at rest." 
Such a disjunctive is not true when there is a medium; v, g., 
"John must either write or come to see me." It is possible 
that he may do neither. 

A term, or a proposition, is taken reduplicatively, or by 
reduplication, when any particles or clauses are annexed to it 
which have the effect of doubling or repeating it, in order that 
the sense in which it is used may be rigorously defined; v. g., 
"all substance as substance, is good;" "a being, so far forth 
as it is free, is necessarily intelligent;" "water, as such, is 
composed of eight parts of oxygen with one part of hydrogen." 
When a term is used reduplicatively, it is restricted to a precise 
signification; the limiting words and phrases are, as such, as, 
so far forth, precisely take?i, and the like. 



ARTICLE III. 

OPPOSITION. 

For opposition* between two propositions, first, they must 
have the same subject; secondly, they must have the same 
predicate; thirdly, one must, in some sense of the terms, affirm 
what the other denies. Hence, opposition is a mutual repug- 
nance between two propositions, arising from the affirmation 
and negation of the same thing in the same respect. 

* ' • Oppositio est affirmatio et negatio ejusdem de eodem. ' ' Opposition is the 
affirmation and negation of the same thing in regard to the same object. 

3 



34 LOGIC I FIKST PAET. 

This opposition is twofold, first, of contradiction; second, of 
contrariety ; in contradictory propositions, one simply denies 
the other; v. g., "all souls are substance;" the contradictory, 
"not all souls are substance." A negative prefixed to any 
affirmative proposition forms its contradictory, because any 
particular and negative proposition is the contradictory of the 
opposite universal proposition. 

Contrary* propositions are both of them extreme; that is, 
what one of them affirms as universal, the other denies with 
equal universality; v. g., "no miser is happy;" the contrary, 
"all misers are happy." 

Hence, a contradictory merely denies its opposite, while the 
contrary goes further, and affirms its equally general opposite. 

Of two contradictories, one is necessarily true and the other 
false; two contraries cannot, at the same time, be true; but 
both of them may be false; v. g., "all good men are prosper- 
ous in this world; no good man is prosperous in this world;" 
these propositions are both false. 

Subcontrary propositions are both particular \ and they differ 
in quality; that is, one is affirmative and the other negative ; 
as, " some men are honored ; " " some men are not honored." 
Subcontraries may both be true, but they cannot both be false ; 
for, if both were false, they would make two contradictories to 
be both false, which cannot be ; v. g., " some men are 
learned ; " " some men are not learned." It is evident that 
both of these propositions cannot be false. 

* " Contraria jlixta se posita magis luoescunt." When contraries are put 
near to each other they become clearer. 
' ' Contraria versantur circa idem. ' ' Contraries regard the same thing. 



CHAPTER III. 



ARTICLE I. 

REASONING. 

The power in the soul by which it perceives, judges, reasons. 
is termed the understanding, the judgme?it, the reason, accord- 
ing to the act which it performs ; yet, it is one and the same 
power that understands, judges and reasons. All the powers 
of the soul that are concerned in the acts of knowing, when 
taken collectively, constitute the mind; hence, the soul is the 
spiritual substance with its perfections ; the mind is the aggre- 
gate of its powers or faculties, the understanding, conscious- 
ness, will and memory ; but mind, more particularly, stands for 
the power in the soul of knowing. 

Every process of reasoning is reducible to an act of the 
mind by which it determines the agreement or disagreement, 
the identity or diversity of two things, by comparing them to 
a third; v. g., " that which is designed is the work of an intelli- 
gent cause ; the world shows design ; therefore, the world is 
the work of an intelligent cause." The two things here com- 
pared to a third, are the "world" and "the work of an intelli- 
gent cause ; " and the third thing to which they are compared 
is that which is " designed" with which they both agree, and, 
therefore, they agree with each other. 

All reasoning or argument rests on this self-evident princi 
pie : " when two things are each equal to a third thing, they 
are equal to each other ; " " when one of two things is equal, and 
the other unequal to a third thing, they are unequal to each 
other." Take care to observe, however, that when the two 
things are both unequal to a third, it does not follow that they 
are either equal or unequal to each other. 



36 LOGIC I FIRST PART. 

The truth of this agreement or disagreement of two things, 
following from their relation to a third, is termed the conse- 
quence or sequence; and the proposition which expresses that 
agreement or disagreement, as following from the comparison, 
is called the conclusioji or consequent. 

Hence, an act of reasoning, or an argument expressed in 
full, consists of three judgments or propositions ; the first two 
are a comparison ; and the third, or conclusion, affirms the 
consequent which follows from this comparison ; v. g., 

"All virtue is commendable ; 
Diligence is a virtue; 
Therefore, diligence is commendable." 

Here "diligence" and "commendable" are both compared to 
"virtue," and judged to agree with it; the agreement of "dili- 
gence " and " commendable " is perceived to follow from their 
agreement with "virtue"; and the truth of that agreement 
thus following, is the sequence or consequence which is declared 
in the third proposition or conclusion, " diligence is commend- 
able." Sequence, therefore, expresses the dependence of the 
conclusion on the premises; and is truly there when the con- 
clusion or consequent really follows from the premises. 



ARTICLE II. 

THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS LAWS. 

An argument expressed in the preceding form is termed a 
syllogism; hence, a syllogism is defined to be " an argument 
consisting of three propositions so related to each other that, 
the first two being granted, the third necessarily follows from 
them." The first two propositions are sometimes termed the 
antecedent; also, the pre?nises; and the conclusion is sometimes 
termed the consequent; which, however, must not be con- 
founded with consequence or sequence. 

The peculiar and specific act of reason, by which its nature 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 37 

/ 

is defined, is, the knowing of one thing front another; i. e., 

reason is the power of deriving the knowledge of one thing 
from the knowledge of another by means of the relation be- 
tween the two. ( Vide rule fifth for a good definition.) 

The syllogism is the formula for the act of deriving the 
knowledge of one thing from that of another by means of 
their relation to each other. There is no other mode of learn- 
ing truth proper to reason as such ; tor, it belongs only to in- 
telligence to perceive truth directly in itself, and not by means 
of its relation to other truth. To reject the syllogism, there- 
fore, as a mode of acquiring truth, is to reject reason itself. 
Nor, in fact, is it possible to state an argument against the 
syllogism without virtually employing that very form itself; 
for the argument itself would be an exercise of reason, inas- 
much as it would be a formal effort to derive the knowledge 
of one thing from that of another to which it was assumed to 
be related. 

When the propositions of a syllogism are categorical, the 
syllogism is categorical; and when they are hypothetical, it also 
is hypothetical. 

A syllogism consists of three propositions, each containing 
two terms, and each one of these terms is named twice in the 
syllogism : these terms are the subjects and predicates of the 
propositions. 

The subject and predicate of the conclusion are the ex- 
tremes, the former being the minor extreme or ter?n, and the 
latter the major extreme or term. 

The major premise is strictly the one which contains the 
major extreme; and the ??ii?ior premise the one which contains 
the minor extreme. But in practice, the premise which comes 
first is generally termed the ?najor, and the other the minor 
premise. 

The term twice named in the premises to which the extremes 
are compared is called the middle term; in the preceding syllo- 
gism "diligence" is the minor extreme, because it is the sub- 
ject of the conclusion; "commendable" is the major extreme, 
because it is the predicate of the conclusion ; and " virtue " is 



38 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

the middle term, because it is the one to which the two others 
are compared. 

The rectitude of the conclusion, as already observed, de- 
pends on its sequence; that is, on its following from the pre- 
mises ; its truth depends on the nature of the 7natter. 

Observe, that in the following syllogism — 

"Every virtue is hateful; 
Patience is a virtue; 
Therefore, patience is hateful ; " 

There is rectitude of conclusion, but it has not truth, because 
one premise is false in matter. 

The conclusion may express truth, and yet not follow from 
the premises; v. g., 

"All virtue is good; 
Health is not a virtue; 
Therefore, health is good." 

Here there is truth of matter, but not rectitude or sequence of 
conclusion. 

The requisites of a correct, simple or categorical syllogism 
are expressed in the following rules or canons : 

Rule First: The syllogism must contain three, and only 
three, terms. 

Rule Second: No term can have greater extension in the 
conclusion than it had in the premises. 

Rule Third : The conclusion must never contain the middle 
term. 

Rule Fourth : The middle term must be, at least once, dis- 
tributed ; that is, it must be, at least once, taken according to 
the whole of its extension. 

Rule Fifth : A negative conclusion cannot follow from two 
affirmative premises. 

Rule Sixth : No conclusion follows from two negative pre- 
mises. 

Rule Seventh : The conclusion follows the less worthy pre- 
mise. 

Rule Eighth.- No conclusion follows from two particular 
premises. 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 39 

First Rule: The reason of this rule is obvious, if we 
reflect that a syllogism is founded on a comparison of two 
terms with a third ; and, hence, if there were four terms, it 
would not be a syllogism, but several comparisons from which 
there could follow no certain conclusion ; since the terms might 
agree in pairs, or disagree, without any relation to a third term. 
There may be four terms explicitly or implicitly; v. g., 

"Diligence is commendable; 
But anger is not a virtue ; 
Therefore, anger is not commendable." 

This syllogism contains four terms explicitly. But when four 
terms are used, it is generally done by employing the middle 
term in two senses: 

1 Ccesar is a word of two syllables ; 
But Bi-utus killed Coesar; 
Therefore, Brutus killed a word of two syllables." 

In this syllogism Ccesar is used in two senses — as a word and 
for a person-, hence, when the middle term is ambiguous, it is 
equivalent to two terms. 

Second Rule : If a term have greater extent in the con- 
clusion than it had in the premises, there would then be in- 
ferred from the premises what is not contained in them ; but 
the conclusion, from its nature, is that which follows from 
the premises; v. g., 

"Every animal is a substance; 
No tree is an animal ; 
Therefore, a tree is not a substance." 

In this syllogism "substance" is a particular term in the pre- 
mises, while it is universal in the conclusion ; that is, in the 
premises " substance " is compared to the middle term only as 
to a part of its extent; while in the conclusion it is denied of 
" tree," according to its whole extension. 

Hence the conclusion, as such, can have no greater exten- 
sion than its premises. 

The fact that we frequently derive the knowledge of that 
which is greater from the knowledge of that which is less, as, 
for example, when from their relation we infer a cause from an 



40 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

effect, which, as such, is inferior to it, is not adverse to this 
rule when rightly understood. The conclusion must not have 
greater extension than the premises; but it may have more 
comprehension; nay, its terms, in some sense, must have 
greater comprehension ; for the conclusion is the synthesis of 
a subject and predicate which is not made in the premises.* 

Third Rule : If the middle term be used in the conclu- 
sion, nothing would be inferred; since the conclusion in that 
case would be but a repetition, in some shape, of one premise, 
and, therefore, it would not^express a sequence; v. g., 

' 'AH virtue is commendable ; 
Kindness is a virtue ; 
Therefore, virtue is commendable." 

Fourth Rule : If the middle term be not, at least once, 
distributed ; that is, be not at least once a universal, it would 
be equivalent to two terms ; for it might be taken, according 
to one part of its extent, in one premise, and according to an- 
other part in the other; whence the major and minor terms 
would be compared to two things instead of one; v. g., 

" Every man is an animal; 
Every bird is an animal; 
Therefore, every man is a bird." 

In this syllogism "man" is compared to "animal," taken ac- 
cording to one part of its extension, and " bird," according to 
another part; whence, as the two extremes are not compared 
to the same term, no conclusion legitimately follows. 

The subject of every universal proposition is distributed, and 
it is not distributed in any other than a universal proposition; 
the predicate of every negative proposition is distributed, and 
it is not distributed in any but a negative proposition. 

Fifth Rule : A negative conclusion cannot follow from 
two affirmative premises; for, when they affirm the agreement 
of the major and minor terms with the middle, the conclusion 
must affirm the consequent agreement of the major and minor; 
v. g., "a substance whose action, or mode of operation, exceeds 

* "Semper enim est potior causa suo effectu."— Div. Th. 1, 2, p. q. 66, a. 1. 
The cause is always superior, in some respect, to its effect. 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 41 

the powers of matter, is above matter; the actions of the human 
soul transcend the powers of matter; therefore, the human soul 
is a substance which is superior to matter," is a correct syllog- 
ism by this rule. 

Sixth Rule : When the premises deny the agreement of 
both the major and minor, terms with the middle term, then 
nothing is affirmed as to the identity or diversity of the major 
and minor; it is only declared that they do not agree with the 
middle term; hence, when both extremes disagree with the 
middle term, they may either agree or disagree with each 
other; v. g., 

" A reptile is not a bird; 

A snake is not a bird ; 

Therefore, a snake is not a reptile." 

This conclusion, though false in matter, derives neither truth 
nor falsehood from the premises. 

" A bird is not a reptile ; 
A tree is not a reptile ; 
Therefore, a tree is not a bird." 

This conclusion is true in matter, but it does not follow from 
the premises. 

Seventh Rule : The unworthy premise is that which is 
negative, in respect to that which is affirmative; and that which 
is particular, in respect to that which is universal. The reason 
of the rule will become obvious if it be observed that when 
one premise affirms the agreement of its extreme term with 
the middle term, and the agreement of the other term with the 
middle is denied in the remaining premise, it follows that the 
extremes disagree with each other; v. g., 

" If A is equal to B, 
And C is not equal to B ; 
Then C is not equal to A." 
Or 

" Xone but organized, living, corporeal beings are mortal; 
Angels are not corporeal beings ; 
Therefore, angels are not mortal." 

Again, if a term which is particular in the premises, be made 
universal in the conclusion, in such case, an agreement will be 



42 LOGIC : FIKST PART. 

affirmed in the conclusion which is not implied in the premises; 

v. g., 

" All virtue is commendable; 
Some parsimony is a virtue ; 
Therefore, all parsimony is commendable." 

Here the conclusion affirms that all parsimony agrees with 
" commendable," though in the premises it is only said that 
some parsimony agrees with " virtue," the middle term. Hence, 
this is, at the same time, a fault against the second rule. 

Eighth Rule : When both premises are particular, neither 
term is distributed ; and hence the extremes may be actually 
compared to different parts of the same extension ; v. g., 

" Some Cretans were liars; 
Some Romans were liars ; 
Therefore, some Cretans were Romans." 

This is a vicious syllogism ; for the major and minor terms 
agree with " liars " in different parts of its extension ; therefore, 
since they are not compared to the same thing, it does not 
follow from the premises either that they agree or that they 
disagree with each other. This syllogism is wrong by rule the 
fourth also, since the middle term is not distributed. Yet, 
even when the terms are all singular, the conclusion may be 
valid; v. g., 

" Romulus was the founder of Rome; 

The first king of Rome was Romulus 

Therefore, the first king of Rome was the founder of Rome." 

Here the conclusion is really consequent, lor the middle term, 
" Romulus," may be considered as virtually a common term 
taken according to its whole extent and including "founder of 
Rome," and "first king of Rome;" this is termed by the old 
philosophers, an expository syllogism. It is an apparent excep- 
tion to the eighth rule. When the three terms are really singular, 
they may be identical as to their object; and then it is not a 
real argument, but a sort of definition, by synonyms; v. g., 

' ' Man is a rational animal ; 
Man consists of soul and body; 
Therefore, a rational animal consists of soul and body. 

This also is an expository syllogism. 



LOGIC I FIRST PART. 43 



ARTICLE III. 

HYPOTHETICAL OR CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS ; THE DIS- 
JUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM. 

A hypothetical syllogism is one in which a categorical con- 
clusion is deduced from a hypothetical premise. In a hypo- 
thetical proposition, the conclusion or consequent is verified 
Avhen the condition is verified; hence, when the major propo- 
sition is conditional, i. e., has a condition which is expressed 
by " if," or its equivalent, in the minor the truth of the condi- 
tion is affirmed as a categorical proposition, from which the 
truth of the conclusion follows; or the truth of the co?isequent 
is denied; whence the falsity of the condition will result; v. g., 

" If Brutus killed Caesar, then Caesar is dead; 
But Brutus did kill Caesar ; 
Therefore, Caesar is dead." 

In such syllogisms, then, the minor premise may either affirm 
the truth of the condition, or deny the truth of the conclusion; 
in the first case, the consequent will be the conclusion of the 
syllogism; v. g., " Caesar is dead;" in the second, the denial 
of the condition will be the conclusion of the syllogism; v. g., 
" Brutus did not kill Caesar ; " and in both cases, the argument 
will be hi form, that is, consequejit. 

But, as regards the matter, it does not follow that if the con- 
dition be false, the consequent is therefore false ; for it may be 
true for some other reason; v. g., even if Brutus did not kill 
Caesar, still Caesar may be dead from some other cause. 

Again, it does not follow that if the consequent be true the 
condition is therefore true, for the consequent might be verified 
by a different condition ; v. g., though it may be granted that 
Caesar is dead, it does not therefore follow that he was killed. 

In such hypothetical enunciations as the following, "if man is 
a mineral, he does not feel;" the consequent has not real, but 
only suppositive truth, for the antecedent is merely an arbitrary 
supposition. 

Hence, when, in a conditional proposition, the truth of the 



44 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

affirmative consequent is really dependent on that of the affirm- 
ative antecedent; or, also, when the antecedent is so included 
in the consequent, that the denial of the conseque?it necessarily 
implies the denial of the antecedent, we have for the conditional 
argument the following 

Rule : First, In the affirmative conditional, the minor pre- 
mise muse affirm the antecedent, and the conclusion must affirm 
the consequent ; v. g., "if the soul reasons, it is a simple sub- 
stance; but the soul does reason; therefore the soul is a simple 
substance." Second, In the negative conditio?ial, the minor 
premise must deny the consequent, and the conclusion must 
deny the antecedent, observing that two negatives in English 
are equivalent to an affirmative; v. g., "if the soul perishes 
when the body dies, then the soul is not a spiritual substance; 
but the soul is (is not not) a spiritual substance ; therefore, the 
soul does not perish when the body dies." 

As regards the form of the hypothetical or conditional argu- 
ment the preceding rule is absolute, or it admits no exception. 
But it may happen by accident, or in virtue of the matter, that 
the conclusion is true, even w r hen these rules are inverted; as, 
for example, when the antecedent is the sufficient reason of the 
consequent; if the antecedent is denied* the conseque?it may also 
be denied; v. g., " if the sun is at the meridian, it is noon ; but 
the sun is not at the meridian; therefore, it is not noon" This 
conclusion is true, not in virtue of the fonn, but on account 
of the ??iatter; in other words, it is not logically consequent, 
though it is materially true. 

Also, when the condition and conseque?it are in matter iden- 
tical and co-extensive, by accident, and not in virtue of the 
form, the falsity of the condition infers the falsity of the conclu- 
sion; v. g., "if Apollo was not a man, then he was not a 
rational animal; but he was a man; therefore, he was a rational 
animal" : "if man is immortal, he will not die; but he is not 
immortal ; therefore, he will die." As the condition and con- 
ditionate are identical, the falsity of one always infers, neces- 
sarily, the falsity of the other, on account cf that ide7itity. This 
species of argument, for its brevity, is used in practice ; and 



LOGIC I FIRST PART. 45 

when the matter is true, the proof of the condition is the proof, 
also, of the condiiionate; or vice versa. The same thing which 
is misunderstood or denied under one form of expression, may 
be seen and admitted under another; hence, this mode of proof 
is legitimate, and may be useful in some cases. 

A syllogism is disjunctive when it proceeds from a disjunc- 
tive proposition. The disjunction of the antecedent and con- 
sequent is perfect when they divide the whole matter so as to 
admit no medium; v. g., "man is either mortal, or not mortal;" 
in man there can be no medium between mortality and immor- 
tality. The truth or rectitude of the disjunction is determined 
by the matter. In the completely disjunctive syllogism, the 
admission of one member of the disjunction requires the denial 
of the other; v. g., "either man is mortal, or he is immortal; 
but he is mortal ; therefore, he is not immortal ; " " the honor 
of first discovering America belongs either to Americus or to 
Columbus ; it belongs to Columbus ; therefore, it does not 
belong to Americus." When one member of a disjunctive 
premise is merely the contradictory of the other, if the affirm- 
ative one be granted, the negative one has a double negation, 
which is really an affirmative; v. g., " either it rains, or it does 
not rain ; it does rain ; therefore, it does ?iot not rain ; " i. e., it 
does rain. 



ARTICLE IV. 

OTHER FORMS OF ARGUMENT WHICH MAY BE REDUCED TO THE 
SYLLOGISTIC FORM. 

The ejiihymeme is a syllogism, one of whose premises is not 
expressed; v. g., "the poor are men; therefore, they are not 
to be contemned." The sorites is a series of propositions in 
which the predicate of the first is the subject of the second, the 
predicate of the second is the subject of the third, and so on 
till the last or conclusion, in which the predicate of the last 
proposition is conjoined to the subject of the first proposition ; 



46 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

v. g.. " he who does not restrain his passions, has many violent 
desires; he that has many violent desires, is unquiet; he that 
is unquiet, is miserable ; therefore, he that does not restrain his 
passions is miserable." Both these forms of argument consist 
of abridged syllogisms. 

The epycherema is a syllogism in which one or both of the 
premises are proved, each by its reason ; or it has its reason 
annexed to it in the syllogism; v. g., "every spiritual substance 
is incorruptible, since it neither has parts nor depends on matter; 
but the human soul is a spiritual substance, since it is intel- 
ligent; therefore, the human soul is incorruptible." 

The dilemma is a compound argument which consists of two 
members proposed disjunctively, and so related that the legiti- 
mate conclusion from either member, or horn, is a refutation 
of the adversary; v. g., "the skeptic's denial of all certainty is 
either true or false ; if true, then that is certain ; if false, still 
more is there certainty ; therefore, in either supposition, scep- 
ticism is false." 

This argument is called a dilem??ia, because it consists of but 
two members. The trile?nma and quadrilemma are too compli- 
cated to be ordinarily useful in reasoning. 

A dilemma is faulty; ist, If the division of the matter made 
by the disjunctive be not coniplete; in other words, if there be 
a medium of escape from it. The dilemma put into the mouth 
of Socrates when dying, has this fault: " Death is either a sweet 
sleep, or it is a transition to the happy companionship of 
Orpheus and Ulysses; in either case, therefore, it is good to 
die." Between " sleep " and the "society of Ulysses," there is 
a wide medium. But when the early Christians said to the 
Roman tyrant, " either we are innocent, or we are guilty; if 
innocent, why condemn us ? if guilty, why refuse us a lawful 
trial?" between men's innoce7ice and guilt, and also between 
the corresponding provisions of the law, there is no medium. 
2d, The conclusion derived from one, or each member of the 
dilemma, may not be legitimate; in this case, it not only proves 
nothing, but it may be retorted; v. g., it was said to a judge, 
who was about to enter into office, " you will administer the 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 47 

laws either well or ill; if well, you will displease the people; if 
ill, you will displease the gods;" he retorted, "I will administer 
the laws justly or unjustly; if justly, I shall not displease the 
gods; if unjustly, I shall not displease the people." 

Another example of the dilemma which may be retorted: 
Protagoras bargained to educate Euathlus for the law, half of 
the money to be paid when his studies were finished, the rest 
when Euathlus gained his first suit; after some time Prota- 
goras sued Euathlus, and this was the first case for Euathlus. 
Protagoras thus argued : " Either Euathlus will lose or gain 
this case ; if he lose it, then the money is to be paid me by 
the decision of the court; if he gain it, then he must pay me 
by our contract." Euathlus retorted : " If the decision is in 
my favor, then I will pay nothing by the sentence of the court; 
if against me, I will pay nothing according to the contract, 
since I will not have gained my first case" The fallacy really 
arises from Protagoras having, by the contract, no right to bring 
the suit, as he was to wait till Euathlus gained his first case; 
hence, the disjunction did not include the whole matter. 
Euathlus' dilemma was at fault, because he assumed that the 
judge's decision would annul the contract, or exempt him 
from paying, if he gained the suit ; and Protagoras was wrong 
for assuming the canceling of the contract, in case the decision 
of the judge was adverse to his disciple. 

A sophist argued : " You say that you lie; and if you speak 
the truth, then you do lie; if you say falsely that you lie, then 
also you lie; therefore, whether you speak truly or falsely, you 
lie." He does "lie" in each case, but not about the same 
thing, and under the same respect. 



CHAPTER IV. 



ARTICLE I. 

SCIENTIFIC METHOD : ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS, IN THEIR 
RELATION BOTH TO PARTICULAR SCIENTIFIC COGNITIONS, 
AND TO SYSTEMS OF SUCH COGNITIONS. 

There are two methods which the mind follows in acquiring 
or imparting knowledge by reasoning; namely, Analysis and 
Synthesis. In analysis the mind proceeds from the compound 
to its simple components, from the particular object to the 
general truth ; but in synthesis this order is inverted, and the 
mind proceeds from the simple to the compound, from the 
general to the particular. 

The particular, as this man, this rose, is compound, or has 
many component marks or properties, while the universal has 
but o?ie jnark; hence, the process of going from a particular 
object or truth to the general or universal, is analysis. When 
we say that the particular is compound, we regard the compre- 
hensioji of the term. The more general the term is, the greater 
its exte?ision, but the less its comprehension; v. g., the term man 
includes many marks, as, " substance," " animal," " rational " ; 
the term being includes but one mark, but, as to its extension, 
it is applicable to all things. 

When by argument we proceed from a subject to a predicate, 
the method of reasoning is analytical; when the reasoning is 
from the predicate to the subject, the method is synthetical. A 
simple syllogism is synthetical; a sorites may combine in it 
both synthesis and analysis. But analysis and synthesis may 
also regard the general method by which a series of cognitions, 
a particular system of knowledge or a particular science is ac- 
quired or taught ; however, they are always distinguished from 

48 



LOGIC : FIKST PAET. 49 

each other in the same manner. By analysis we resolve what 
is complex into its simple constituents ; by synthesis we form 
one whole out of many constituents. By analysis we find the 
extension of terms, ideas or propositions ; by synthesis we find 
their comprehension* 

In all lengthy trains of reasoning both synthesis and analysis 
may occur, whether the general method be conducted according 
to the one or the other. Induction, as a method of acquiring 
science, is analysis; regarded as a syllogism, it is synthesis/ for, 
as a general method of scientific reasoning, it deduces univer- 
sal principles from particular facts, and this is analysis. When 
its conclusions are finally established, it is by one argument 
concerning the whole class in which a law or property is pre- 
dicated of them ; this is synthesis, and yet it pertains to the in- 
duction. When a property is deduced from a substance; 
when algebraic formulae are resolved by transformation into 
more general formulas ; the process in each case is analysis ; 
for, in these instances, the universal is deduced from the par- 
ticular. When we predicate the effect of the cause, or pass 
from the general truth to the particular object, the process is 
synthesis. Analysis is called, also, the method of invention; 
synthesis the method of discipline, or instruction. 

Observe, however, that in education, considered as to its 
general scope and progress, knowledge advances by analysis; 
for the progress of the mind in education thus generally un- 
derstood, is from the particular to the universal ; from what is 
less universal to what is more universal; but yet the particular 
steps or acts of cognition by which the mind proceeds, are, as 
already remarked, both those of synthesis and those of analysis. 
This will be easily understood if it be kept in mind that to 
deduce a general property from its subject is analysis; to predi- 
cate is synthesis. The mind, by the law of its nature, begins 
with the knowledge of physical and sensible objects, reasons 
to their general properties ; it passes from quantity to its gene- 
ral properties, and finally attains to strictly metaphysical truth; 

* " Multa ex uno analysis, unum ex multis efficit synthesis." Analysis 
makes many out of one; synthesis makes one out of many. 



50 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

i. <?., to the most absolute and universal truth. This progress 
of the intellect, considered as to its general method and final 
result, is analytical. But the particular arguments or acts of 
reasoning in this advance of the intellect towards what is most 
universal, are sometimes synthetical, sometimes analytical, in 
their method; v. g., when the universal axioms of geometry 
are proved to be verified in particular figures, or parts of quan- 
tity, this is synthesis; but when, by comparing the parts or 
divisions of particular figures, general conclusions are deduced 
from them, this is analysis. 

If we conceive genus as composed of species, and species as 
composed of individuals, then to resolve genus into its species 
thus assumed to be its components, and resolve species into 
individuals, is a?ialysis. But this, however, would not be a 
strictly correct mode of conceiving the universals, genus and 
species. Since analysis is the resolution of that which is com- 
pounded into its constituents, it properly regards the comprehen- 
siofi of its object, not the extension. Yet, it may sometimes be 
convenient to conceive extension as consisting of component 
parts of quantity ; in which case it is to be regarded as capa- 
ble of analysis, in a wider sense of the term. 



ARTICLE II. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Demonstration is a legitimate argument in which an evident 
conclusion necessarily follows from evident premises. Its pre- 
mises are either immediately evident in themselves; or they are 
mediately evident as necessary conclusions from other premises, 
which are evident. Such demonstration is simple when it con- 
tains but one argument, or syllogism ; it is complex when it 
contains two or more arguments. The premises are prior to 
the conclusion ; they are the cause of the conclusion ; they are 
better k?iown than the conclusion. 

A demonstration is direct when the conclusion is evident 
from the agreement of the subject and predicate; v. g., "the 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 51 

first cause must be independent of any preceding cause ; now, 
God is the first cause; therefore, God is independent of all 
preceding cause." 

The demonstration is indirect when it is shown that the con- 
tradictory of a proposition necessarily leads to an absurdity; 
v. g., " God is either eternal, or he is not ; " to say that " God 
is not eternal," is to affirm a proposition that leads to absurdity ; 
for that which is not eternal is produced by some cause ; but 
by the hypothesis, " God is not eternal ; " therefore God, the 
first cause, is produced by some cause; which is absurd. 

A demonstration may be either a priori or a posteriori. When 
the truth of the conclusion depends upon, and proceeds from, 
the truth of its evident premises, as its necessary cause, the argu- 
ment is a priori; but when the truth of the premises logically 
depends upon the truth of the conclusion, then the argument 
is a posteriori; in the first case the reasoning is from principles 
to their results, or this is to reason a priori; but in a posteriori 
reasoning, the process is from the results to the principles or 
causes. 

It is to be observed that the a priori method of argument 
regards truths taken in their ontological order; the ontological 
order proceeds according to the real relation which they bear to 
each other as cause and effect, in themselves considered ; and 
in this respect the cause is prior to the effect. The logical or 
psychological order regards the relation to each other in which 
we first know or learn them; which, in many cases, is in the 
reverse order; that is, by passing from the knowledge of the 
effects to the knowledge of their causes : taking truths in this 
order, is to learn or reason a posteriori. 

A thing may be prior to another, either physically or meta- 
physically; a thing is physically prior to another, when it is the 
real cause of the other ; it is metaphysically prior, when it is an 
essence from which attributes* are conceived as emanating ; or 
in which they are conceived as inhering; for essence is meta- 
physically prior to attribute or quality of any kind. 

*"Proprium sen attributum est quod fluit ab essentia ratione forma?." 
Property or attribute is what flows from essence in virtue of the formal princi- 
ple in that essence. 



52 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

ARTICLE III. 

INDUCTION. 

Inductio?i is an argument in which we conclude that, because 
some property or law is true of each individual of a class, or, 
at least, of a large number of them, it is necessarily a property 
or law of the whole class. An inductive argument, in form, 
would run thus : " a property, or law, that is common to each 
individual of a class, belongs to all the class ; but it is a law 
of each heavy body to gravitate towards the centre of the 
earth; therefore, etc." 

The force of the conclusion depends on the uniformity and 
universality of the facts observed ; it affords certainty for many 
physical laws of material objects; because the action of such 
agents is physically necessary, and is, circumstances being the 
same, constant and uniform. But as regards the laws of still 
more strictly contingent beings; that is, things that really de- 
pend on mutable free agency for their existence, or, as to 
whether they will happen or not, the conclusion can seldom 
strictly afford more than probable or conjectural certainty. 

There are few classes of real objects in respect to which one 
mind, or even several minds, can actually make a complete 
induction. But the general observation of mankind, extending 
through a great length of time, affords proof that is, in many 
cases, perfectly conclusive, both as to facts and their obvious 
causes. The induction from facts universally attested, is some- 
times first formally made by one superior mind; as, when 
Newton inferred the law of gravitation, the general induction 
being suggested by the falling of an apple from the tree. It 
is a law or rule that all heavy objects near the earth's surface 
gravitate towards its centre, whatever may be the hypothesis 
employed to explain the cause. 

Some predicates can be affirmed of a class distributively, but 
not collectively; and vice versa, some can be affirmed of it col- 
lectively, but not distributively. When a predicate pertains to 
a part, or a member, or some members, of a class, only as such, 
then such predicate cannot be affirmed of the whole class. For 



LOGIC : FIRST PART. 53 

example, " a part of a class is incomplete ; therefore, the whole 
class is incomplete." Here, incomplete is predicated of a part, 
as such, or by reduplication, as it is termed. A similar remark 
applies to predicates which can be affirmed of the whole class, 
only as such: "a hundred years make a century; therefore, each 
year of the hundred makes a century; " which is absurd. 

Induction affords a prudent rule for the observation and 
study of natural phenomena; but it is neither a new nor a 
distinct method of acquiring or imparting science; since man 
has observed facts and drawn conclusions from his observa- 
tions ever since the days of Adam. Though Lord Bacon 
made no new discovery in Logic or Philosophy when he ex- 
plained induction, and insisted so much on the extensive and 
accurate observation of facts, before laying down their prin- 
ciples ; yet his writings stimulated scientific research and helped 
much to the advancement of physical science. 



ARTICLE IV. 

PROBABLE ARGUMENT. 

Probability in objects of cognition is an appearance of truth, 
coming from a greater force of argument on one side, which 
inclines the mind to assent to that side as true, but yet leaving 
room for doubt or fear that the opposite may be true. Both 
sides of a proposition may, in respect to our knowledge, be 
truly probable. 

An argument is merely probable when one of its premises is 
only probable ; for a still greater reason, it is merely probable 
when both premises are only probable. A proposition is prob- 
able only, when there are good reasons for assenting to it, yet 
there is a possibility, amounting to any degree of probability , that 
its opposite may be true. For probability, as such, is essen- 
tially different from certainty. 

It is manifest that truth, when considered in itself objectively 



54 LOGIC I FIRST PART. 

or a parte rei, is incapable of mere probability, which, by its 
nature, pertains to finite cognition only. 

The conclusion follows the weaker premise, according to the 
seventh rule of the syllogism ; hence, while evident premises 
give a certain and evident conclusion, one probable premise 
renders the conclusion only probable. 

The argument is probable ; ist, when we reason from remote 
and imperfect analogy or indeterminate resemblance; 2d, when 
the reasoning is upon some hypothesis. Analogy is a likeness, 
or a certain agreement of relation or proportion, between ob- 
jects of different species, on account of which the one suggests 
the other, and hence, from one similarity, another one is in- 
ferred. (Vide Chap. 1. Art. 3.) 

Identity includes all that likeness, or sameness of attributes 
or qualities, found in objects of the same species. Similarity 
implies an identical quality, or some identical qualities, in ob- 
jects that are otherwise different; v. g., same color, shape, etc. 

The force of argument founded on analogy, or resemblances, 
depends upon such general principles as the following: " similar 
causes produce similar effects ; things that are seen to be similar 
in nearly every respect, are wholly similar," etc. 

Analogy can found strict demonstration or give a conclusion 
which is scientific; v. g., when we demonstrate the existence 
of God from the creation. The extremes agree with the medium, 
in this case, by analogy only. 

The hypothesis, or supposition, is a " proposition, which, though 
not yet demoiistrated, is assumed to be true, because it affords a 
satisfactory explanation of many facts." For example, to assert 
that " there is a subtile fluid diffused throughout the universe 
whose undulations explain the phenomena of light." To this 
class may be referred many of the theories adopted for the ex- 
planation of natural phenomena. An hypothesis is more or 
less probable, according to the number of facts or phenomena 
which it satisfactorily explains. Its logical value never exceeds 
probability ; or it remains only an opinio?i until truly demon- 
strated. An opinion is a judgment which is assented to, but 
with some hesitancy or fear, as to its objective certainty. An 



LOGIC : FIKST PART. 55 

hypothesis that is demonstrated, is thereby changed into a the- 
sis, and ceases to be an hypothesis. 

Between the extremes of attaching too much importance to 
analogical reasoning and hypothetical theories on the one 
hand and pronouncing them valueless on the other, is the 
wiser middle course of estimating them according to the 
degree of probability which their arguments furnish. 



ARTICLE V. 

SOPHISMS OR FALLACIES. 

A sophism, ox fallacy, is an apparent argument, which, under 
the specious form of truth, leads to a false or absurd conclusion. 
The following are the fallacies which most frequently occur: 
ist, the equivocation, or ambiguous middle; 2d, the fallacy of 
composition and division; 3d, of the accident; 4th, dictum sim- 
pliciter et secundum quid; or, confounding what can be said abso- 
lutely with what can be said under a particular respect only; 5 th, 
the ignoratio elenchi, or ignoring the question; 6th, the petitio 
principii, begging the question, or, the vicious circle ; 7 th, non 
causa ut causa : no cause at all for a cause, or the fictitious cause. 

The equivocation, or ambiguous middle, is a fallacy arising 
from the use of a term of more meanings than one ; attribut- 
ing to it a different signification in each premise, but drawing 
a conclusion that supposes the two meanings to be identical; 
v. g., the Romans equivocated, when, after Antiochus had 
stipulated to surrender half his navy, they compelled him to 
divide each vessel into halves, and then deliver up the half of 
his navy by giving them the half of each ship. 

Ambiguity arises, then, from the fact that a proposition is 
capable of having two meanings; for example, when the 
priestess of Apollo said to Pyrrhus, who consulted her when 
he was about to invade Rome : " I say, Pyrrhus, you the 
Romans will conquer;" her credit was saved in either event; 
whether Pyrrhus or the Romans were victorious. - 



56 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

This fallacy, or the double middle term, is of the most fre- 
quent occurrence, perhaps, of all the errors in reasoning. 

Composition and division: this fallacy is committed if, when 
two predicates, taken separately or one at a time, agree with the 
same subject, it is inferred that they agree with it when they are 
taken conjointly ; v. g., " Peter can walk and Peter can lie 
down; therefore, Peter can at the same time lie down and 
walk." Peter can walk, and lie down by division, is true; 
otherwise, it is not true. Or, vice versa, if they agree when 
taken conjointly, and it be inferred that they agree when taken 
separately ; v. g., " man has a body and soul, or is a rational 
animal ; therefore, matter is man, and spirit is man ; " which is 
incorrect. 

Fallacia accidentis : the fallacy of the accident arises from 
confounding those predicates that essentially belong to the 
subject with those that accidentally belong to it ; or, in other 
words, from not distinguishing between what is essential, and 
what is accidental to the subject; v. g., "that is bad from 
which evil comes ; but evil comes from the study of philoso- 
phy, medicine, the physical sciences, etc. ; therefore, the study 
of those things is bad." " Evil " comes by accident, to this or 
that person, owing to intellectual or moral defects, and erro- 
neous reasoning ; but it does not thence follow that the well 
directed study of those sciences is bad. Again, "the exact 
site of an ancient city is not surely known ; therefore, that city 
never existed." 

The fallacy termed dictu?n si?npliciter et secundum quid (of 
confounding what is simply true with what is true in a certain 
respect only) : a predicate is* affirmed simpliciter, i. e., simply or 
absolutely, when it is affirmed without any limiting word or 
phrase joined to it; as, " Plato is learned." Here the predi- 
cate, "learned," is not restricted to any particular object; 
but when the predicate is affirmed secundum quid, or, in a cer- 
tain respect, there is a limiting adjunct to it; v. g., "Peter is 
learned in Botany;'" here, " learned," is restricted to a par- 
ticular object, "Botany." The fallacy arises from arguing that, 
because the predicate agrees with the subject in one of the 



logic: first part. 57 

senses, it therefore agrees with it in the other.; v. g., "he that 
throws goods into the sea, wills the destruction of them ; 
but the master of a vessel, in a storm, throws goods into the 
sea; therefore, he wills the destruction of them." He wills 
the destruction of them in a certain respect, as a means to an 
end necessary, and not otherwise to be attained, it is true ; 
that he wishes to destroy them simply, or absolutely and 
directly, is not true. The fallacy termed, dictum simpliciter et 
secundum quid, or, of what is said simply and absolutely, or 
relatively and under a certain respect, is like to that termed, 
accidentis. "A man eats what he buys in the market; he buys 
raw meat in the market ; therefore, a man eats raw meat." 

Ignoratio ele?ichi, or ignori?ig the question; in familiar lan- 
guage, often termed "evading the question;'" or, " changing the 
question." 

Iguoratio elenchi, or ignoring the question, is an evasion of 
the real question in dispute, and attempting to prove some- 
thing else that apparently includes the thing in dispute; v. g., 
if a certain means to an end were denied to be just, one should 
prove that the end is good, and thereby seem to justify the 
means ; or, if the immortality of the soul were proved, and one 
should answer as if the etertiity of the soul, or its having no 
beginning, were the question. The ignoratio elenchi, or ignori?ig 
the question, is sometimes from real, not simulated ignorance 
of the state of the question; it may also come from obtuseness 
of the understanding; but it is often the artifice of a crafty and 
sophistical mind, which is wanting in moral rectitude. This 
fallacy occurs frequently in the harangues of demagogues; as 
does also the assertion by means oV interrogatory. 

To the "ignoratio elenchi" may be referred the error which 
consists in " proving too much ; " of which it is justly said, " he 
that proves too much, proves nothing ; " v. g., if one should 
attempt to demonstrate that the human soul is a substance, and 
his arguments went to show that man's soul has the properties 
of matter, he would then commit the error of "proving too 
much." 

Petitio principii, or begging the question, under which may be 



58 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

included the vicious circle* and the false supposition, is the as- 
sumption of what is in question ; v. g., if it be the question in 
dispute as to whether a particular substance have weight, and 
it be answered, " that has weight which is ponderable, the sub- 
stance in question is ponderable; therefore, it has weight;" this 
would be the petitio principii, or begging the question. If it 
should be argued that " the earth turns on its axis because the 
sun is stationary; and, on the other hand, the sun is stationary, 
because the earth turns on its axis; " this would be to reason in a 
vicious circle, or to prove two propositions, the one by the other, 
as a reason. If it be said, " Pompey did not return to Rome after 
the death of Caesar," this would be a false supposition, or & false 
assumption; namely, falsely assuming it to be a fact that Pompey 
was alive at Caesar's death. The argument may falsely sup- 
pose or assume either a fact or a principle ; the fallacy is the 
same in all these cases, and consists in assuming in the argu- 
ment something that is in question. 

This fallacy is sometimes concealed under a proverb ; v. g., 
" the exception confirms the rule;" i. e., the formal exception, or 
one properly so-called, proves the existence of its co-related 
rule. For instance, if an old charter were found, exempting a 
certain family, for special reasons, from military tax, this ex- 
emption or exception in their favor, would prove the existence 
of a general law imposing such tax. But this axiom is some- 
times misapplied ; as v. g., when coimter facts or contrary in- 
stances are adduced to prove the non-existence of a rule, then 
in answer, they are preposterously assumed to be exceptions 
which prove the existence of the rule. This is false assump- 
tion; and, when viewed under another respect, it is also the 
fallacy of the double middle. 

Non causa pro causa, no cause at all as a cause, is a fallacy, 
in which that, which is no cause at all, is assumed to produce an 
effect, simply because the two are contiguous in. time and place; 
or from some other mere coincidence or circumstance. The 
Pagans ascribed " the downfall of the Roman Empire to the 

* " Circulus non est vitiosus in relativis." Illation from one co-relative to 
another is not a vicious circle. 



LOGIC I FIEST PART. 59 

rise of Christianity," when, perhaps, the converse was more 
nearly true. " Comets cause wars, plagues and other calam- 
ities." Or this fallacy may be committed by attributing effects 
to vague and fanciful agents ; as fate, hick, fortune, or other 
superstitious causes. They are all the same fallacy, and from 
such delusions even educated minds are not all exempt. The 
origin of such errors is ignorance, along with an instinctive 
desire to know the cause of strange or terrible events. 

"Post hoc ergo propter hoc;" or, "a thing happened after 
another, therefore, it was caused by it; " is obviously false, and 
is a form of expression which, on that account, is often em- 
ployed in answer to the fallacy, " non causa pro causa" 

Of the seven fallacies above described, the first two are verbal 
fallacies ; the remaining five, are material fallacies ; or, they 
arise from the matter or truth of the propositions being at fault. 

Mere sophistry is unworthy of a candid mind ; but even 
vigorous and truthful intellects may, by mistake, employ incon- 
sequent argument. The most ordinary fallacy that leads to 
unintentional error in reasoning, is the coniplex or ambiguous 
middle term, which is not accurately distinguished, so that 
what is false may be rejected, while that which is true is ad- 
mitted. 

Examples of inconsequent argument : " as the body is com- 
posed of many members, so the soul is composed of many 
powers ; therefore, since the former can be divided into its 
component parts, so can the latter." Here distinguish between 
compound objects which possess members that are really distinct, 
and, therefore, separable; and objects that are simple, having 
powers not really distinct from them as parts ; and which are, 
therefore, indivisible substances. 

" Whatever is opposed to reason must be rejected ; but faith 
in mysteries is opposed to reason; therefore, faith in mysteries 
must be rejected ; " or, "faith in mysteries is against reason." 
Distinguish what is above reason from what is against reason; 
also, faith that presupposes prudent motives of credibility ; and 
faith that rests on insufficient grounds or no grounds at all; and 
is, therefore, unreaso?iable. To believe what is above reason, 



60 LOGIC : FIRST PART. 

when we have valid authority for its truth, is not belief which 
is against reason, though the object is above reason; but to 
believe pretended mysteries, that directly contradict the evi- 
dent principles of reason, would surely be against reason. 

It will be found that complex or double middle terms gen- 
erally contain both truth and error; they must, therefore, be 
carefully distinguished; the one to be admitted, the other to be 
rejected. 

An ancient sophist puzzled some less acute contemporary 
logicians with the following objection against the possibility ot 
motion : "A thing cannot move where it is not; nor can it move 
where it is; but that which can neither move where it is, nor 
where it is not, cannot move at all; therefore, a thing cannot 
move at all." 

The ingenious reader will readily see that the clause, "where 
it is," is equivocal; in one sense it means, " where it is at rest;" 
in another it signifies, " where it is not at rest;" i. e., where it is 
moving. In this second sense of the words, it may be said 
that, "a thing moves where it is." It surely cannot move 
where it is ?ioi, in the direct and proper sense of the expression. 

This sophism, which under a somewhat different form is at- 
tributed to Zeno; as also the one devised by him to prove that 
Achilles could not overtake the turtle which had a given dis- 
tance the start of him ; both rested, in reality, on the false as- 
sumption that a period of time consists of an infinite number 
of moments, and that a given distance consists of an infinite 
number of points ; whereas, in truth, time, distance, and simple 
motion, as such, do not consist of distinct parts, for they are 
continuous, and not, as number is, discrete. 



LOGIC SECOND PART. 
LOGIC APPLIED. 



Since Logic is chiefly concerned with the acts of the intellect 
in discourse of reason, or right argumentation, it is manifest 
that it must include in its object the truth of cognitions, and 
the means of knowing with certainty; without which all mere 
forms of argument are unmeaning, or nugatory. 

Hence, the second part of Logic treats of logical truth and 
certainty; and the means of attaining them. Its object is, 
therefore, the extrinsic norma of right reasoning; that is, its 
matter. 

A genuine or truly valid argument must not only be inform, 
but its judgments must possess logical truth. 



CHAPTER I. 



ARTICLE I. 

TRUTH, ERROR AND FALSEHOOD DESCRIBED. 

Truth* may be divided into metaphysical, logical and moral 
truth. Metaphysical truth is the agreement of the essential 
properties of a being among themselves, and with their essen- 
tial concept or prototype, whether that being be actual or only 
possible; for, whatever exists, or is only possible, has, in the 

*" Veritas estrerum, cognitionis, et sermonis." Truth is of things, of cognition, 
of language. 



62 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

essential and eternal archetype of it, the constituents by which 
it is what it is, and can be nothing else; and it is such inde- 
pendently of our knowledge, though not independently of 
divine intelligence. But metaphysical truth, as such, and truth 
considered as transcendental, pertain to general metaphysics, and 
will be treated in another place. 

Logical truth* is the conformity of the understanding know- 
ing to the thing or object known. The concept or idea may 
be conceived to be the medium between the object and the 
intellect, "est medium quo incognito."! Moral truth, is the 
conformity of the language, or signs of thought, to the inter- 
nal judgment of the person uttering the affirmation of that 
judgment ; or, it is moral truth, when the internal judgment 
is truly expressed. The language or sign expressing the inter- 
nal judgment may be termed, the enunciation. But we must 
distinguish between the logical truth of an enunciation, and its 
?noral truth ; the enwiciaiion is logically true, when the judg- 
ment which it declares is right; that is, when the judgment is 
objectively true; or, expresses a real conformity of the mind to 
the object known. J The enunciation is morally true, when it 
declares correctly the internal judgment, such as it is in the 
mind. When this conformity of the enunciation and the i?iternal 
judgment is wanting, then the enunciation is erroneous. Logi- 
cal truth of enunciations regards the rectitude or the correct- 
ness of the judgment objectively; mo?-al truth pertains to the 
language of the subject uttering the judgment. It is termed 
?noral truth, because its right expression, or enunciation, is 
generally subject to the will, which, being free, attributes to it 
a moral character. 

As concrete truth always implies both an object known, as 

* ' ' Veritas est adaeqtiatio intellectus, et rei. ' ' Truth is the equation of intel- 
lect and object; i. e., it is the conformity of the power as knowing with the 
object as known. 

t ' ' Species intelligibilis (conceptus) est medium quo et incognitum ut quod. » ' 
The idea in the mind is the medium of knowledge, though it is not seen itself as 
an object, in the act of perceiving. 

\ ' ' Ex eo quod res est vel non est, vera est oratio. ' ' According as the object 
is, or is not, the proposition that enunciates it is true. 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 63 

one term, and the intellect knowing, as the other term of the 
relation, truth is sometimes denominated by the objects, and is 
then called truth of the metaphysical, physical and moral order, 
according to the objects. In this sense we may apply the 
definition of truth by St. Augustin : "Veritas est quae ostendit 
id quod est : " Truth makes known that which is.* 

Error is assent to what is false, or dissent from what is true ; 
it is an act of the mind by which we affirm two things to 
agree, which do not, in themselves, agree ; or, we deny the 
agreement of two things, which, in themselves, do really agree. 
As assent, in matters whose evidence does not force the under- 
standing, is a free act of the mind, error may be attributed to 
the will as its formal or actuating cause ; yet the action of the 
will, in error, is not always deliberate. 

Falsity : Falsity is the opposite of truth; and is, therefore, a 
want of conformity in the mind to the object of cognition. 
This want of conformity is either negative ox positive; negative, 
when the concept expresses the object only partially or ob- 
scurely ; v. g , should it contain nothing more about the moon 

* Truth is, by its nature, for the intellect, and is its proper object; as good is 
the object of the will, as color and figure constitute the object of sight, or as 
sound is the object of hearing. Truth, then, is of the intelligible order, or is 
ordained for the intellect, by its nature; truth and intellect are connotative, so 
that the one supposes the other. Truth, in itself, is a relation, and is threefold: 
1st. The relation of agreement between a real being and its concept, or its essen- 
tial prototype, according to which it is constituted; like to that, lor example, 
which is between the idea of a house in the mind of the architect, and the real 
house, which he forms exactly according to that idea in his mind; or the idea in 
the painter's mind, and the picture on canvass, which accurately expresses it. 
2d. The relation of agreement between the mind knowing an object, and the 
object itself; v. g., the exact conformity of the mind knowing an orange to the 
real orange itself. 3d. The relation of agreement between the words or signs by 
which we express or manifest the cognitions in our minds , and those cognitions as 
they really are in the mind; v. g. , " virtue is amiable, ' ' are words that express 
truly a real judgment of your mind, and, therefore, your words agree with the 
mind, and the relation is real between the cognition and its enunciation. 

Truth, then, in its formal entity, is a relation; it is threefold, as said above, 
and it is totally comprehended in this threefold division: 1st. The agreement or 
relation between a thing and the prototype in the concept of its essence or nature, 
is metaphysical truth; 2d. The conformity of the mind knowing, to the object 
known, is a relation of agreement between them, and is called logical truth, or 
intellectual truth; 3d. The conformity or relation of agreement between words 
and signs, used to enunciate or manifest cognitions, and the cognitions as they 
actually are in the mind, is called moral truth. 



64 logic: second paet. 

than, that it is a luminary. This is false by privation, and is, 
perhaps, more properly, ignorance. Positive falsity, is a disa- 
greement of the cognition and its proper object ; for, in that 
case, the mind attributes to the object what does not belong 
to it, or denies what does belong to it ; this is a want of con- 
formity in the understanding, to the proper object of its cogni- 
tion ; v. g., " God is a body; the human soul is material." 

It may be said, therefore, that falsity in the mind, when 
positive, is the effect of error in judgment : for, how else can 
positive falsity be in the mind, or g^t access thereto ? 

Simple apprehension cannot, per se, i. e., of itself, or of 
its own proper action, induce error, or cause falsity in 
the mind. A simple apprehension, or perception, is an 
act of the mind by which it acquires an inchoate cognition ; 
by which it takes hold of the object, as it were; or perceives 
it, and forms for itself an idea or similitude of it. In this, 
nothing is explicitly affirmed or denied by the mind ; and 
its conformity to the object is limited to the mere perception ; 
as it does not. express a judgment. Hence, the apprehension 
is a necessary effect of a necessary law, and, therefore, cannot 
be false. The judgment, or the understanding judging, is never 
per se false ; but assent can be false, by precipitancy, or, by 
impulse of the will ; and, therefore, positive falsity in the mind 
is produced only by error in judgment. 

If it be objected that many ideas of rude and uncultivated 
people are not conformable to their objects ; as, v. g., they may 
conceive " the sun to be a roimd pla?ie a few feet i?i diameter" 
etc. ; and, since all languages declare the sun to rise, and set, 
it would appear that the minds of all men were long iti error 
in regard to a sensible fact. 

We should distinguish : that these ideas may not be con- 
formable to their objects, fiegatively, i. e., by privation, is true; 
but if it be meant that they are not conformable to their ob- 
jects, positively ; then we should subdistinguish ; they may not 
be really conformable after a judgment is formed ; but it is not 
true to say that before the judgment there is a positive falsity, 
or want of conformity in the mind to the object. Language 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 65 

expresses the sensible fact of the sun's rising and setting, though 
the philosophical hypothesis formerly employed to explain its 
cause is now known to be untenable; or, in other words, the 
minds of men did not err in affirming they^/, but philosophers 
erred in giving its explanation. 

Mere apprehensions or ideas are true, so far as they express 
their objects positively; since they are produced by the mind 
and object, operating both naturally and necessarily. Even 
the intellect cannot be forced to assent to what is false, as 
false; but it can, under the command of the will, assent to 
what is false, in those cases in which the evidence of the truth 
does not necessitate its decision. Truth, properly so-called, is 
only in the understanding which judges ; and it is only by a cer- 
tain imitation or analogy, and, therefore, improperly and incom- 
pletely, in sensation and simple apprehe?ision, which are means 
of knowing truth. Truth is fully and properly only in that 
act by which the mind is fully conformable to its known 
object ; but the mind is fully and properly conformable to its 
object only when it affirms what the object is; i. e., when 
it judges. Any preceding act of knowing is pfeliminary and 
preparatory to full knowledge, or truth, properly so-called. 



ARTICLE II. 

DIFFERENT STATES OF THE MIND IN RESPECT TO TRUTH. 

As the mind attains truth by acquiring ideas conformable to 
their objects, and by comparing these ideas or concepts to their 
objects, or among themselves; it is manifest that the mind 
may by these efforts approach more or less nearly to complete 
knowledge of things. Hence, the different states of the mind 
in respect to truth. 

The following classification of those states is sufficiently 
comprehensive: ist, Ignorance; 2d, Doubt; 3d, Suspicion; 
4th, Opinion; 5th, Certainty. They comprehend the differ- 
5 



66 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

ent relations the mind may have to the objects of its knowl- 
edge, either as ignorant of those objects, or as knowing them 
in different degrees of perfection, i. e.,more or less completely. 

Ignorance is the state of the mind when it has no knowledge 
of an object ; v. g., we are ignorant as to whether the number 
of the stars be odd or even; or what was the precise number 
of angels created ; or how long the present world will endure. 

Doubt is the state of the mind when the judgment is sus- 
pended between the two parts of a contradictory ; or when 
the assent of the understanding cannot be determined to either 
of two contradictory propositions or judgments. 

Doubt is either positive or negative; doubt is positive when 
there are reasons that persuade in favor of each proposition ; 
which, however, do not determine the intellect to assent to 
either, but leave it, now drawn to one side, now to the other, 
still hesitating in uncertainty between them. 

The doubt is negative when there are either no reasons at all 
in tavor of either side, or such as are of very little moment. 

Suspicion is a propensity or inclination to judge on slight 
grounds; in it, the judgment is often prompted or impelled by 
passion or affection in the will ; and it is apt to tend rather to 
the unfavorable side. 

Opinion * is an assent of the understanding to one of two 
contradictory or opposite propositions ; not, however, without 
fear of the other being true. 

For an opinion to be prudent, the following conditions must 
be fulfilled: ist, a careful examination of the reasons in favor 
of each contradictory, must precede the assent of the under- 
standing ; 2d, the side embraced must have in its favor a grave 
motive; and the objections against it, as well as the reasons in 
favor of the opposite proposition, must be suitably answered; 
3d, the assent in favor of the opinion formed must not be more 
firm than the motive or decisive reason in its favor justifies. 

* ' ' Opinio est actus intellectus quo fertur in unam partem contradictionis'cum 
formidine alterius . Assensus probabilis est idem ac opiniativus . ' '— (Vide Div. 
Thorn. P. I. ; Qu. 79; Art. 9; Ad. 4.) Opinion is an act of the intellect by which 
it is borne to one side of a contradictory, but with fear lest the opposite be true. 
Assent to what is probable is the same as opinion. 



LOGIC I SECOND PART. 67 

An opinion may be probable, more probable, most probable ; but 
an opinion, as such, cannot transcend the limits of probability; 
for. if what was an opinion be made afterwards positively certai?i, 
it thereby ceases to be an opinion, and becomes a thesis or a 
certain truth. Probability and certaifity differ essentially, since 
they are of different species ; and therefore no degree* of prob- 
ability can constitute certainty. 



ARTICLE III. 

certainty; evidence; species of certainty; they differ 
as to intensity. 

Certainty is a state of the mind in which it adheres firmly 
to the truth on account of motives which exclude all doubt, 
and all fear of the opposite being true. 

Certainty, primarily and properly, is in cognitition, and is 
therefore subjective ;t but it is attributed by translation to the 
object. For the sake of greater clearness, therefore, certainty 
may be considered both as objective and subjective. 

Objective certainty is the necessary truth of the object known 
as cognoscible; its u necessitas seu jirmitas essendi." The neces- 
sity here meant is, in the case of facts, co?isequent; and it is, 
therefore, common to all accomplished and actual truth, or to 
every actual object. Subjective certainty is a firm adhesion of 
the mind to the object as true, which excludes all doubt and 
all fear of the opposite being true. 

* "Gradus non mutat essentiam rei." The degree, i. e.,more or less, does 
not change the essence of a thing. 

t ' ' Certitudo subjectiva est firmitas adhsesionis virtutis cognoscitivse ad suum 
cognoscibile." Subjective certainty is firmness of adhesion in the power 
knowing to the object known. 

" Objectiva est firma et invariabilis objecti determinatio in suo esse. "— (Bil- 
luart.) Objective certainty is the firm and invariable determination of the ob- 
ject in being; or, its existence as actual, and, under that respect, both necessary 
and unchangeable. 

' ' Nihil est adeo contingens, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat. ' ' — (Div. 
Thom. P. I. ; Qu. 86; Art. 4.) Nothing is so absolutely contingent as to be, un- 
der no respect, necessary. 



68 LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 

The causes of certainty, or the motives that lead to it, may 
be reduced to two classes; namely, evidence, and authority or 
testimony. 

Certainty which is produced by evidence* may be distin- 
guished, according to its objects, into three kinds, which differ 
in the degree of intensity or force with which they necessitate 
the assent of the intellect: ist., Certainty, whose object is truth 
which is known per se; i. e., which is self-evide?it, or is seen to 
be truth, and assented to, so soon as the terms which express 
it are understood; v. g., "two things which are equal to the 
same thing, are equal to each other; the shortest distance be- 
tween two given points is a straight line," etc. 2d., A second 
kind of the certainty which comes from evidence, is furnished 
by conclusions which follow necessarily from evident first prm- 
ciplesj this kind is often termed scientific certainty. It will be 
explained more fully in Article VIII of this Chapter. 3d., A 
third species of certainty is furnished by the objects of internal 
and external or sensible experience; or, that which is possessed 
when the power of consciousness and the organs of sense are 
directly cognizant of their proper objects. 

Certainty, whose medium or formal motive is authority or 
testimony, is either from evident signs or marks, or from wit- 
nesses that evidently testify to what they know directly and in 
its objective evidence — ex evide7itia in attestante — as eye-wit- 
nesses, ear-witnesses, and the like ; or, it is the certainty which 
is afforded by supernatural faith, in which neither the testimony, 
nor the object, is evident to the mind assenting ; f v. g., when we 
believe that "that there are three Persons and but one Nature 
in God, because God revealed it." Here, neither the fact of 

*' ' Omnis certitudo naturalis postulat evidentiam vel in re vel in attestante. » ' 
All natural certainty requires evidence, either in the object or in the witness; 
i.e., evidence of the testimony that mediates between the mind and the object or 
truth. But, for the act of supernatural faith, this evident medium, witness or 
testimony (evidentia in attestante) is not required, except as a preceding condi- 
tion. 

t" Fides omnis est essentialiter obscura quia nititur medio rei extrinseco, 
ideoque res manet secundum se ignota, sicut antea. " — (Billuart.) All faith is 
essentially obscure, because it depends on a medium which is extrinsic to the 
object, and, therefore, the thing remains unknown in itself, even after it is be- 
lieved. 



LOGIC : SECOND PAKT. 69 

the revelation having been made, nor the Trinity itself, is evident 
to us ;* though the revelation itself was, doubtless, evident to 
many; v. g., to Prophets, Evangelists, etc. In this case, the 
principles that supply for evidence, are the light of faith in the 
understanding and an impulse of grace in the will ; hence, actual 
faith is free, and it is thereby capable of meriting. But, for 
supernatural faith, it is an essential condition, or prerequisite, 
that its articles be evidently credible.] " Non crederet (quis) 
nisi videret ea esse credenda, vel propter evidentiam signorum 
vel aliquid hujusmodi : " i. e., no one can believe without evi- 
dence as to the credibility of the truths assented to. (Div. 
Th. 2, 2, qu. i, a. 4, ad. 2.) But matters pertaining to super- 
natural Faith, and the resolution of its act,f pertain to the 
scope of Theology; it is here proposed directly to treat only of 
natural or philosophical certainty, and its principles or causes. 
But from what has been said it may be concluded as beyond 
doubt, that the individual reason can prudently assent to no 
truth except it either know that truth in its own objective evi- 
dence, or have for its assent to the truth a certain and infallible 
motive, while certainty, as already observed, is primarily in cog- 
nition, or is subjective. Evidence, on the contrary, is primarily 
in the object; or, it is most properly the object that is evident; 
but the light of the object as seen§ or perceived by the cog- 
noscive power, is termed subjective evidence. 

Evidence is either immediate, or mediate; truths are imme- 

♦"Motiva credit) ilitatis praestant evidentiam consequential, sed non consequen- 
tis : probant quod revelatio debet credi sed non dant evidentiam rei revelatae 
seu veritatis creditae . ' ' Motives of credibility afford evidence of the consequence, 
but not of the consequent: they prove that revelation ought to be believed, but 
they do not give evidence of the thing revealed, or the truth believed. 

fSuarez, De Virt. Theolog., Disp. 4, Sect. 6, says that the intellect does not 
doubt in matters of faith without rejecting their credibility as not evident. 

tThe " resolution of the act of faith," is its analysis, which is made in order 
to distinguish clearly all that is necessary to the act, whether as conditio sine 
qua non, as directive of it, as formal motive, as material object, etc. 

§ ' • nia dicuntur videri quae per seipsa movent intellectum vel sensum ad sui 
cognitionem, ut sunt prima principia et conclusiones ex ipsis evidenter deduc- 
ts, vel sensibilia sensibus debite proposita. ' ' — (Billuart, De Fide; Disp. I; Art. 
4.) Those things are said to be seen which of themselves move the intellect or 
the sense to know them; such are first principles and the conclusions evidently 
deduced from them, or sensible objects duly proposed to the senses. 



70 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

diately evident when they are known per se, i. e., are self-evi- 
dent. The objects of the senses and those of consciousness 
may also be regarded, when actually observed, as immediately 
evident to these cognoscive powers. Truths are mediately 
evident, when the mind comes to the certain knowledge of 
them only through the medium of reasoning; or, when it 
knows them only as evide?it deductions from their principles. 

Evidence may also be considered as either intriftsic, or extrin- 
sic. It is intrinsic, in self-evident truths, in the demonstrated 
conclusions from evident premises, and in the proper objects of 
the senses and consiousness. Evidence is extrinsic when it is 
not derived immediately from the object or truth, but passes 
through the medium of testimony, and is thereby indirect and 
and reflected light of the objective truth. Objects thus known 
are not said to be evident, but believed, or they are objects of 
faith. A preceding and evident judgment of their credibility 
gives just grounds from which is inferred, or may be in- 
ferred, the necessary truth of the objects in themselves. 
Hence, distinguish between what is evidently true, and what 
is only evidently credible; in the first, the object is evident; in 
the second, the object is obscure. 

A high degree of probability is sometimes termed moral cer- 
tainty. But probability and certaifity differ in species or essence ; 
and, therefore, in strictness, no degree of probability can equal 
real certainty; or, no number of probabilities can constitute 
certainty. 

The main theory of evidence and the certainty which is 
founded upon it may be briefly summed up as follows : 

Evidence, in its general sense, includes not only the capa- 
bility in the object of being see?i, or clearly known, i. e., its 
cognoscibility ; but, also, the capability* in an agent of 
seeing it, together with the exhibition of the object to the 
mind, or the act of seeing it to be what it is, and that it cannot 

* ' ' Evidentia objecti est capacitas in objecto apparendi nostro intellectui si 
eidem objiciatur; apparentia objecti in intellectu est evidentia subjectiva." 
Objective evidence is the capability in the object of being seen by the intellect if 
presented to it; the manifestation of the object in the intellect is subjective evi- 
dence. 



LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 71 

be otherwise than it is seen. It is manifest, then, that evidence 
may be considered as both objective and subjective. 

The cognoscibility of the object, or objective evidence, pre- 
supposes objective certainty, and is caused by it. Hence, it 
may be said that objective certainty is the origin of objective 
evidence; objective evidence is the proximate cause of subjec- 
tive evidence, and the subjective evidence produces subjective 
certainty. Therefore, in the order of cause and effect, objec- 
tive certainty is first, subjective certainty is last, and evidence is 
the medium between them. 

Certaifity, when considered according to its objects, and the 
medium by which they produce certainty in the mind, is meta- 
physical, physical or moral. The three kinds of certainty thus 
denominated differ in their species or essence \ because their 
objects differ specifically. These kinds of certainty differ in 
species ; for, acts are specified by their objects, and the objects 
give determinate species not only to the acts, but to those 
things that are consequent upon acts, as the states produced 
by those acts. The acts of knowing metaphysical truth, physi- 
cal truth, and moral truth, have objective principles, which, it is 
clear, differ essentially; for the metaphysical is purely of intel- 
lect, the physical implies the sensible, and the object of moral 
certainty is inevident, or essentially obscure. Hence, meta- 
physical, physical and moral certainty all differ specifically, be- 
cause their objects differ in species. 

In order to perceive the conclusiveness of the preceding 
reasoning, it is necessary to understand the force, and to see 
the truth of the philosophical axiom, " acts* are specified by their 
objects." It means about the same thing as saying, " effects 
derive their species or essence from their causes; or, effects 
depend for their species or essence on their causes ; or, effects 
really proceed from their causes ; " which is evidently true. 
Now, regarding the act as an effect, the object of the act is one 
of its causes, as well as the agent that puts that act. Hence, 

* ' ' Actus speciflcantur ab objectis. ' ' Acts are specified by their objects; or, 
acts derive their species from their objects. 



72 LOGIC : SECOND PAKT. 

when it is said, " action* is specified by the agent ; passion is 
specified by the term ; " or, " operations, and habits, and pow- 
ers, are specified by their objects ; " or, " all operation is speci- 
fied by the form {by the specific nature), which is the principle 
of the operation ; " all these expressions really convey the 
same truth, though they present it under different respects. 
An agent specifies its acts, because it gives to the acts which it 
puts, their determinate nature ; powers, habits, etc., are speci- 
fied by their objects ; for, since their objects determine them 
to act, the objects are also pri?iciples or causes of action, and, 
on that acccount, attribute to the acts something which is 
essential to them as effects produced by the objects. Colors 
cannot be heard; sounds cannot be seen; but color and figure 
determine or specify vision, or the act of seeing; sounds deter- 
mine the specific acts of hearing. Hence, because objects are 
principles that determine acts in the agents to which those ob- 
jects are connatural, they also specify those acts. 

Intensity, or force of the assent : The assent of the mind 
differs in its intensity, according to the different species of cer- 
tainty ; or, according to the objects which, through their 
proper mediums, produce certainty in the mind. 

Observe that assent is an act of the intellect, as conse?it is an 
act of the will. The intellect assents to truth ; i. e., agrees to, 
admits, takes the truth : ist, through the immediate evidence of 
the truth, as in matters which are self-evident, or known 
per se; 2d, through mediate evidence, or on account of some- 
thing else, as, when it assents to a demonstrated conclusion on 
account of the certain premises from which it necessarily fol- 
lows; 3d, on account of evident testimony to the inevident 
truth, and also in voluntary obedience to the motives of super- 
natural faith; 4th, when the motives furnish only probability; 
in which case the assent is voluntary, and the judgment 
assented to is only an opinion. 

That the assent of the intellect, as thus described, should 

* ' • Actio specificatur ab agente; passio a termino. " 
" Operationes, et habitus et potentise specificantur ex objectis." (Div. Th. 
Mem. Lect. 1, Sect. 2.) 

1 ' Omnis operatio specificatur per formam, quae est principium operationis . ' ' 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. T6 

have different degrees of intensity or strength, according to its 
motives, and the principles that produce it, is both natural, and 
just to truth itself: ist, because the objects which produce 
different kinds and degrees of assent differ in their nature ; 2d, 
because truth in the mind is in conformity with the objects. 

As to intensity in assent, there are three principal degrees of 
the subjective certainty that is merely human or natural ; cor- 
responding to the three species of objective certainty, or three 
species of objects: ist, metaphysical certainty, whose object is 
necessary and immutable, i. e., metaphysical truth ; 2d, physical 
certainty, whose object is physical truth, i. e., the existence and 
the positive laws of created or contingent beings; 3d, moral 
certainty, whose object is truth known by the testimony of wit- 
nesses, or the moral laws that universally govern man. 

Metaphysical certainty has for its object, either truth that is 
a priori, and absolutely necessary; or truth that is derived 
from it by demonstrative reasoning ; the certainty in us caused 
by the latter is less intense than that which is caused by the 
former. 

We have physical certainty, when the object known is a fact, 
or is something actually and physically existing, and is evident 
to our cognoscive powers; v. g., we have physical certainty 
that the sun now shines, or does not; or other facts of sense, 
and consciousness. 

Certainty is styled moral when its medium is that testimony 
which depends for its significance and truth on the knowledge 
and veracity of an intelligent and free witness. This testimony 
may be manifested either by words, modes of action, or any 
other .signs of conscious thought or affection. Hence, any 
manifestation of truth by means of signs, which are intelligent 
and/ra? in their cause, pertains to that testimony which is the 
medium of moral certaitity. 

We have moral certainty when a sufficient number of reliable 
witnesses all concur in testifying to a sensible fact; v. g., 
"London exists." We have moral certainty, in a less strict 
sense of the words, moral certainty, that " all mothers love their 
children ; " in this latter case, exception is absolutely possible. 



74 logic: second part. 

When we possess metaphysical, or physical certainty, we are 
said to know the truth that causes it, or is its object; but when 
our knowledge comes through the testimony of others, we are 
said to believe the truth of which we thus become certain. 

In moral certainty we must distinguish between the object 
or truth testified to, and the testimony itself: the object is 
essentially inevident or obscure ; but the testimony, at least as 
a natural medium of certainty,* must be evident. 

The manner in which natural faith and supernatural or divine 
faith are respectively related to their mediums or motives of 
assent, will be rendered more clear by means of an example : 
" Hannibal defeated the Romans in the battle of Cannae," is a 
historical fact which is believed on its testimony. Those to 
whom the fact of the defeat was evident in itself, were the first 
witnesses, and they knew the fact in its own objective evidence. 
Through them as eye-witnesses it became generally credited or 
believed as made certain by their testimony ; through writings 
and other means of tradition it has come down to the present 
time. All the testimony, from that of the eye-witnesses, as 
descending to the present time, constitutes, when it is all taken 
together, the medium which in some manner unites our minds 
with the fact, and this medium is evident in itself to us ; for, we 
actually know it in existing history and tradition. Our assent 
to the fact, " Hannibal defeated the Romans in the battle of 
Cannae," is on account of this evident medium as extending 
from the present time to the period when it occurred. 

The proposition, " God is Triune," is believed as an article 
of divine faith. There is likewise in this case an evident tradi- 
tion or medium of testimony, clearly traceable back to the 
days of the Messias himself, that this Messias explicitly affirmed 
and taught " God to be Triune." This medium, as in the other 
case, connects us in some manner with the Messias revealing 
that article of faith ; but our assent, as an act of divine faith, is 
not on account of that medium or tradition which is evident 
to us and certain, for such a medium constitutes only a natural 

* i 'Evidentia in attestante: quando evidenter constat de dicente." It is evi- 
dence in the witness, When the witness is evidently known as such , ... 



logic: second part. 75 

principle of assent ; our assent, as an act of supernatural faith, 
is only and exclusively because God revealed it. The existence 
of the evident medium is an essential prerequisite for this act of 
faith, and is a demonstrative proof that it is prudent to elicit 
it; but it is not itself any part of the formal motive for the act, 
that formal motive being, God said it, or God revealed it ; in 
such manner, however, that both the motive and the assent are 
alike supernatural, and totally distinct from the natural medium. 

The further explanation and proof of this, we remit to the 
theologian. 

What is here said suffices, it is believed, for a correct under- 
standing of philosophical certainty as related to that of super- 
natural faith, and as distinguished from it in its principles ; and 
this much was also judged necessary for the adequate treat- 
ment of the matter proper to the present article. 

As a mode of knowing truth, the intellectual vision, or the 
distinct, evident perception of truth in its own objective evi- 
dence, is more perfect than knowing it by the medium of 
faith; but yet, divine faith* is more noble in respect to its 
object, which is the truth of God himself, than any natural 
knowledge, whose medium is evidence or the testimony of 
creatures. 

The intensest natural certainty is that which is caused by 
metaphysical truth, because the object is necessary and immu- 
table. Physical certainty is next in the degree of its intensity 
or force ; though its object is contingent truth, yet, it is made 
evident to us, and the certainty in the mind corresponds to 
the principles that produce it. A contingent being is one that 
can exist, or cease to exist, according to the free choice of its 
cause; or, it is one that depends on a free agent for its exist- 
ence. Moral certainty is the least intense : ist, because its 

*" Fides est nobilior quara scientia ex parte objecti; quia ejus objectum est 
Veritas prima; sed scientia habet perfectiorem raodura cognoscendi, qui non 
repugnat perfections beatitudinis, scilicet visioni, siciit ei repugnat modus 
fidei." (Div. Thorn. I, 2 P. ; Qu. 67; Art. 3; ad. 1.) Faith is more noble than 
knowledge as regards its object, because its object is the First Truth; but knowl- 
edge is a more perfect mode of cognition, because it is not repugnant to beati- 
tude, namely, to vision; to which, however, the mode of knowing by faith is 
repugnant. 



76 logic: second part. 

object is obscure or is known indirectly and mediately only ; 
2d, because the morals and actions of men are more mutable, 
and more purely contingent, than are the laws of physical 
nature, or the acts of natural agents, and the truth in the mind 
is in conformity to the objects. 

Both metaphysical and physical evidence always necessitate 
assent. Testimony, also, when fortified with certain condi- 
tions, v. g., as when it refers to a sensible fact, when many 
witnesses agree, and collusion is impossible, in such adjuncts 
necessitates assent; yet, in many cases, it is possible to dissent, 
even when this refusal of assent to the testimony is most im- 
prudent ; in other words, the assent of the understanding to 
the truth is, in such instances, under the control of the will. 
This happens more especially when the object is wholly ob- 
scure; or, when both the object and the testimony are inevi- 
dent. 

Though certainty is perfect in its species when its motive is 
the evidence that the object is what it is, and that it can be 
nothing else ; yet, within its species, the evidence can be of a 
higher or lower degree in different minds, or in the same mind 
under different circumstances. Hence, the certainty with regard 
to the same truths may be more or less inte?ise, according to 
those conditions. 

Supernatural Faith* is, in itself, simply and absolutely more 
certain than any natural cognition; but it is not thus as 
regards us. 

The certainty here meant is the firmness with which the cog- 
noscive power adheres to its cognoscible object. This firm 
adhesion of the mind may arise from the action of the 

*" Nihil prohibet id, quod est certius secundum naturam, esse quoad nos 
minus certum propter deb ilitatem intellectus nostri : qui se habet ad manifes- 
tissima naturae sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis. Unde dubitatio qua? accidit 
in aliquibus circa articulos fidei, non est propter incertitudinem rei, sed prop- 
ter debilitatem intellectus humani." (Div. Thorn. , 1 P., Qu. 1; Art. 5, ad 1: et 
I, 2; Qu. 4; Art. 8.) Nothing prevents that which is more certain according to 
its nature from being less so in regard to us, owing to the weakness of our intel- 
lects, which, in regard to things the most manifest in themselves, are like the eye 
of the owl in the light of the sun. Hence, the doubts which come to some per- 
sons about articles of faith are not owing to uncertainty in the object, but to the 
weakness of the human intellect. 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 77 

will determining the intellect to adhere, independently ot any- 
legitimate motive of assent, to its object; this actually happens 
in obstinate error. But tenacious adhesion of the mind from 
such a motive cannot be properly termed certainty ; more cor- 
rectly, it is pertinacity. Again, this firm adhesion may arise 
from a true medium of certainty, and yet derive its efficacy both 
from the intellect and the will. Now, divine faith derives its 
certainty from the divine veracity, the First Truth, which in- 
finitely exceeds all created mediums of certainty or truth, as is 
self-evident. Hence, faith, in respect to its object, is the 
highest and most perfect motive of certainty which the human 
mind has in our present state of existence. 

As regards our minds, or considered subjectively: that is 
more certain, in respect to us, which the intellect can more 
fully possess, which is more connatural and proportioned to it, 
which more completely satisfies and quiets it ; though, in other 
respects its assent through a connatural motive be, in itself, not 
the most certain. This is what actually happens in that cer- 
tainty which we posess concerning objects which are evident to 
us, as compared to the certainty which we have through the 
medium of divine faith.* Hence, although faith, in respect 
to its motive, gives the highest and intensest certainty ; yet, in 
the subject, i. e., in our minds, there may spring up indeliber- 
ate doubt ; for, the debilitated intellect, like the owl at noon- 
day, " sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis," is unable to see by 
light so superior as that of divine faith. This faith is in itself 
absolutely the most certain; but the disposition of the subject 
renders doubt possible. 

* ' ' Ipsum testimonium primae veritatis se habet in fide, ut principium in sci- 
entiis demonstrativis . ' » The testimony of the First Truth is, in matters of faith, 
like the principle, in scientific demonstration. 



78 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

ARTICLE IV. 

ULTIMATE CRITERION OF TRUTH ; OR, ULTIMATE MOTIVE OF 
CERTAINTY. 

A criterion of truth is a rule or standard by which truth is 
unerringly known and distinguished from falsehood and error. 
Also, because certainty in the mind is the legitimate result of 
truth thus known, it follows that the criterion of truth is, at the 
same time, the criterion of certainty. This criterion, in its last 
reason or motive, is evidence in concrete. In other words, 
all certainty supposes evidence, either as its formal motive, or 
as a preceding conditio si?ie qua non, an i?idispensable condition, 
to which the mind finally reverts in order to dismiss all doubt.* 
Hence, it will be seen why the sounder philosophers so uni- 
versally insist on the truth of the proposition, " Evidence is 
the ultimate criterion of truth, or is the ultimate motive of 
certainty." 

Evidence is said to be the ultimate criterion of certainty or 
truth ; because, when the motives and principles of certainty 
are examined reflexively, or by their analysis, evidence is the 
last reason or principle which is dwelt on by the mind, in 
determining the admissibility, or the validity of all the motives 
for its assent furnished by any object. In the direct acquisition 
of certainty, evidence may be considered as, under some respect, 
the first principle or motive of assent. Hence, then, evidence 
is termed, under different respects, both the first principle and 
ultimate motive of certainty. 

The following are essential requisites for the ultiniate criterion 
of truth: ist. It should not require demonstraliofi ; for, all 
demonstration supposes something more known, from which 
another truth is deduced, and which thereby becomes also 
known; hence, if this principle or criterion were demonstrable, 
the truth from which it is deduced, would be the ultimate 
standard in question ; or, if it were not self-evide?it or known 
per se, the medium through which it is known, would be that 

* ' ' Evidentia est ultimiim in quo quiescit intellecrus noster . ' ' (Billaart, T. 1 ; 
Proem-.- Dissert. 1; Art. 7.) In evidence the intellect finally rests quiet. 



logic: second paet. 79 

standard. 2d. This ultimate standard must be internal, not an 
external rule; or, it must be intrinsic to the mind. An extrinsic 
standard of truth can be known only by its medium; or, it 
must be recognized by the individual reason, "per lumen ra- 
tionis nalurale" through the evidence, that it is a medium of 
certainty. In other words, in order to follow any external 
criterion of truth, or assent to it with certainty, an evide?it 
judgment of its reliability is an essential prerequisite; i. e., 
dltimately this external standard must be tested as a medium 
or law of certainty by evidence in concrete, or formal evidence, 
which is an internal principle. The mind must first be certain 
that this external criterion exists; that it is true; and it can 
know this truth, which is external to itself, only by the evidence 
\ of it in the mind. 

This standard cannot be divine faith : for faith presupposes 
the knowledge that there is a God, who is true ; and it is an 
\ essential prerequisite that Revelation, or the truths proposed 
for belief be evide?itly credible ; otherwise there could be no 
rational assent. Hence, divine faith cannot be either the first 
or the only motive of certainty; since it has essential prerequi- 
sites to it, which must be known by their evidence. 

The criterion of certainty cannot be the common consent of 
men, as some authors erroneously maintain ; for the admission 
of such a standard of truth, which, like divine faith, is external, 
presupposes the evident knowledge that men exist, attest, 
attach a definite meaning to their words ; that they agree, etc.; 
all these truths suppose an internal principle of the mind which 
is their criterion, or is the standard by which they are ulti- 
mately tested; i. e., evidence in the concrete is the ultimate 
criterion of all truth, or the ultimate motive of certainty. 

It follows from what has been said, that error in a sane mind 
is never physically necessary; for assent is necessitated only 
by perfect evidence, and, in all other cases, it is caused by the 
will, to which, therefore, must be referred assent or dissent, 
when the understanding is not compelled by the evidence. 



80 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

ARTICLE V. 

PRIMITIVE TRUTHS; THEY ARE NOT DEMONSTRABLE. 

Primitive truths are such as neither require nor admit of 
proof, either because they are per se* known, i. e., known of 
themselves, without the aid of other truths from which they are 
deduced, or by which they are proved; or, because they are 
facts of experience, known directly through our cognoscive 
powers. 

To begin reasoning or philosophising with universal doubt, 
is simply absurd; for doubt, as such, can give neither evidence 
nor certainty of anything deduced from it, since the conclusion 
has the nature of the premises. It is but little less absurd, to 
begin with admitting the testimony of consciousness (cogito ergo 
sum, I think, or am thinking, therefore, I exist, which is a 
petiiio principii), and doubting that of other powers, the ex> 
ternal senses, etc.; for all these powers, taken together, con- 
stitute our only natural means of knowing; and it is as legiti- 
mate and reasonable to deny or doubt the truth of one natural 
faculty or power in respect to its own proper objects as that of 
another. 

From consciousness, which is purely subjective, to the ob- 
jective, is not a valid illation, since no power or faculty can 
transcend its own order of objects, and pass without a medium, 
to a class specifically different, or really separated from it. 

But sound philosophy must begin with, as admitted, because 
undeniable, the truths or principles that are known to reason, 
without argument, of themselves, and which need no proof, 
and admit none, and require no other reason for an assent, than 

**' Propositio perse nota est, quando ea est comiexio praedicati cum subjecto, 
ut penetrari subjectum nequeat, quin ea comiexio deprehendatur in ipsa ratione 
subjecti. Seu propositio per se nota dicitur cujus Veritas per se et sine medio a 
se distincto imiotescit: sic lux dicitur per se visibilis, quia eaipsa et non per 
medium magis lucidum videtur . ' ' A proposition is per se known, or is self-evi- 
dent, when the connexion of the predicate with the subject is such, that the 
subject cannot be understood, without the connexion being perceived in the very 
nature of the subject. Or, a proposition is said to be per se known, or self-evi- 
dent, whose truth is known in itself and without any medium which is distinct 
from it: thus light is per se visible, for it is seen in itself, and not by means of 
another medium more distinct than itself. 



logic: second pakt. 81 

their own self-evidence. With regard to empirical knowledge, 
or that acquired by experience, we must also admit, without 
other proof, the evident perceptions of the mind, through the 
senses and ccnsciousness ; since these, too, are direct cogni- 
tions of evident truth : nature, of itself, cannot err.* Nor do 
we thereby assume truth on faith i?i natural law. No ; we assent 
to it, because it is evident ; and it is evident because it is truth, 
or that which is, and we know it to be stfch as we see it to be. 

Hence, then, our own existence, our perceptions of external 
objects, the acts of consciousness, truths known /w w, as, "it 
cannot be that the same thing exists, and does not exist, at the 
same time;" and the like, are truths that are admitted as abso- 
lutely certain, and incapable of logical proof; since that alone is 
capable of proof which can be made more evident by another 
truth still more evident, from which it is evidently deduced. 

Therefore, genuine philosophy begins, not with doubt or 
negation; but with certain first truth, immediately evident 
without demonstrative proof, and the affirmation of it. 

This question, as to primitive truths, should not be con- 
founded with the question, as to the origin of ideas; this latter 
subject pertains to psychology, or the philosophy of the mind, 
but yet it will be briefly treated in a subsequent part of this 
work. 

The importance of the foregoing doctrine will be appreciated 
if it be remembered that, as said by an illustrious author (D. 
Th. de veritate, a. i). "the certainty of knowledge comes 
from the certainty of its principles ; for, the certainty of infer- 
ences or conclusions is known only when they are resolved 
into their principles." 

Observe, also, that inferences or conclusions, as such, partake 
in some mode of the nature of their premises; for they are 
caused by them. Hence, principles or premises that are evi- 
dent and absolute, furnish conclusions which are necessary and 
evident in virtue of those premises. 

*"Xatura non deficit in necessariis." Nature is not deficient in -\vhat is 
necessary. 



CHAPTER II. 



MEANS OF ATTAINING TRUTH WITH CERTAINTY. 

The means of attaining truth may be classified under the 
following heads, viz. : ist, the faculty of consciousness ; 2d, 
the internal senses and the external senses ; 3d, the ideas 
which the mind has acquired, and which it compares among 
themselves, or, simple Apprehension, Judgment and Reason- 
ing; 4th, Testimony or Authority, which exacts rational assent. 



ARTICLE I. 

THE POWER OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The word consciousness is here used to signify the power or 
faculty of the mind to reflect on its own modifications or oper- 
ations, together with the act of thus reflexively seeing what 
is within itself. In this sense it corresponds to the Latin 
phrases, sensus intimus, conscientia reflexa, and is, therefore, not 
only the power, but includes the act of the mind by which it 
sees and recognizes what happens within itself, as its own. 
Hence, it has for its immediate object internal facts; i. e., ist, 
the modifications of the mind alone, as ideas, judgments, acts 
of volition; 2d, modifications of the human compound, as 
grief, gladness, cold, hunger. The act or modification of the 
mind is not anything really distinct from the mind itself ; it is 
the mind acting within itself as subject and object. In an act 
of consciousness two things are always seen, at least con- 
fusedly, viz., the impression, and the subject of it ; for the im- 
82 



logic: second part. 83 

pression is always perceived in concrete, as it is ; therefore, it 
is seen not as abstract or separate from the mind, but in the 
mind itself. For the mind knows itself as a living principle of 
action, by its own operations ; i. e., it knows its acts, as its own. 
The faculty or power of consciousness does not attain physi- 
cally and immediately to external objects; but it becomes cog- 
nizant of them only as they are presented through the action 
of the senses, the imagination, and as seen through the ideas 
or concepts in the intellect, but without directly perceiving 
the internal medium. (Vide page 62, note.) Without this power 
of the mind we could have no reflex knowledge of anything; 
even evidence itself can only become a motive of philosophical 
certainty when it is an object of consciousness; or is reflexively 
seen as such. The action of consciousness is implied in all 
judgments; for it is the directing and controlling influence in 
all the mind's completely rational action. 

Consciousness, therefore, affords an unerring motive of cer- 
tainty, as to the truth of its objects; that is, both of our ex- 
istence and the mind's own modifications. 

This proposition cannot be logically demonstrated, since the 
formal argument would explicitly assume what is in question ; 
but, on the other hand, we cannot conceive or declare a doubt 
of it, except on its own testimony. All demonstration presup- 
poses some truths that are known per se, that is, evident in 
themselves without proof; or, such as are known through our 
cognoscive powers by their own objective evidence, as facts 
which neither require nor admit any demonstration ; what we 
know by the direct and immediate act of consciousness is an 
evident fact of this kind. It neither admits nor requires 
demonstration ; for, the understanding clearly perceives the 
truth in the objects of its own acts, as self-evident; and it is 
absurd either to doubt or to attempt the a priori proof of what 
is self-evident. To deny the absolute certainty of its testi- 
mony is to reject all certainty, and the right use of reason, and 
logic itself; which would be either intellectual blindness or 
moral perversity. 

The fact that persons who are delirious, or dream, do not 



84 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

have normal action of consciousness, and do not thereby 
either perceive or acquire truth, does not militate against the 
thesis, that consciousness affords an infallible motive of cer- 
tainty as to its own objects. In such conditions the mind per- 
ceives and judges by the phantoms of a disturbed imagination. 
This organ, in those states, has none but disordered action ; 
for, when diseased or disturbed, the imagination cannot coop- 
erate in rational thought, as will be more fully explained in an- 
other place. As disturbed water reflects images in distorted 
fragments ; so, when the fancy is in an abnormal state, its action 
is morbid and disorderly, and its imagery is in undistinguisha- 
ble confusion. 

When this organ is so diseased or disordered as not to have 
normal action, the intellect is thereby more or less completely 
shut off, according to the extent and nature of the affection, 
from the entire world of realities, with which the fancy, as will 
be again remarked in the next article, is its essential medium 
of communication; and, in this state of seclusion, it is either 
wholly or partially unable to distinguish what is merely of the 
sickly fancy, from what is objectively real. In such case, this 
organ either forms no image at all of objects acting on the 
external senses, or those images are distorted and confused. 
Even in dreams, the action of the external senses being sus- 
pended, and those senses thereby ceasing to present real ob- 
jects to the imagination, it is not then a medium of rational 
communication for the soul with real or actual objects; which 
strikingly shows how entirely dependent the intellect is on the 
imagination, for all the objects of its action. 

By the power of consciousness it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish in impressions that are even but recently past, 
whether they were acts of the will, or acts of the soul as not 
free ; especially since the acts and affections of the will are, 
by their nature, more obscure than are the acts of direct per- 
ception or judgment. But even in this and analogous cases, 
in which truth may be difficult of attainment, close observa- 
tion of what actually occurs in the mind, with careful reflec- 



logic: second part. 85 

tion, secures the judgment from error, especially if the mind 
merely affirms what it perceives, and as it perceives it. 

Abnormal action of the faculties proceeds from a disturbed 
condition of the bodily organs, and is an exceptional case, that 
properly has nothing to do with the thesis; for it has reference 
to the operations of the mind only in its sound condition. The 
causes of diseased mental action properly pertain to another 
science for their analysis. 



ARTICLE II. 

THE SENSES; THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF ORGANIC 
POWERS. 

The senses, sensation, the nature of organic action, also the 
nature and specific objects of intellectual action, are explained 
somewhat diffusely in this article and the succeeding one; be- 
cause a clear distinction between organic action and intellectual 
action is of the utmost importance, even for the very beginning 
of philosophic study. That distinction is ignored in some 
popular works on philosophy, and is directly denied in others, 
either because their authors had made no careful and con- 
siderate examination of the subject, or because it was their 
pleasure to teach an hypothesis which identifies matter and 
intellect. 

The old philosophers classified the senses as internal and 
external. The i?iternal senses are, imagination; sensile 7nem- 
ory; potentia cesti/naliva, or power of estimating material things, 
as good or evil for sensible appetite; sensns commimis, "com- 
mon sense," an organic power, by which the impressions made 
on the external senses are sensibly distinguished from each 
other. 

A sensible organ, or an organic power, is a member of the 
living animal compound, i. e. ; compound of a substantial vital 
principle, and matter; it is capable of vital action in respect to 
its proper objects, and is ordained by its nature to sustain and 
perfect the living organism to which it pertains. Hence, or- 



86 logic: second part. 

ganic power essentially belongs to animal nature, and is, there- 
fore, living, and corporeal or material. 

Imagination, and fancy, are two names for the same organic 
power, or internal sense, and are used in this work indiscrimi- 
nately; the former word is derived from the Latin language; 
the latter, from the Greek. Imagination is the power of form- 
ing and reproducing sensible images made out of the impres- 
sions received by the senses from external objects. Sensile* 
memory is the organic power by which these impressions are 
retained, and recognized when they are reproduced ; or, more 
explicitly, sensile memory, which is an organic power, is the 
faculty of retaining the quasi concepts or intentions of those im- 
pressions and images in the fancy, and sensibly recognizing 
them when they are reproduced. 

If the reproduction of the past impression be understood to 
include the recalling of it, then, the reproduction of an impres- 
sion may be referred, under different respects, both to the 
imagination and the memory. 

The intellectual memory is not an organic power, but is a 
faculty of the soul itself, having no more direct dependence 
on the organs of the body than the understanding or will has. 

THE CONNEXION OF THE INTERNAL SENSES, AND THEIR 
DEPENDENCE ON EACH OTHER. 

The polenlia cesti.mativa is the power of duly estimating, i. e., 
sensibly appreciating the fitness or unfitness of an object to 
satisfy the wants of animal nature, or, as good or harmful for 
it. The sensus communis, which is analogous to the potentia 
cestimativa, is the basis of all the external senses, and is thus 
commo7i to them, somewhat as the sense of touch, under an- 
other respect, may be regarded as the basis of all the senses ;t 
but it moreover distinguishes the impressions made on the five 
external senses from one another. It was argued thus : even 

*It is manifest that sensile is here a more proper term than sensible, sensitive or 
sentient, any one of which would be equivocal in this connexion. 

t ' ' Omnes alii sensus fundantur supra tactum. ' ' (Div. Th. , 1 p. , qu. 76, a. 
5.) All the other senses are founded on that of touch. 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 87 

the brute animal feels that it sees, feels that it hears, feels that 
it smells, etc. ; but the eye cannot distinguish between color 
and sound, the ear cannot distinguish between sound and smell, 
etc.; there-fore, there must be an organic power which receives, 
feels, and distinguishes all these impressions made upon the 
external organs. To do this, is the function of the se?isus com- 
munis, or " common sense," so called, because, as already ob- 
served, it is the common basis and principle of unity for all the 
five external senses. The imagination, which is also an internal 
sense, forms its images or p/iantasmata from the impressions 
made through the external senses on the sensus communis/ the 
potentia cestimativa, i. e., the power of estimating or valuing 
objects as good or hurtful for appetite, makes its appreciation 
or estimate of its objects as presented to it by i/nages in the 
fancy; and in this act the potentia cestimativa forms for itself 
quasi concepts expressing the uses, "intentions" of sensible 
objects, and these quasi concepts are retained by the sensile 
memory. All these powers are purely organic, and are situated 
in the brain. They are possessed by all the perfect animals :. 
i. e., ail animals that hawtfive external senses. 

They discriminate, in certain instances, between the prop- 
erties of objects presented to them through the external senses; 
not, however, by way of a formal judgment; but by a true, 
though sensible, appreciation of them.* 

But the potentia cestimativa, as it is in man, is far more per- 
fect than it is in irrational animals. In man it is not limited 
in its action to merely appreciating a sensible object as useful 
or hurtful for appetite ; but it can compare particular and sin- 
gular objects of the kind among themselves, in a manner not 
unlike to that in which the intellect co?npares universals, and it 

* "Opinio passionem facit in appetitu, non autem imaginatio ; si enim prae- 
cise imaginemur hostes, non statim timemus aut lugimus; secus vi-ro si opine- 
mur prassentes. Ratio est, quod sola apprehensio qualis est in phantasm, non 
movet appetitum nisi accedat aestimativae operatro." — Musaenra Philos. de 
Anima. Opinion produces passion in the appetite, imagination does not ; if 
we merely imagine enemies, we do not at once flee away or fear; it is otherwise 
though, if we have the opinion that they are present. The reason is , that the sole 
apprehension as it is in the fancy cannot move appetite, unless there accede to 
it the operation of the potentia cestimativa, which reputes the object to be real. 



88 LOGIC: SECOND PART. 

thus approaches to a nearer resemblance of intellectual action. 
Hence, this power in man, was termed vis co^itativa, or cogita- 
tive power; or, also, ratio particularism ox particular reason; and 
it was described by the old philosophers as the connecting link 
in man between sense and reason. It is, therefore, under differ- 
ent respects, both the highest power of sense, and, in some 
manner, the lowest power or act of reason : yet this power is, 
in itself, merely organic. 

The human soul, by the power of consciousness, can reflect 
on its own acts and what affects it, and see these operations as 
its own; but no sense or organic power, whether internal or 
external, can reflect on itself or its own act ; this power of 
reflex action pertains to simple intellectual substance only. 

It is, perhaps, not too much to affirm that no other theory 
as yet proposed by philosophers, so consistently or so satis- 
factorily explains the phenomena of what may be termed by 
analogy, the brute mind, or which accounts equally well for all 
that which is merely sensible or organic operation, in man also. 

THIS THEORY FOR THE EXPLANATION OF SENSE COGNITION, 
ACCOUNTS CONSISTENTLY FOR ALL ITS PHENOMENA. 

In order that the limits of purely sensible knowledge may 
be more distinctly traced, and be more clearly seen, it will be 
useful to consider this truth, namely, that the doctrine of in- 
ternal sense, or internal organs of sensible cognition, is in itself 
not repugnant to the nature of organic power. For since the 
fact is undeniable that the senses have many virtues or perfec- 
tions of various species and degrees, we can easily conceive 
internal ones capable, without at all transcending the specific 
nature of organic power, of receiving and acting on the impres- 
sions conveyed to them by the external senses, as their conna- 
tural objects; analogously to the manner in which the external 
senses receive and act on impressions from their objects. 

Since the sense has no reflex action, the impression which is 
actually in it must be immediately produced by the object and 
the organ, and as the object is singular, concrete and material, 
the impression as in the organ, though vitally received by it, 



logic: second paet. 89 

must be a material effect. Both the organ, and the object 
are material \ therefore, the effect of their combined action is 
material. The material nature or character of the impression 
in the external sense, is all that is per se or necessarily required 
to constitute it the connatural object of another organic power 
that is superior to the external sense. That the fancy is an 
internal organic power of this kind, i. e., that its proper or 
connatural object is an impression furnished by the external 
sense, will be rendered more manifest by what is to be shown 
a little further on. 

They who deny or fail to recognize the existence of internal 
senses, attribute all sensible 'operation, whose principle is not 
obvious, or which cannot be explained by the action of exter- 
nal sense alone, either to instinct or to intellect. Instinct, in 
such theory, is a vague and indeterminate power which is 
made to account for all cognoscive operation which transcends 
the capacity of external sense. But this is to evade the diffi- 
culty, n°t to explain it. Instinct,* more precisely and accu- 
rately understood, is a natural impulse and positive tendency 
to some vital action which is useful or necessary for the indi- 
vidual agent or its species, that utility of the action not being 
apprehended or known by it as an end to be attained. Thus 
we explain some actions of beavers, ants, migratory birds, etc. 
They apprehend certain sensible objects, and are moved by 
them to action ; but the design or intention of the end in their 
action, we ascribe, through the law of their nature, to the 
Author of their being. 

Considered in itself, instinct appears to be a virtue or prin- 
ciple of action superadded to nature as operative, over and 
above appetite and cognition ; subserved by them, and direc- 
tive of them and the subject to which they belong, in certain 
matters in which those powers are not sufficient for the end to 
be attained. 

In order not to confound merely organic action with intel- 
lectual action, we must not lose sight of the truth that their 

•Div. Th. 1, 2. p. qu. 40, a. 3. 



90 logic: second part. 

objects are essentially distinct ;* the formal, proper, connatural 
object of organic power or sense, is the singular, or concrete 
and material reality ; that of the intellect, is the abstract, uni- 
versal or intelligible, which is, of its nature, absolutely super- 
sensible, and is therefore immaterial. 

THE BRUTE SOUL, ANIMA BELLUINA, IS MATERIAL. 

Brutes evidently have those cognitions that are perfected in 
sense alone ; though they show no signs whatever that they 
possess intellect or free will. Their action is physically neces- 
sary and uniform, quid determinatum ad unum, "what is deter- 
mined to one mode of action." An agent which is thus limited 
to that action which is physically necessary has, of course, no 
rational empire over its own operation, and, therefore, has no 
intelligent principle of action. 

It cannot be legitimately denied that an agent which depends 
on matter in all its action, also depends on matter in existing, 
according to the metaphysical principle, "modus agendi sequi- 
tur modum essendi," "action is according to the essence of the 
agent:" or, that which is material in its action is also material 
in its essence ; and hence, knowing the action, we may justly 
conclude a posteriori to the esse?ice or nature of the agent that 
puts it. This axiom holds true, whether the agent is the urn- 
vocal, or the equivocal cause of the effect produced by means 
of its act. 

The argument may be stated more strictly in form, thus: all 
organic action is material action, because both the organ is 
material, and its object is per se material ; the brute mind has 
none but organic action, and, therefore, it has none but mate- 
rial action.t But that which wholly depends on matter in its 

*"Sentire, et consequentes operationes animae sensitive, accidunt cum ali- 
qua corporis immutatione . . intelligere exercetur sine organo corporeo. " 
(Vide Div. Thorn. Sum., 1 p., qu. 75, a. 3.) To feel sensibly, and the conse- 
quent operations of the sensitive soul, happen •with some change in the body 
. . . to understand, is exercised without a bodily organ. 

f ' ' Cum animae brutorum animalium non per se operentur, non sunt subsis- 
tentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem. ' ' (Div. Th. 1 p. 
qu. 78, a 3.) Since the souls of brute animals do not operate per se, they do not 
subsist, (or exist alone or apart from matter) , for every thing exists and acts in 
a similar manner. 



logic: second part. 91 

action, also depends wholly on matter in existing; now, the 
brute soul is affixed to matter and limited to matter in all its 
action ; it is, therefore, similarly dependent on matter in exist- 
ing; i. e., it can not exist per se, or alone and apart from 
matter, but only dependency on it. 

The force of this reasoning will be still more clearly perceived, 
if it be borne in mind that we not only know an agent by its 
action, and know it only by its action ; but its action is, in 
some proper sense of the words, the measure of its essence ; 
"unumquodque agit in quantum est actu, i. e., in quantum 
forma actuatum ; " " every thing has action, in proportion as it 
has actual essence.'" 

THE HUMAN SOUL A SPIRITUAL OR IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE. 

By similar reasoning it follows that since the acts of the 
human soul, intellection and volition, are wholly inorganic, for 
their objects are wholly immaterial, and the intellect and will 
elicit their acts alone, i. e., without any other second cause as 
a concurrent principle, the soul is therefore immaterial; or, 
since the human soul operates per se, or without direct depend- 
ence on matter, it also can exist per se, or is an immaterial 
substance. 

The intellect knows material or sensible things by their intel- 
ligible essence;* i. e., by real intellectual types or similitudes of 
them expressed in concepts of their essence ; hence, it knows 
material things in an immaterial manner, which it is not possi- 
ble for organic power to do. 

The human soul, when existing separate from the body, is 
said to subsist i?icompletely j because, by its very nature, it is 
ordained to substantial union with the body. But, considered 
as a substance, it can be said to exist completely when in that 
state, because it exists per sey i. e., it, as it were, stands alone, 
or exists without leaning or depending on a?iother thing, by in- 
hering in it. 

♦"Essentia rerum materialium sunt in intellectu hominis, vel angeli, ut 
intellectum est in intelligente, et non secundum suum esse reale. ' ' (Sum. , 1 P. , 
Qu. 57, Art. 1, Ad. 2.) The essences of material things are in the intellect of 
man, or the angel, as that which is understood is in that which understands, 
and not as to their real existence. 



^ 



92 logic: second part. 

It would seem necessarily to follow from what is said above 
that the brute soul, anima bellui?ia, is a substantial and living 
principle, or, as expressed by the old philosophers, forma sub- 
stantialis et principium vivefis; and, in fact, such it evidently 
must be. Yet, its total dependence on matter in operating 
proves that it is totally of matter also in existing ; it can exist 
only in union by composition with matter, and it is, therefore, 
only incomplete, and, at the same time, partial substance. 

Besides, even if we conceived it absolutely possible for the 
brute soul to exist separate from matter, to which it must 
naturally be affixed in existing, as shown above ; then it could 
have no sensible action, for it would be destitute of an organ ; 
it could have no spiritual action, for it would have no intellect; 
therefore, its state would be that of mere potentiality, or exist- 
ence without action ; i. e., the supposition is absurd. 

IS THE IMAGINATION AN ORGANIC POWER; OR, IS THE SUBJECT 
IN WHICH IT RESIDES, THE SOUL; I. E., THE SPIRITUAL 
SUBSTANCE AS ESSENTIALLY DISTINGUISHED FROM MATTER ? 

The imagination or fancy is organic ; or, its subject is the 
living compound, and not the soul or spiritual substance alone; 
its peculiar function in man is to serve the intellect, or to pre- 
sent objects to it by means of true images of those objects.* 

It is an organic power, for the brute animal possesses no 
higher principle of action than that of sense or organic power, 
as already seen ; but the brute has imagination, and even sen- 
sible memory also; for the arguments which prove the exist- 
ence of fancy in them, at the same time conclusively show 
them to possess organic or sensible memory. For the perfect 
animal, imagination is physically necessary, since it must know 
sensible things not only as present and acting on its external 
organs ; but it must know them when they are absent so that 
it may tend to such objects as are necessary for sustenance, 

*' 'Anima rationalis, licet quamdiu corpus informat, supponat operationem 
phantasise quae per organum operatur, tamen organo non elicit suana intellec- 
tionem." (Irenaeus Carmelit, et philosophi passim.) The rational soul, though 
so long as it informs the body it suppose the operation of fancy which acts 
through an organ, does not elicit its intellection by an organ. 



logic: second part. 93 

preservation, etc. But to form and preserve the images of 
sensible things, to reproduce and recognize them, are respect- 
ively the functions of fancy and sensible memory. Since brutes 
have no intellect, this power must be merely organic in them ; 
it follows, therefore, that the faculty, imagination, is, at least, 
not per se, or necessarily intellectual. 

But even in man this power can form the image of no ob- 
ject except one that is either sensible in itself, or which it can 
represent as invested with sensible forms or qualities. Now, 
a power that can have no object of action but that which is 
sensible, and, therefore, material, must itself be material; for 
the nature of a power is known by the specific objects of its 
action, since action follows the nature, or agrees with the nature 
of the agent. The imagination in man is, therefore, an organic 
power, or its subject is the living compound of soul and body. 
Or, in fewer words, the imagination is not an intellectual prin- 
ciple, because its connatural object is only the sensible or 
material ; and, hence, it is per se, or esse?itially material or 
organic. 

The imagination in man is sometimes termed " the medium 
between the senses and the intellect ; " " fantasia est media 
inter sensum et intellectum." Hence, without the action of 
the external senses, the fancy could form no images of sensible 
objects; without the action of the fancy, the intellect could 
not naturally have any communication whatever with any real 
object, or any sensible power of cognition, and hence it would 
be totally insulated from all the proper objects of its action. 
The fancy, therefore, is for the intellect the essential medium 
of comviunication with the entire order of reality. As we are 
now constituted, the intellect cannot contemplate or even per- 
ceive any object, except as in some manner e?nbodied and 
reflected in that minor* 

The fancy can form no image every real component of 
which was not originally acquired by the actual observation 

•"Corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis 
actio exerceatur, sedratione objecti." (Div. Th. 1 p, qu. 75, a. 2, ad. 3.) "The 
body is required for the action of the intellect, not as an organ by which such 
action is exercised, but on account of the object. 



94 LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 

of sensible things : a man blind from his birth can have in his 
fancy no real image of color ; " quibus deficit unus sensus, 
deficit una scientia; " "they who never possessed any one 
sense, are destitute of one species of cognition." 

WHAT, IN REGARD TO MENTAL THOUGHT, IS THE SPECIAL 
FUNCTION OR ACT OF THE IMAGINATION, WHOSE CONNA- 
TURAL OBJECT, AS ALREADY SHOWN, IS PER SE MATERIAL. 

Imagination is generically the same in man and brute ; in man 
it forms and presents images to the intellect, which the intellect 
contemplates, and by abstraction forms from them its intel- 
ligible concepts or ideas of things.* In the brute its images 
serve as objects for the faculty of sense, termed potentia cesti- 
mativa, or power of sensibly discerning objects as good or 
noxious for the animal : t called by what name soever, unde- 
niable facts prove that brute animals possess this faculty of 
distinguishing such uses or intentions of sensible objects, no 
less than facts also prove demonstratively that they have no 
intellectual act. 

That no brute faculty can apprehend the abstract or universal, 
or can judge, is strictly demonstrated by induction only ; but 
this induction, it cannot be questioned, has long since actually 
been made by mankind, logically, over and over again, and in 
the most general manner; and each one's daily observation 
verifies the conclusion which is known, as a fact, to have been 
reached by mankind. Whence it logically suffices here merely 
to affirm the impossibility of any duly attested law or fact of 
brute action being adduced, which cannot be fully accounted 
for, by the operation of sensible or organic powers, as they are 
above described. 

♦With strange confusion, both of thought and of language, this action of the 
intellect is, by certain writers, called imagination. Wherefore, since this volume 
contains no treatise on the science of Psychology, it was judged advisable to 
explain more fully and explicitly in this place the specific and distinguishing 
acts of fancy and intellect, than is strictly pertinent to a work on Logic and 
General Metaphysics. 

t "Ad apprehendendum intentiones qua? per sensumnon accipiuntur ordinatur 
vis aestimativa." (Div. Th., 1 p., qu. 78, a. 4.) The vis cestimativa, or power 
of sensibly appreciating, is ordained for apprehending the uses or intentions 
Which are not received through the external sense. 



logic: second part. 95 

THE NATURE AND THE CONNATURAL OBJECT OF THE EXTER- 
NAL SENSES ; THEY DO NOT ERR PER SE, I. E., THEY CAN- 
NOT PHYSICALLY CAUSE ERROR. 

The external senses are the five organs through which the 
mind becomes cognizant of various exterior* objects, by- 
means of the properties of those objects. The organs are in 
themselves capable of being acted on, and of conveying to 
the mind the impressions received, but are indifferent as to 
their particular object; their action is determined in species 
by the connatural and singular object, which is duly present 
to them. The external senses are, sight, hearing, touch, taste, 
smell. 

Sensef is an organic power of the soul, and is cognoscive 
only of those things that are singular and ??iaterial; i. e., ist, 
it is an active principle, whose subject is man, or the compound 
of soul and body, and not a part only of man, as is the case 
with the intellect, whose subject is the spiritual substance of the 
soul alone, not the compound; 2d, sense is termed organic, be- 
cause it is affixed to an organ, which, as already observed, is a 
compound of soul and matter ; and hence, under this respect, 
sense could also be denominated a power of the body, or a cor- 
poreal power; 3d, it perceives or apprehends only the singu- 
lar; L.e., the concrete, determinate individual; while the in- 
tellect, on the contrary, has for its object the universal; 4th, 
it cannot attain in its action to every species of singular thing; 
v. g., it cannot perceive an angel, but its object is only the sin- 
gular which is at the same time material^ The sensible, there- 
fore, or the object of sense, may be defined to be "any material, 

* • ' Sensus 11011 apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum; 
similiter neque imaginatio . " (Div. Thorn. 1 P., Qu. 57, Art. 1, ad. 2.) Sense 
does not apprehend the essences of things, but only exterior accidents; like- 
wise, the imagination does not apprehend the essences of things. 

t " Sensus est facultas animse organica, singularium materialium cognosci- 
tiva." Sense is an organic power of the soul, capable of knowing singular 
material objects. 

X ' ' Omne sensibile est materiale. JJ Whatever is sensible is material. ■ 



96 logic: second part. 

extended, and singular object or being, which is perfective of 
"sense or organic power, by intimate conjunction with it."* 

An object is sensible, either per se,\ or per accidens; an object 
is sensible per se or of itself, which has, of its own nature, the 
power of perceptibly affecting, or producing an impression on 
the sense; v. g., light has of itself, and by its own nature, the 
power of physically producing such impression on the eye; heat, 
on the touch, etc. 

An object is said to be sensible per accidens, when, without 
having any power in itself to act on the sense, yet it has con- 
joined with it some property or accident by means of which it 
does become known as present. In this case, while it does 
not itself physically act on the sense, yet it becomes known to 
the sense in some manner, by means of another thing in con- 
junction with it that does thus act; v. g., Socrates has com- 
plexion, animal heat, etc.; the color can be seen per se, the heat 
can be felt per se; but it is not Socrates the person that thus 
acts per se on the senses, for sense is immediately acted on, not 
by substance, but by accidents only; hence, Socrates is an object 
that is sensible per accidens; or, more generally, substance, as 
such, is sensible only per accidens ; i. e., substance, as such, is 
not properly a sensible object at all. 

For an object to become sensible per accidens, the following 
conditions must be fulfilled ; ist, it must be susceptible of a 
property or accident which is perse, or of itself, capable of acting . 
on the sense, and also actually have such property or accident; 
2d, it must be an object which can be known per se or in itself, 
either by the intellect, or by some sense or organic power; 
v. g , the senses perceive or know material substance per acci- 
dens, the intellect alone can know it per se; i. e., as its proper 
object; a colored object may be known per accidens by the 
touch, but it is known per se, or as its proper object only by 

*■' Sensibile est ens materiale extensum, singulare, perfectivum sensus per 
intimam cum eo conjunctionem." The sensible is a material being, extended, 
singula!*, and perfective of sense by intimate conjunction with it. 

t ' ' Sensus externus non fertur in praeteritum nee futurum. ' ' External sense 
does not attain to that which is past, or future. 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 97 

the sight. If both the foregoing conditions be not verified, 
an object cannot, indeed, be known by the senses at all. 

The sensible per se is either proper, or common; the proper* 
sensible is what can be perceived by one sense and only by 
one sense; v. g., color, as such, is the proper object of sight 
only, and therefore it cannot be perceived, as such, by any 
other sense. 

The commo?i sensible, \ is what can be perceived by more 
senses than one, and it is on that account said to be common 
to them, or their common object. Under the name, common 
sensible, five classes of sensible objects are enumerated as in- 
cluding all things to which the term is applicable; viz.: " motion, 
rest, number, figure and size." These are all objects both of 
sight and touch, and they may, also, in certain cases, fall under 
the other senses, as a little reflection will show. All the qual- 
ities or accidents of material objects which can be perceived 
by more senses than one, can be reduced to one or other of 
the preceding five genera of conwnon sensibles. Size, as per- 
ceived by the eye, is modified and corrected when perceived 
by the touch ; and vice versa. Distance seen by the eye, and 
distance attested by the touch, serve to correct and perfect the 
judgment of it in the mind. 

It may be said, then; ist, that the common sensible modifies 
the proper; 2d, that the se?isible per accidens is known only by 
means of the proper, but it does not in any manner modify the 
action of the proper sensible % on its own particular organ; 3d, 

* <e Proprium sensibile uno solo sensu sentitur: commune, pluribus." The 
proper sensible is apprehended by one sense only : the common, by more than one. 

t " Communia non sunt sensibilia per accidens; quia hujusmodi sensibilia 
aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione sensus ' ' (alterius) . (Div. Thorn, 
lp., qu. 78, art. 4, ad. 2.) The common sensible is not sensible merely per 
accidens; for it really causes an effect on the sense. 

X * ' Sensibile per accidens nullam vim habet ex se movendi vel immutandi sen- 
sum.' ' The sensibile per accidens has no power, of itself , of moving or immedi- 
ately affecting sense. 

1 ' Proprium est quod ita uno sensu percipitur, ut alio percipi non possit; et 
circa quod sensus errare non potest. Commune est, quod pluribus sens i bus 
potest percipi, et circa quod sensus potest falli." The proper sensible is per- 
ceived by one sense only, and it cannot be apprehended by another : in regard 
to it, the sense cannot err. The common sensible can be perceived by more 
senses than one, and iu respect to it, the sense can err. 

7 



98 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

in the common sensible, the same property may be perceived 
through different organs, but it is done by specifically different 
action in them. 

The mind is invincibly impelled to refer the impressions 
received through the senses to the external objects acting on 
them, and thereby manifesting themselves to it as their cause; 
not, however, by blind impulse, but by the evidence. The 
mind thus refers the impressions received, even before any 
reflex judgment, because it thereby actually perceives through 
the senses the properties or objects that produce them. This 
inborn and resistless propensity to refer our sensations, or the 
impressions made on the senses, to corporeal or physically 
existing beings, as their actual cause ; or, in other words, this 
sensation thus received and referred, is the testimony afforded 
by the senses. 

Sensible objects act through their properties on the organs ; 
these properties are, ist, primary or absolute properties ; that 
is, such as, in some manner, flow from their essence, and with- 
out which they cannot naturally exist; as, extension, figure, 
motion, or rest ; 2d, relative or secondary properties ; as, color, 
taste, particular size, etc. But as the senses do not of them- 
selves judge, and are incapable of reflex action, it is only the 
mind that perceives the nature of objects, or that of their prop- 
erties. It is true that there is an implicit or imitated judg- 
ment in every sensation as such, since it may be regarded 
as an affirmation, in a wide sense of the term ; but, because 
the action of sense is in itself entirely subject to physical and 
natural law, this implicit or imitated judgment must be referred 
through the law of their nature, in obedience to which they 
act necessarily and truly, to the Creator of the senses.* Ex- 

* ' ' Veritas aliqua reperitnr in simplici mentis conceptione,neque solum men- 
tis, sed etiam sensuum . . constat qua} et qualis sit luce Veritas quas in sim- 
plici mentis notitia reperitur: nihil enim aliud est quam Veritas ipsa transcend- 
entalis, his entibus accommodata." (Suarez Metaph., Disp. 8, Sect. 3.) There 
is a kind of truth found in the simple conception of the mind, and not only in 
the conceptions of the mind, but in those also of the senses. . . . It is clear 
of what nature this truth is, which is found in the simple knowledge of the 
mind: it is indeed nothing else than transcendental truth, accommodated to 
those things . 



logic: second part. 99 

ternal objects, as remarked, act through their properties on the 
senses ; the senses are, therefore, said to know per accidens, or 
accidentally, the substance; it being invariably conjoined with 
those properties. But, substance is per se known, i. e., can 
be said formally said properly to be known by the intellect only. 

DOES THE MIND, THEN, ATTAIN TO THE CERTAIN KNOWL- 
EDGE OF OUTWARD OR SENSIBLE OBJECTS BY MEANS OF 
THE SENSES? 

The soul informs* each organ of sense ; and on that account 
the soul is the principle through which the organ feels, or acts 
vitally ; and hence, by some, consciousness, or the soul as con- 
scious, is termed the basis of sensation. Yet, the soul being 
affixed to an organ, its natural action through that organ is 
subject to necessary law; i. e., the organs of sense, in actually 
perceiving the impressions from external objects, are governed 
by physical laws of nature which are immutable, except by 
miracle. When an organ is in its normal condition, the object 
and concurrent circumstances being the same, the organic 
action will always be the same; but a change in the normal 
state of the organ will, in obedience to physical law, modify 
the impression received from those objects, according to the 
nature and extent of that change. t 

But it will help to the clearer intelligence of the matter, if 
we consider these sensible impressions : ist, as they affect the 
organ, and are modifications of it; 2d, as representative of the 
objects from which they are received. These impressions, con- 
sidered as modifications of the organ, are always true, wh ther 
the mind errs in its judgment or not ; for, whether the organ 
be well or ill disposed, it conveys the impression just as it 
receives it. There is in it that necessary action which belongs 
to all agents, which operate in obedience to natural law ; and, 
therefore, if the organ be disordered, the impression received 

* ' ' Forma est principium agendi in unoquoque. ' ' The form is the principle 
of action in every object. 

t ' ' Quidquid recipitnr, secundum modum recipientis recipitur. ' ' Whatever 
is received, is received according to the nature of the recipient. 



100 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

is modified by the disease, according to the nature and extent 
of the affection ; but it still conveys what it receives, no more, 
no less. Therefore, the senses per se, or of themselves, do not 
deceive, since they act by the necessary laws of nature itself, 
and these laws are true and uniform ; i. e., they always act in 
the same manner, under the same circumstances. 

But when we consider sensible impressions as representative 
of the objects from which they are received, the senses, being 
ill-disposed, or right means not being employed to use them 
prudently in judging, may become the occasion, but not strictly 
the efficient cause, of error. Thus, when the palate is disor- 
dered, that may seem to the mind to taste bitter which is in 
itself sweet ; to a diseased eye, that may seem yellow which is 
really white ; but, in these cases, the qualities tasted and seen 
are not really, or a parte rei, the sweet or white in the objects; 
but these qualities as modified or overpowered by other causes. 
It is not the function of the sense to judge, or distinguish 
cause and effect ; this is the function of the mind ; the only 
proper office of the organ is to receive the impression as given 
and convey it to the mind as received. Hence, the senses, by 
accident, not per se, may be the cause, or rather the occasion, 
of erroneous judgment. 

For the testimony of the senses to afford an infallible motive 
of certainty, the following conditions must be fulfilled : ist, 
the object must be duly prese?it ; otherwise, a steeple, for 
example, that is square may be judged to be round; 2d, the 
organs of sensation must be in a healthy or fiormal condition; 
v. g., a jaundiced eye makes all objects appear with a yellow 
tinge ; 3d, there must be agreement in the sensations received, 
both through the same organ, and different organs, according 
to the nature of the object; and they should be compared by 
the mind ; in default of this condition, a staff that is partly in 
the water will be judged to be crooked, when in reality it is 
straight, the different refracting powers of air and water not 
being attended to by the mind. 

Thus we have certainty as to external objects, because they 
afford the mind, through the organs of sense, the evidence of 



logic: second part. 101 

their existence, qualities, etc. ; and, therefore, the mind is cer- 
tain of their truth, because it sees that truth. From this it fol- 
lows that the certainty which we have through the testimony of 
the senses is founded on evidence, the ultimate motive of all 
genuine certainty ; for we see the essential connection between 
the testimony of the senses, and the reality of their objects, on 
the one hand ; and on the other, the divine veracity ; and this 
is evidence. 

To affirm that the objects of sense can per se cause error ; 
i. e., by their own real action produce error, is to compromise 
divine veracity; because the physical laws of nature depend 
for their force and whole efficacy on God ; and natural falsity, 
either in them or in the objects subject to them, would be refer- 
able to God as its cause. 

As the imagination, or power of forming and reproducing 
images of things, is orga?iic; that is, the soul in intimate union 
by real composition with, and acting through, a material organ 
as its instrument ; it is liable, as already remarked, to disease 
and disordered action, inasmuch as it is material. Hence, this 
organ, above all others, may interrupt or disturb the normal 
action of the mind; since the mind, as we are actually consti- 
tuted, can have no normal action without it; in other words, 
the imagination truly co-operates in all thought, by presenting 
or exhibiting its images, or the objects of thought in which the 
intellect sees the intelligible. Whence it follows that the human 
mind, while in connection with the body on earth, cannot 
naturally have completely independent, or, in every respect, 
purely spiritual action; i. e., it requires the aid of the imagina- 
tion.* Yet, this aid is merely extrinsic ; for the acts of the 
understanding are immanent, and are elicited by the faculty 
alone, as their immediate or proximate principle. But, even 
in the concepts of objects the most abstract, the imagination 
co-operates with the action of the mind, by presenting terms 
and various related objects under their quasi images or their 
names. A striking proof of this necessary co-operation of 

* VideS. Th.lp., qu.84, a. 7. ' ' Prinoipium nostrae cognitionis est asensu." 
The beginning of onr knowledge is from the senses. 



102 logic: second part. 

the imagination in all our intellectual action, as noticed in 
another place, may be drawn from the facts learned by obser- 
vation of insane minds. The mind, as such, or the soul, being 
immaterial and simple, is incapable of dissolution or decom- 
position, and, therefore, it cannot be diseased in its substance ; 
but the imagination, being an organ, is material, and it is, 
therefore, susceptible of disease. 

To recapitulate what has been said : The action of external 
objects on the sensible organs is modified by various causes, 
which may all, however, be reduced to two classes; ist, the 
medium through which the object acts may be more or less 
changed by the agency of other mediums which intervene and 
combine or mingle with it; v. g., the appearance of an object 
seen at a distance is, in some instances, subject to many muta- 
tions of color, figure and size, arising from vapors, by which 
the refraction and transmission of light are changed. A second 
class of causes which affect the sensation as actually received, 
are such as influence the natural action of the organ itself; v. 
g., disease, excitement, diminished activity, etc. Although the 
external senses do not err per se, since they convey only the 
impressions which they actually receive from physical and real 
objects, even when these impressions happen to be modified 
either in the medium or in the organ ; yet, it is conceded that 
they may err per accidens, or accidentally* By this it is meant 
that, under special conditions, their impressions are conjoined 
with error in the cognition or judgment, which these impres- 
sions do not physically produce, but to which, however, they 
give occasio?i. This is an exceptional case, is accidental, and 
affords matter for exercising the intellectual virtues, art and 
prudence. \ 

While this contingent and occasional error does not destroy 
the essence of certainty in sensible cognitions, yet it cannot be 

* " Qui occasione sensuum in errorem incidit, non ideo fallitur ob malum 
nuntium, sed quia ipse malus est judex. ' ' (S. Aug. de vera Relig., C. 33.) He 
that by occasion ofthe senses falls into error, is not therefore deceived because 
of a bad witness, but because he himself is a bad judge. 

t " Ars et prudentia circa contingentia versantur." Art and prudence re- 
gard contingent things as their proper objects. 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 103 

denied that it weakens the force of such certainty in its whole 
species.* 

It should, perhaps, be said here, also, for the fuller explana- 
tion of the whole subject, that the imagination, when in an 
abnormal state, as it is in the demented, errs per se, or, truly 
causes error; for, in such condition of that organ, true judg- 
??ient is physically impossible, at least in reference to some 
matter; or, in other words, error is then physically necessary. 
When the imagination is diseased, then by its own physical 
action, or ex se, it obtrudes images or phantasmata before the 
mind, which are objectively false, and which, nevertheless, the 
intellect necessarily apprehends as being really true. Hence, 
then, it may be argued thus: that organic power per se deceives, 
which physically necessitates error in the judgment or cogni- 
tion; but the insane fancy does this; therefore, the insane fancy 
per se deceives. Hence it is that such agent becomes irre- 
sponsible. 

But observe that, on the contrary, the image furnished by a 
disordered external sense, as a jaundiced eye, is not, in strict 
language, objectively false; for, its object is real, not purely fic- 
titious, as are the phantasms of an insane imagination; and, 
moreover, in the event of abnormal sensations, correct knowl- 
edge and true judgment are still attainable, which is not the 
case in reference to the objects presented by the fancy when it 
is organically diseased, so as to be incapable of normal action. 



ARTICLE III, 

SIMPLE APPREHENSION, JUDGMENT AND REASONING, ALL FUR- 
NISH INFALLIBLE MOTIVES OF CERTAINTY, AS TO THEIR 
PROPER OBJECTS. 

The understanding, or intellect, is an inorganic faculty ; or, 

* " Sensus fallitur circa proprium objectum; sed solum per accidens, etrarius: 
inde nihilominus naturalis cognitionis certitudinem minui, nemo negaverit." 
(Irenaeus, De An., c. 2, sect. 2, §. 3.) The sense is deceived about its proper 
object, but only per accidens, or by accident, and very rarely; hence, neverthe- 
less, no one "will deny that the certainty of natural cognition is thereby some- 
what impaired. 



104 logic: second part. 

in other words, it is not affixed to any organ of the human 
compound; but its acts are proximately from itself, and are, in 
themselves, purely super-sensible ; and it resides in the soul, 
as its only subject. 

The formal, adequate and connatural object of the human 
intellect, i. e., the intellect of man, who esse?itially consists of 
soul and body united, by substantial co?nposition, is the quiddity, 
or essence, of sensible things.* Its cognitions begin with the 
sensible ; by means of the sensible it proceeds to the abstract 
or super-sensible, which it understands by comparing it to cor- 
poreal things, or the objects of sense, t The formal object of 
cognition should be proportioned to, or commensurate with, 
the power which knows; it, therefore, should possess a corres- 
ponding degree of immateriality with it. In other words, the 
object should be, in some proper sense of the terms, as far 
removed from matter as the power; for, as cognoscive power 
rises in perfection, so must its formal object rise also ; and as 
the power approximates or recedes from matter, according to 
the greater or less degree of its perfection, so also must its 
object. 

According to this principle, the uncreated essence of God, 
is the commensurate or adequate object of the divine intellect; 
spiritual or Angelic essence, i. e., created immaterial essence, 
is the proportioned object of Angelic intellect; the essence of 
the human soul, is the connatural and proportioned object of 
the cognoscive soul when existing separated from the body ; 
the essence of sensible things, is the primary and commensurate 
object of the human intellect, when the soul is affixed to matter 

* ' ' Omnia quae in prsesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per com- 
parationem ad res sensibiles et naturales. ' ' (Div. Thom. , 1 p. , qu. 87, art. 7.) 
All things which we understand in our present state, are known to us through 
comparison to things that are sensible and natural, (that act by necessary phys- 
ical laws, or are sensible and physical agents.) 

t " Intellectus humani, qui est conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est 
quidditas, sive natura in materia corporali existens, et per hujusmodi naturas 
rerum visibilium, etiam in invisibilium rerum aliquam cognitionem ascendit." 
(Div. Thom. , 1 p. , qu. 84, art. 7 in C.) The object of the human intellect which 
is conjoined to the body, is the essence or nature existing in corporeal matter; 
and by means of such natures of visible things, it also ascends to some knowl- 
edge of invisible things. 



logic: second part. 105 

by union with the body; the singular concrete, and material, 
as having color, taste, smell, or as affecting the living organ, is 
the proper object of sensible or organic power.* Hence, it 
will be readily seen why man is often termed, " the link that 
binds together the material and spiritual orders, "t 

It would be an error, however, to infer from the preceding 
doctrine that the human intellect is organic; for it by no means 
follows that because its primary and adequate formal object is 
the essence of the sensible, the intellect is therefore the subject 
of sensible and organic mutations, or that it has organic action. 

But it does logically follow that man's intellect knows God, 
and other superior substances of the spiritual order, only by 
comparison with what he immediately knows in the sensible 
order; and that he rises by reflexion on sensible things, and 
by abstraction, to the conception of those substances which are 
of another order. { 

It would be equally erroneous to infer from what is above 
stated, that the human intellect knows only the sensible and 
material; for it also reasons of God and angels.§ The mean- 

* " Sensus non fertur per se nisi in singularia et accidentia materialia." Sense^er 
se, i. e., of its own action, attainsonly to singular objects and material accidents. 

f'Natura huraana rationalis ab Angelica degenerat, quod sit ordinata ad in- 
formandum corpus, cui propterea alligatur; attamen cum Angelica convenit, 
quod sit spiritualis; et in eo sensitivam superat cum qua similiter convenit, 
quod sit materialis; undehomo dicitur a nonnullis jftbwZa spiritualis et material's 
ordinis, eo quod inter utrumque meclius, utrumque in se copulat." Rational 
human nature falls below the angelic nature in that it is ordained to inform a 
body, to which it is, therefore, bound; however, it agrees with the angelic 
nature, in that it is spiritual. In this respect, also, it rises above sensitive na- 
ture, though it agrees with it in that it is material. "Whence man is called by 
some the link between the spiritual and material orders, for he stands between 
both, and unites both in himself. 

| " Invisibilia Dei per ea qua? facta stmt, intellecta conspiciuntur." (Rom. 
i. 20.) The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the 
things that are made. 

§ " Mens seipsam per se novit, quia tandem in suiipsius cognitionem pervenit, 
licet per suum actum." (Sum. 1 p., qu. 87, art. 1, ad. 1.) The mind knows 
itself by itself, because it does come to the knowledge of itself, although by its 
own act. The soul knows itself only by its acts : it does not immediately or 
intuitively perceive its own real essence. 

" Quamdiu anima est corpori unita, intelligit convertendo se ad phantasmata. 
Sed cum merit a corpore separata, intelligit, non convertendo se ad phantas- 
mata, sed ad ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia : unde seipsam per seipsam 
intelligit. Est autem commune omni substantive separatae, quod intelligat id 



106 logic: second paet. - 

ing which is intended to be conveyed in defining the adequate 
or commensurate object of man's intellect is, that the human 
understanding primarily and formally knows as its first and 
proper object, material essence; and that all its knowledge of 
higher things it acquires by aid of the material or sensible, 
through which it apprehends what transcends the senses, and, 
by comparison and abstraction, forms lor itself concepts or 
notions of superior essences. 

The intellect of man first conceives God, angels, spirits, under 
imaginary corporeal forms; which imperfect ideas of super- 
sensible substances, it corrects by reasoning; v. g., not unlike 
what takes place when we observe the staff which is partly in 
the water ; it may be first conceived to be really bent, but by 
reflexion and further knowledge of truths not immediately 
presented in what the senses manifest, we come to know that 
the staff is not bent, but is really straight. 

Similarly, due proportion being allowed for intellects that 
know by simple intelligence, and not by the less perfect way of 
reason, in order for the angels of one order, or hierarchy, to 
conceive those of another, they must compare and measure 
them by the primary and formal object of their own intellect, 
which is their own essence;* for, as every sense has its own 
adequate or commensurate object to which it is limited ; v. g., 
the eye has figure and color, the ear has sound for its proper 

quod est supra se per modum suae substantia. Sic enim intelligitur aliquid 
secundum quod est in intelligente. Est autem aliquid in altero per modum ejus 
in quo est." (lp., qu. 89, art. 2 in C.) So long as the soul is united to the 
body, it understands by converting itself to the images in the fancy. But when 
it is separated from the body, it understands without converting itself to the 
images of the fancy, but it converts itself to those things which are in themselves 
intelligible; hence, it then understands itself by itself. It is likewise common 
to every substance separated from matter, to understand that which is above 
itself, by means of its own substance. For, a thing is understood, according 
to the manner in which it is in the one understanding it; and a thing is in an- 
other, according to the nature of that other in which it is. 

* ' ' Modus intelligendi est proportionates modo essendi : seu modus cogno- 
scendi non sequitur modum rei cognitae, sed modum essendi potential cogno- 
scitivae." The mode of understanding is proportioned to the mode of being: or, 
the mode of knowing does not follow the mode of the thing known, but the mode 
of being which is in the cognoscive power. 

" Sensus est singnlarium; intellectus universalium. ' ' The sense is of sin- 
gulars; the intellect, of universals . 



logic: second part. 107 

object; so must every created intellect have its connatural and 
determinate object, beyond which, or apart from which, it can- 
not operate ; that of the divine intellect must be the uncreated 
and infinite. 

The adequate or commensurate object of the human intel- 
lect should be so stated and understood as to be clearly distin- 
guished from that of sense, and trom the respective objects of 
the purely spiritual or angelic, and the Divine intellect. For this 
end, it should be observed that every agent must act or oper- 
ate according to its essential mode of existing;* or, it must act 
according to its nature. Nor can its action ever exceed its 
essence ; t for, powers are the appendices of essence, and are 
measured and limited by it ; as no accidents can exceed their sub- 
ject, so no properties or essential attributes can exceed the essence 
from which they flow or result. It is manifest, also, that pow- 
ers must have objects of their action which are proportioned 
to them, and which, therefore, must be proportioned in perfec- 
tion to the essence which is the subject of those powers, since 
the power follows the essence, and is limited by it. 

In man, the soul is bound to the body, with which it is 
united by substantial composition; in that condition it is 
dependent on the external and internal senses for its intelligent 
action, though the cooperation of these organic powers is only 
objective; i. e., they efficiently cooperate in so much as they 
present the object, whose intelligible essence the intellect 
comes to know from the sensible impressions, by means of 
abstraction ; and, in fact, man, as he is now actually consti- 
tuted, cannot immediately perceive any other being than one 
which is, in some respect, material. Hence, the primary and 
proper object of man's intellect must be the essence of sensible 

* ' ' Uunumquodque operatur ad modum sui esse. ' ' Every thing acts, accord- 
ing to the mode of its existence. 

t ' ' TJnaquaeque potentia in operando liraitatur per essentiam cujus est poten- 
tial ' Every power is limited in its operation, by the essence of which it is a 
power. 

" Corpus reqiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organnm quo talis actio 
exerceatur, sed ratione objecti." (Div. Thorn., 1 p., qu. 75, art. 2, ad. 3.) 
The body is required for the action of the intellect, not as an organ by which 
such action is exercised, but on account of the object. 



108 logic: second part. 

and material things ; and it is only by reasoning upon sensible 
things that he rises to notions of immaterial or spiritual beings. 
Careful reflexion upon the facts of one's own experience and 
intellectual operations, strikingly confirms the truth of the fore- 
going statements. 

The three principal acts, or operations of the understanding in 
cognition are, Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning 
or Ratiocination. A judgment consists of concepts or ideas that 
are compared; and reasoning consists of judgments compared 
to each other. The principal and characteristic function, or 
act of the understanding, is, to perceive truth, to distinguish 
the true and false ; the good and evil, as true and false. In 
the ideas or concepts of things, by means of abstraction or 
remotion, it perceives the universal and the intelligible essence 
of the objects presented to it by the organs of sensation. 
These it compares, and, by means of analysis and synthesis, it 
forms a multitude of new concepts and judgments. 

Simple Apprehersion is the mere perception of the object, 
without any explicit affirmation .or negation. The apprehen- 
sion, to repeat here briefly an explanation already given, 
when the term is used to express the concrete result or 
product of the act of apprehending, is also called an idea, a 
concept, a notion. The word idea is more generally used ; and 
it was selected because the mind, by the act of apprehending, 
forms a sort of sifnilitude of the object perceived ; and the 
term idea means a visible appearajice, or a likeness. This idea, 
by means of which the mind expresses the object of its cogni- 
tion, is also termed the mental word, verbum me?itis, since the 
mind is conceived to speak it, as it were. But this mental word, 
or idea, in the mind perceiving, must not be confounded, as 
already remarked, with se?isation, or with the image, in the 
imagination ; both of which present only sensible qualities, and 
are effects of organic action, which are common to us and the 
brutes. Of the concept whose object is entirely abstract, as 
the infinite, the imagination forms no image ; but, when we 
think of such objects, it strives to form its image of them, and 
it always presents, at least, the terms for them. 



LOGIC: SECOND PART. 109 

The object which the mind perceives, considered in itself 
with its marks or determinations, by which it is what it is, and 
nothing else, is the material object of perception ; but the 
object, as actually manifested to the mind, is the formal 
object of perception. 

The distinction between an apprehension, a judgment and 
reasoning, may be aptly illustrated by an example. If we 
conceive an idea of world, the mere act of perceiving or see- 
ing that idea of world without affirming or denying any pre- 
dicate, is a simple apprehension; but in uttering the proposi- 
tion, '•'■the world is a contingent being" there is a. judgment 
formed; since it affirms the agreement of a predicate and sub- 
ject. If we compare several judgments, and deduce from them 
another, or new judgment, on account of its ?iexus with them, 
this operation of the mind is reasoning; v, g., " The world is 
a contingent being; therefore, its cause is a free being; but 
this cause being free, is also intelligent, since freedom and in- 
telligence connote each other." This is reasoning, or deducing 
one judgment from others. 

All these acts of the intellect are immanent; that is, they 
remain in the mind ; or do not, as such, pass out of it to an 
exterior term, or object of efficient action. 

Immediate or simple judgments are those that are formed by 
the mind seeing directly and immediately the agreement of the 
subject and predicate, without any reasoning. The material 
object of this immediate judgment may be either ideas or facts; 
and these facts may be either i?iternal or external. We form a 
judgment of ideas, when we consider their objects in their 
essence, apart from their actual existence. We judge of facts 
when we think of objects in the concrete, and actual order of 
physical existence, and make any affirmation concerning them ; 
whether they be facts of internal consciousness, or of external 
objects. 

The objects of thought may be divided : ist, into those that 
pertain to the order of reason, or to necessary matter; 2d, into 
those that belong to the experi?nental or empirical order. Judg- 
ments whose objects are wholly of the sphere or order of 



110 logic: second part. 

reason, are ?iecessary and universal; for their objects are not 
limited to the particular, as are, these trees, these men. 

But when the objects of the judgment are in the order of 
experience or of the experimental order the judgment is particu- 
lar and contingent; because its objects are particular and con- 
tingent. But in the judgments formed upon both these 
classes of objects, the evidence is immediate; in the sense that 
it is not derived from a comparison of other judgments, but is 
furnished by the simple comparative apprehension of the ideas, 
which are affirmed to agree or disagree. 

Mediate judgments are such as are formed by discursive 
reasoning; i. e., by comparing several judgments, and per- 
ceiving that the nexus of the premises and conclusion is such 
that we cannot assent to the premises without assenting to the 
conclusion ; in other words, it is by the medium of reasoning 
that such judgments are formed. 

Reasoning which proceeds from certain and evident prin- 
ciples, is termed demonstrative, or apodictic. This reasoning 
which is termed demonstrative, or apodictic, is of four kinds : 
i st, reasoning a priori; as when we conclude from the cause to 
the effect, or from the principle to its application; v. g., "that 
which has life has motion ; an animal has life; therefore, an 
animal has motion;" 2d, reasoning a posteriori; as, when we 
deduce the cause from the effect; e. g., "order exists in all the 
works of the universe ; therefore, all the works of the universe 
have an intelligent cause ; " or, as in the proverb, " ex pede 
Herculem," from the footprints, I conclude it was Hercules ; 
3d, the reasoning is direct, when from one notion of the subject 
we infer another; e. g., "man is free; therefore, he is intelli- 
gent ; " 4th, reasoning is indirect or apagogic, when we show that 
its contradictory or contrary leads to an absurdity, called, also, 
re duct io ad absurdum; e. g., "If God is not eternal, then He 
had a beginning; if He had a beginning, He had a cause; 
and if He had a cause, then He is not God at all; which is 
absurd." 

Of these forms of demonstration, the one a p?iori excels 
the rest ; that is, it is the most satisfactory to the mind ; for in 



logic: second part. Ill 

it the mind reposes at ease, with no desire to know more of 
the conclusion thus demonstrated to it, or made evident in its 
causes; in the others, the certainty is perfect in species, since 
ail doubt is excluded ; but the mind's repose is not so com- 
plete, it may desire more, and, when the nature of the matter 
permits, it will strive to know a priori the truth which it thus 
attains by reasoning a posteriori. 

Knowledge acquired by reasoning a posteriori, in itself is not 
scientific knowledge; as will be shown in a subsequent article. 

Reasoning is also divided into pure, empirical and mixed. The 
pure is that in which the premises are both necessary, or are' of 
the order of reaso?i; v. g., " None but a straight line is the 
shortest distance between any two points; a curved line is not 
straight ; therefore, a curved line is not the shortest distance 
between two given points." 

The empirical argument has both premises experi?ne?ital 
truths ; " the rose bush that is set out in May will grow ; this 
rose bush was set out in May ; therefore, it will grow." The 
mixed reasoning is that in which one premise is absolute truth, 
and the other empirical; v. g., "a contingent being cannot ex- 
ist unless there is a necessary being ; but there exist contingent 
beings; therefore, there is a necessary being." 

In all these species of ratiocination, the conclusion has the 
nature of the premises in some mode, and it follows the less 
worthy premise in quality and quantity. 

The intellect, by iis perceptions or in forming concepts, passes 
from the particular to the universal; but, in reasoning, this 
process 'is reversed; and the progress is from what is more 
general to that which is less so; for the middle term is always 
general, in respect to the conclusion. Under this point of 
view, reasoning is synthetical. 

The conclusion is implicitly in the premises ; it is first expli- 
citly seen, as such, only when the middle term is found ; the 
nexus with the premises then becomes evident. This truth 
solves the objections against the syllogism, whether it be con- 
sidered as a means of discovering or of proving truth. 

By means of these acts of cognition, namely, simple appre- 



112 LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 

/tension, judgment and reasoning, the mind acquires genuine 
certainty of their objects ; for, there is truth in all of them. 
As already shown, truth is the conformity of the mind know- 
ing to the object known ; and, in apprehensions and judg- 
ments, there is this conformity in different degrees, to be sure ; 
but each is perfect, according to its kind. 

The specific perfection of every cognition, is the truth that 
is in it. In a simple apprehension, an object is perceived, 
though no explicit judgment is formed; this is conformity of 
the mind to the object, perfect in its species and degree. In 
judgment, and reasoning, this conformity is more perfect in 
degree, because they affirm explicitly ; and while in apprehen- 
sions there is only that implicit affirmation, or transcendental 
truth participated in by them, and referable ultimately to the 
first truth; in our judgments, truth is explicitly affirmed by the 
mind, giving to reason and intelligence their specific nature, 
and their highest value. 

If the judgment faithfully affirms only what the ideas are 
immediately seen to include, or exclude, it is clear that no 
erroneous judgment can be assented to. All our cognoscive 
powers are determined to their acts of cognition by the evide7ice 
in their objects; and when truth is seen to be such, it is known 
to be such ; and their acts are as true, as they are necessary, 
partaking of the truth of their first cause. 

This doctrine cannot be denied, unless by that systematic 
scepticism, in which the human mind is morally false to itself, 
and is, therefore, perverse in its own enunciations. For the 
ailment of those minds that can si?icerely doubt evident first 
principles, philosophy can furnish no remedy. 



ARTICLE IV. 

OBJECTIVE REALITY OF IDEAS. 

The ideas here meant are those that express or represent in 
the mind the essences or natures of objects, and which the 
intellect forms by reflecting on its concepts, and abstracting or 



logic: second paet. 113 

removing from them the conditions of individuality, i. e., the 
concrete accidents. They are not the same then as the ideas 
which the mind acquires immediately, by simple apprehen- 
sion and by the senses, whose objective truth was sufficiently 
evinced in the preceding articles. 

The ideas whose objective truth is here to be shown, are 
those reflex ideas, or notions, that are general, or, that include 
•many objects ; v. g., substance, cause, effect, the possible, etc. The 
question is, then, do such ideas really and truly express or repre- 
sent the objects for which they stand, or is there through them 
a conformity of the mind to the objects of its cognitions ? Have 
these ideas any objective value, or have they true agreement 
with their objects outside of the mind, as perceiving or knowing 
them ? or, are they merely certain subjective and innate forms, 
or types in the intellect, according to which the mind forms for 
itself its objects which it calls substance, cause, effect, etc. ? Is 
that which is expressed in these general and primary ideas, in 
any respect, in the objects for which the ideas stand ; or is it 
merely subjective? Is the conclusion from the idea to its ob- 
ject, valid illation, as the conclusion from the photograph like- 
ness to the person represented by it, is valid illation ? Has, 
for example, that which is called substance, really in itself what 
the mind attributes to it in its idea of it ; or, does it exist only 
in the idea or form in the mind, the idea having no extrinsic 
object truly corresponding to it ? 

In the foregoing interrogatories the same thing is variously 
expressed, the same notion is presented under different phases, 
purposely in order that the real state of the question may be 
more clearly apprehended by the youthful inquirer. 

It is affirmed, then, that ideas are truly and really the repre- 
sentatives, and exponents of their objects, as they are; that the 
objects of cognition are truly expressed in the mind, by those 
ideas or final and general mental words. This is no more, 
-indeed, than affirming that the mind is capable of acquiring 
true ideas of the objects which it perceives. 

That which is understood in the mind is the same as what 
is in the object; but in the one it exists in concrete, while in 
8 



114 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

the other it is in the abstract, yet, the relation between them is 
that of truth, or it is the mind conformable to its object of cog- 
nition. We must assign to objects actually perceived concur- 
rent causality, direct or indirect, in the formation of all our 
ideas,* of every kind. In other words, we find a verification 
of all that we know or can positively conceive even as possible, 
in what we have actually perceived in the order of reality. The 
idea in the mind then must truly represent the object, so far as 
that object efficiently concurred in its production, else it would 
be an effect that has no real resemblance to its cause. 

The objective verity of our ideas, is one of those truths that 
cannot be formally demonstrated, nor does it require such 
proof. Nor can it be denied, either, without implicitly affirm- 
ing what is in question. For he that denies it, i. e., that ideas 
are truly representative of their extrinsic objects, thereby as- 
sumes that his idea of an idea is truly conformable to, and 
representative of, its object, for logical truth is the conformity 
of the mind to its object; otherwise, he asserts nothing. There- 
fore, to deny the objective truth of ideas, is an explicit assump- 
tion of the truth that is in question. 

It is evident that if the ideas by which the mind expresses 
the objects of cognition, do not truly present those objects ; 
then, the mind is not capable of attaining truth, or of con- 
forming itself to objects known. But, just as it must be ad- 
mitted that the mind can and does know, through the medium 
of the senses, the existence and distinction of singular and 
concrete objects truly as they are ; so, it is equally evident, 
that its farther notions of their essence and nature, formed by 
abstraction and generalization, by reflexion and right reason- 
ing, are really verified in those objects. He that can doubt 
the objective value of his ideas, and the share that their ob- 
jects have in efficiently helping to their origin and formation, 
should also doubt all first principles, and even internal facts 
themselves ; nay, he would be incapable of forming a certain 
judgment, and, consequently, incapable of any reasoning. For 

*"Ex ohjecto et potentia oritur notitia." Knowledge proceeds from the 
object and the power. 



LOGIC : SECOND PAKT. 115 

the evidence is not more clear for the certainty of first princi- 
ples, internal facts, or for any judgment, than that which the 
mind has for the agreement of its ideas with their objects; in 
other words, for the objective truth of its own notions or 
ideas. They are all evident, and, therefore, all true. 

Hence, the doctrine that the general or common ideas 
in the mind do not express or declare real objective truth, 
but are only a kind of subjective forms by which the intellect is 
directed in thinking ; is purely an assumption, directly against 
what we see and know by the facts of experience ; is destruc- 
tive of all certainty, and has no argument in its favor, except 
those purely fanciful analogies which are the only basis of 
every merely arbitrary hypothesis. This hypothesis does not ex- 
plain or account for. the evident facts of experience, for instead 
of being founded on those facts, or being itself a conclusion 
deduced from them as premises, these facts must be distorted 
and our concept of their nature be changed, in order that they 
may be adapted to explain and prove the theory. 

The manner in which our general or universal ideas are 
formed, and the mode in which they are verified in their ob- 
jects, will be rendered more clear by the fuller explanation of 
the whole subject, which is given in the following article. 



ARTICLE V. 

UNIVERSALS; THEIR OBJECTS; UNIVERSAL IDEAS, HOW FORMED. 

There was long a dispute in the schools as to the nature 
and object of what are termed universals; the disputants were 
divided into three celebrated parties : the nominalists, exagger- 
ated realists and moderate realists. 

The nominalists maintained that imiversals are mere names ; 
that express indefinitely and confusedly a collection of individ- 
uals; some thinking they neither existed in objects nor in con- 
cepts ; while others of the same school contended that they 
exist in the concept, but have no real relation to the objects 



116 LOGIC I SECOND PART. 

included. The exaggerated realists contended that the univer- 
sal is in f he concept, and in the object cutside of the mind, in 
the same maimer that it is conceived in the mind ; that there 
is, in objects of the same species, one and the same real 
essence, really common to all the individuals included in it. 
By their theory, individuals of the same species, being essen- 
tially identical, differ only in their accidents ; there is one com- 
mon human essence which is actually in all men, as there is one 
common entity in all beings. For example, the human nature 
which actually exists in Peter, is really identical with the human 
nature that is affirmed of man in general; and, therefore, Peter 
is both universal and particular, as regards his human nature 
or actual essence. 

It is clear that this doctrine does not differ materially 
from the theory of Pantheism, or the system which identifies 
every real being with God. 

The moderate realists taught that there is in objects of the 
same class a ?iature or essence which is apprehended by the 
mind in a universal idea ; but it does not exist in the mind and 
in the object, or a parte rei, in the same manner; it is concrete, 
in the one ; and abstract, in the other. 

Now, as a fact, there are in our minds universal ideas, and 
there are names or terms in language that stand as signs for 
them. 

General or universal truths constitute the elements of all the 
sciences ; nearly all the names, or nouns, of language, except 
the proper names of individuals, are conwion or universal for 
their classes of objects. Genus, species, difference, attribute, 
accident, express real generalizations in the mind, and, when 
actually applied to objects, are by no means vague, indefinite 
names, expressing nothing but mere concepts which are really 
unfounded in objects outside of the ideas. 

Common or universal names do not stand for a collection of 
particular individuals ; as a family, a people, a thousand; for, 
these terms or names cannot be affirmed of each individual of 
the collection singly : but are applied to many copulatively. 
But, on the contrary, the common names, animal, spirit^ vege- 



logic: second part. 117 

table, are predicated of many taken singly, but not of many 
taken copulatively. 

The perception of similarity in individuals gives rise to uni- 
versal ideas in the mind; and even the idea of a mere collection 
of particular individuals, presupposes the universal idea. 

Common terms, then, express a concept which presents to 
the intellect something that is found equally in many individ- 
uals ; and, therefore, these terms express real ideas in the 
mind, as even the faculty of consciousness directly testifies. 

There is nothing in the objects outside of the intellect which, 
of itself and anterior to any operation of the mind, is universal. 

For, what is universal cannot become singular, since the 
universal and the singular are opposites ; and opposites cannot 
become identical ; v. g., one and many, white and black, com- 
municable and incommunicable, cannot as such become identical. 
No real object, i. e., no actual Jiature, can of itself be univer- 
sal ; so as to be the same in the many really, that it is in the 
individual. If it were universal, would its specific, or its gen- 
eric nature be universal, or both ? Clearly, the universal, as 
such, does not exist, a parte rei. 

Every universal, as such, is formed by the intellect ; but it 
is truly founded in the realities which it includes. 

Two things are verified in a universal ; or it has two con- 
stituents : i st, that which it expresses, is one; 2d, it is commu- 
nicable to many; i. e., it is really multiplied in many individ- 
uals, so that they are numbered, as individuals are numbered. 

If a universal be not one, then the individuals in which it is 
multiplied would form only a collection of different things ; and 
at the same time, if it were not communicable to many, it would 
not be universal, but singular. The universal is, therefore, 
logically verified in objects, though not really or a parte rei ex- 
isting in them as one, and many. 

A colleciioji, as already observed, is constituted by many sin- 
gular things, which are considered as one; the term collectio?i, 
and universal, both include the idea of many, but the universal 
is affirmed of that many, so that it is applied both to the 
whole, and is distributive ly applied to its i?iferiors or subjects; 



118 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

while collection is affirmed only of the whole number of its in- 
feriors or subjects; and its individuals are only parts of it, of 
which collection cannot be affirmed. 

A thing, while an object of sensation, is singular; when an 
object of intelligence, it is, in some manner, universal ; or, as 
the old axiom has it, "singulare dum sentitur, universale dum 
intelligitur;" it is singular, as it is in the sense ; it is universal, 
as it is in the intellect. 

This subject will be more easily understood, if we analyse 
the operation by which the intellect passes from the singular, 
in the simple apprehension, to the universal idea. The opera- 
tion of the intellect, in forming the universal idea, is precisive 
and comparative; i. e., it perfects the universal by the acts of 
prescinding, or abstracting-; and by comparing the inferiors or 
subjects of the ideas thus formed. When an individual object 
is presented by means of sensation to the intellect, it abstracts 
or educes the essence from the sensible representation ; and 
thereby forms the concept in which that essence is separated 
from all individual conditions, or concrete accidents. 

This is a precisive cognition, and is the proper and charac- 
teristic act of the intellect ; and it furnishes the comprehension 
of the universal, and common terms. This precisive cognition 
of the essence thus known, may be called a direct universal; 
because it is formed by a direct cognition; yet, it does not ex- 
plicitly affirm universality, until, by co77iparison, its relation to 
all actual or possible inferiors or subjects is perceived and 
affirmed by the intellect. 

Thus, by this precisive act of the mind, and by comparison, 
the intellect forms the idea of utiity of nature, from the indi- 
vidual objects presented to it; a unity, that is not real, but 
logical. The essence which is thus 07ie, becomes the species 
and genus, and is called the reflex universal. It is by thus 
operating, then, that the mind forms the concept of the uni- 
versal nature or essence. 

The basis on which all universals are founded, or the matter 
of them, is the similar nature that is in the things that consti- 
tute its inferiors or subjects; the generalized idea of that nature 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 119 

constitutes the formal universal, or the universal properly so- 
called. By abstraction the mind can generalize the nature 
known in one thing, so as to extend it to all possible things of 
the kind. 

Hence, then, to state still more precisely, and sum up the 
preceding doctrine, the specific and distinguishing properties 
of the reflex universal, are, ist, its unity, or it is one ; 2d, its 
aptitude or adaptability, to be predicated of many, or exist in 
many, whether as essence, property, or accident. In this wide 
sense of the word, all common terms stand for universals. The 
five universals, or universal predica dies, namely, genus, species, 
difference, property or attribute, and accident, are the only 
universals that can be predicated univocally of all the ten cate- 
gories, or highest genera. Other common terms do not apply 
to all the categories, but are confined to special ones ; also, the 
transcendental predicables, as " being,* something, one, true, 
good, etc.," cannot be applied in any univocal sense to all the 
ten categories, but yet they are applied analogically to all the 
categories. When, therefore, it is said by logicians that there 
are five universals and only five, the meaning is that there are 
just five universals that can be predicated univocally, through 
all the ten categories or ultimate genera. 

That the five universals, genus, species, difference, property 
or attribute, and accident, include all that is univocally pred- 
icate of the ten categories may be thus shown : genus,\ which 
includes species under it, is not whole or entire essence, as 
essence exists in the individuals of a species; but it may be 
regarded as the matter of whole essence. The specific difference 
is the forma, or formal principle, which, by uniting with the 
matter, constitutes the quasi compound, species, which expresses 

* " Sex transcendentalia sunt: res, ens, verum, bonum, aliquid, unum; quae 
barbara voce amplexa sunt per initiales litteras reubau. ' ' There are six trans- 
cendental : thing, being, true, good, something, one. To assist the memory, the 
initials of the corresponding Latin words are formed into the barbarous word, 
reubau. 

t ' ' Genus est quod praedicatur de pluribus specie differentibus in quid incom- 
pletum, sen in quid, tanquam pars materialis." Genus is what is predicated as 
something incomplete, or as a material part, of many things differing in their 
species. 



120 LOGIC: SECOND PART. 

whole or perfect essence ; i. e., essence as it actually is in indi- 
viduals. Also, this essence as in individuals has properties 
that are per se connected with it, i. e., properties that neces- 
sarily belong to it, resulting necessarily from the essence as it is 
in itself intrinsically ; and again, the individuals of the species 
may have accidents that are purely contingent, i. e., which may 
be present, or absent, without affecting the essence in any manner. 

Now, whatever can be predicated at all of any object, must 
be either within the essence of that object, or outside of its 
essence; if it be within the essence, it must be either its mate- 
rial principle, in which case it will be genus that is predicated; 
or, it must be its formal principle, in which case it will be the 
difference that is predicated ; or, finally, it must be the union 
or compound of the two, and in this case, it will be species 
that is predicated. Again, if that which is predicated be some- 
thing that is outside of the essence, either it is something that 
?iecessarily belongs to the object, then it will be property or 
attribute; or, it is something that contingently belongs to it, and 
then it will be accident. There is no univocal predicable ap- 
plying to all the ten categories that cannot be referred to one 
or other of these five. 

The five universals which Logicians enumerate as the only 
ones that are strictly or univocally such, are, then, as already 
observed, genus, species, difference, attribute, and accident, and 
they differ essentially from each other. 

Species and genera differ among themselves essentially* that 
is essential without which a thing cannot exist. Things may 
have some essential attributes common to them, and yet differ 
by other essential constituents which determine them to wholly 
diverse natures. For example, brute and man, have in com- 
mon all that is included in the generical concept, animal ; but 
man has, in addition, intellect that judges, reasons, knows the 
universal or the super-sensible. This is an essential difference 

*"Omne quod de pluribus univoce praedicatur vel est genus, vel est species; 
vel differentia, vel proprium, vel accidens." Whatever is predicated univo- 
cally of many things, is either a genus, or a species, or a difference, or a prop- 
erty, or an accident. 



logic: second part. 121 

by which man is constituted of a wholly different species from 
brute. 

In the direct universal, which the mind has whenever it 
forms its first concept of any intelligible essence or nature, the 
intellect does not positively refer the intelligible essence con- 
ceived by it to its inferiors; for, when the concept of any 
essence becomes actually related* in the mind to its inferiors, 
it is then the reflex universal. 

Hence, the direct concept of an essence makes it only nega- 
tively or inadequately universal ;\ but the reflex and co?nparative, 
which presents the essence as actually referred to many, is posi- 
tively and adequately universal. We may, therefore, consider 
the essence or ?iature in different states : ist, as it is in singular 
or concrete individual objects, in which, while it is truly and 
formally singular, yet it is materially and remotely universal, 
in as much as it is capable of founding the universal; 2d, the 
essence may be considered in abstract, as first conceived by 
the mind, but not actually referred to many ; 3d, it may be 
considered as one, and yet positively referred to many; this 
last is the universal, properly so called.| 

When it is said, " the more universal knowledge is, the more 
i?)iperfect it is;" and that, "philosophy treats of the highest and 
most universal causes of all things ; " the term universal is em- 
ployed in two different senses : in the first case, it is the direct 
universal, which is always more or less vague, and indetermi- 
nate; in the second, it is the reflex, which refers to its inferiors 
positively, and determinately; and it constitutes man's most 
perfect mode of knowing. 

♦"Universale secundum quod accipitur cum intentione universalitatis." 
(Div. Thorn. I p., qu. 85, art. 5, ad. 4.) Universal, according as it is taken 
with the intention of universality. 

t " Cum enim universale sit ens rationis cujus totum esse est, ut cognoscatur : 
haud dubie, non est universale quod ut tale non cognoscitur. " For since the 
universal is an ens rationis, a creation of the mind, whose whole essence is that 
it should be known; there is no doubt that what is not known as such is not a 
universal. 

t"Natura non dicitur adcequate universalis, priusquam concipitur uti una 
apta inesse multis.' ' A nature is not said to be adequately universal before it is 
conceived as ' ' one fit to be in many . ' ' 



122 logic: second paet. 

Hence, it must be evident that the ufiiversal proceeds both 
from things, and from the intellect. The nature actually exists 
in the material basis of the universal, individual and real, in 
each singular thing; while, in the mind, it possesses only an 
ideal existence, and is acquired by reflex and comparative cog- 
nition. 

As the mind, by means of the idea, is conformed to its ob- 
ject ; and because the idea is formed by the combined agency 
of the object and mind, the idea expresses the relation between 
the mind and object; therefore, the idea is objectively true, i. e., 
it is truly representative of the object. 

When we say, " the mind as knowing is conformable to the 
object known," we affirm a relatiofi between the mind and the 
object of its cognition ; and this relation is logical truth, strictly 
so called. Now, a universal idea expresses an actual relation 
of mind and object; for the idea proceeds from both. Though 
the universal nature does not exist really, but only logically, yet 
it is founded in realities, and is verified in those realities; as the 
rule or fneasure is verified, as such, in the objects conformable 
to which it is made, and to which it is applied. 

The universal, then, as referred both to the object and the 
idea, does not possess a real unity and identity; but it is logical 
unity only; for that which is really common to many, is not 
universal, but singular. 

The conclusion follows, then, that every universal, as such, 
is constituted by the intellect ; but it is truly founded in the 
realities which it includes as its inferiors or subjects. 

It may not be far amiss to observe in this place, that, as to 
the theory that one species of substance may be developed by 
natural agencies into another one; and which its defenders 
carry so far as to assert that man even was actually developed 
from rude matter, through various intermediate species of 
plant, animal, to the ape, and finally to man ; the following 
propositions should be carefully considered : 

First: As a fact, there appears to be no instance really 
known of a new species of organism being developed, either 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 123 

from purely inorganic matter, or from another organism of a 
totally different species. 

Second: All the reasoning employed in favor of this so- 
called *• genesis of species," is based upon remote analo- 
gies, which, of course, cannot afford demonstration; for no 
mere indeterminate analogy can ever found a real demonstra- 
tion. 

Third; So far as facts are known, they all, without excep- 
tion, go to prove that there is no development by nature of 
any organic being except from a germ, or from a principle 
which is the equivalent of a germ. 

Fourth : It is repugnant to reason to affirm that a being 
can, in its action, go beyond the limits of its own essence or 
nature,* or that it can transcend its own species, so as to pro- 
duce, of its own efficiency, an object not only of an essentially 
different species, but which is intrinsically superior to it. 

Fifth: As a fact, also, there are many species of substances 
actually existing; each of these species having its own essen- 
tial constituents, by which it is identical with each individual 
of its species, and by which it differs, intrinsically and essen- 
tially, from the individuals of every other species. 

Sixth : To affirm that all material and spiritual substance is 
only force, or a collection of co-related forces, is to assert a 
mere hypothesis, for which no real proof is adduced, or can be 
adduced. 

Force presupposes an agent or substantial principle from 
which it proceeds ; and it is as intelligible to say that every 
thing is motio7i or time, as it is to say that every thing is 
force; for we can as easily conceive motion apart from some- 

* ' ' Effectus non superat causam. ' ' An effect is not above its cause. 

"Modus agendi sequitur modum essendi." Manner of acting must agree 
with the manner of existing. 

1 ' Materia non potest producere effectum immaterialem. (Vide Div. Thorn. 1 
p. , qu. 118.) Matter cannot produce an immaterial effect. 

"Forma est principium speciei; et ab una forma non proveniunt diverse 
species. (Sum. 1 p. , qu. 76, art. 5.) The form determines a thing in its species 
or essence; and from this form, other forms of different essence or species can- 
not proceed. 



124 LOGIC I SECOND PAKT. 

thing moving, as we can conceive force without some agent 
exerting it.* 

" But," it may be said, "force is here the same thing that 
act is when it is understood as the formal principle in every 
thing that actually exists." 

God is called in true philosophy, actus purissimus, or the 
absolutely pure act. In this sense of the word, to exist substan- 
tially, is act (actus), and actus purissimus includes not only exist- 
ing substantially, but existing in a manner that implies infinite 
perfection, and absolute independence of a cause. By the 
terms, " actus purissimus," besides the positive perfection 
affirmed, there is excluded from the concept of God all 
potentiality; i. e., all perfectibility in him by any sort of 
mutation, from non-action into action. Created act perfects 
the creature; for, by action, it acquires what it had not be- 
fore. The human soul, and, likewise, all other created sub- 
stantial f owns, are also said to be acts; i. e., are substantial 
and active principles; but they are perfected by successive ac- 
tion; or, their existence or their action is not simultaneous ; i. 
e., their existence is by successive acts of existing; but infinite 
and eternal act is simultaneous; i. e., free from all succession, 
or all successive action. 

It is evident, then, that the concept of pure act, and the con- 
cept which we have of a substantial pri?iciple which is in poteti- 
tia first, and then becomes actual, exclude each other as com- 
pletely as do those of the finite and the Infinite. These things 
being true, it may be affirmed that, any theory which resolves 
all actual things into co-related forces, so as to ignore or deny 
the preceding distinctions, must be false ; for, it must, in some 
sense, identify beings which are totally and absolutely distinct, 
or make no distinction between beings which have nothing 
that is, in any univocal sense, common to them, and which are, 
therefore, totally distinct. 

The ambiguity of the term force, which is used one while to 

* ' ' Prius est esse quam agere." " Nulla substantia creata potest fieri immedi- 
ate operativa." Existence is presupposed to operation. No created sub- 
stance is immediately operative; i. e., it must possess powers. 



logic: second paet. 125 

express the degree of power exercised; another while for the 
concrete agent itself; and then for what is purely phenomenal, 
gives rise to much equivocal and fallacious reasoning. 

Not a few recent writers on philosophical subjects confound, 
and even identify, certain organic effects which precede or 
accompany intellectual thought, with the action of the intellect 
itself; thus they perplex and darken for their readers some 
truths that are in themselves clear, with language that is in 
reality either superficial or eccentric. Such authors will speak 
of the acts of fancy, or even those of the external senses, as if 
they were really intellectual operations. 



ARTICLE VI. 

MEMORY. 

Memory* is the power of recalling to the mind, recognizing 
and distinguishing things formerly known. 

The me?nory, therefore, performs four principal functions : 
namely, retention of the object or idea; its reproduction, with 
the help of the fancy ; its recognition, and the distinction of Us 
time. 

There is a sensile or organic memory; and there is the intel- 
lectual memory. The sensile or organic ?nemory recalls to the 
imaginationf objects of the senses formerly known through 
them, and recognizes them by means of the sensible conditions 
or properties with which they are invested. This memory, 
being purely organic, is possessed even by brutes; v. g., the 
dog recognizes his master ; the cattle return at the same time 
and to the same place for food ; and numberless other facts 
will readily occur, which put the the truth beyond a doubt. 

* ' ' Memoria prseteritorum est: Seu est ipsa ratio prateriti quam attendit me- 
moria." (3. Thorn, lp., qu. 78, art. 4.) Memory is of past things; or, it is 
precisely the past as such that memory regards. 

t ' ' Imaginatio est quasi thesaurus formarum per sensum acceptorum. (Sum. 
1 p., qu. 78, art. 4.) The imagination is, as it were, a treasury of images 
acquired through sensible power. 



126 LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 

Since the seusile memory is organic, it is subject to all the 
contingencies of disease and decay, which, in the present order 
of Providence, are common to all living organs. 

The sensile or organic memory, therefore, has for its object 
sensible facts, reproduced with some of their sensible conditions, 
and distinguished by their intentions, i. e., as pleasing, hurtful, 
etc. ; and known as past.* 

The action of the intellectual memory has a higher order of 
cognition in it ; this "faculty may be defined : the power of 
reproducing, and recognizing concepts or ideas and judgments 
formerly had. Memory may act spontaneously; or it may be 
made by the will to exert itself, and, along with the under- 
standing, or rather by means of it, to pass through interme- 
diate or associated ideas to ideas more remote. 

This exercise of the memory, in which the understanding is 
applied to various reproduced ideas in order to recall forgotten 
things by means of comparison and reasoning on their relation 
to something which is remembered, is called reminiscence. \ 
Such mode of remembering is proper only to ratiofial beings. 

Why is it that among the ideas with which we are per- 
petually occupied, some are remembered; and others entirely 
vanish from the memory ? In memories which are in a normal 
state, the difference depends, in a great degree, upon the atten- 
tat; and on the association of ideas. 

The attentiofi is the direction of the mind to an object to 
which it adheres for a time. The attention", in such case, is 
either spontaneous, or voluntary and reflex. There is spo?ita- 
neous attention in all thought ; even when the mind takes no 
reflex notice of its own operations. It is violently arrested, 
and long kept, by objects that are strange or marvelous; and 
often returns to them. 

* ' ' Sensus (hominis) est deficient qucedam participatio intellectus. ' ' (Sum. 1 p. , 
qu. 77, art. 7.) Sensible power is a certain imperfect participation of intellect. 

t ' ' Reminiscentia est inquisitio alicujus, quod a memoria excidit; seu, memo- 
riae amissae instauratio ex aliquo interno principio, quod oblivione deletum non 
est. ' ' Reminiscence is seeking for something which has escaped from memory ; 
or, Is the bringing back of a forgotten object, by means of some internal prin- 
ciple which is not lost in oblivion. 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 127 

Attention is voluntary, when the will directs the mind to an 
object to which it adheres for a time; and this it does either by 
one, or many repeated acts. These repeated acts of the atten- 
tion, by which the powers of the mind are often directed to an 
object, constitute meditation* 

A good memory is susceptible, retentive and ready. Its sus- 
ceptibility much depends upon a happy constitution of mind 
and body. Retentiveness and readiness, depend in part upon 
the same cause ; but also upon that degree of attention which 
enables the understanding to form clear and distinct ideas of 
its objects. Prudent exercise of the memory greatly improves 
it in all these perfections. Habitual moral truth and the virtue 
of temperance are requisites for perfecting in it healthful and 
vigorous action. 

The association of ideas is also a great aid both for retentive- 
ness and readiness of memory. Ideas may be associated, or 
united, with other ideas which are distinctly remembered, by 
any circumstances of time, place, number, mode, quality, anal- 
ogy, resemblance; or even by any arbitrary law. But it is 
advisable, when it can be done, to associate truths in the mem- 
ory by some principle of logical connexion. In any of these 
cases, when one idea occurs to the mind, it readily recalls those 
that are associated with it. 

The correctness of intellectual acts, much depends on the 
fidelity of memory : and even the greater or less capacity of 
the intellect, indirectly proceeds, in no small degree, from 
greater or less perfection in the organic powers, sensile mem- 
ory and imagination, t owing to its peculiar dependence on 
these organs. 

The memory, though naturally it is so susceptible of direct 

* "Pluribus intentus, minor est ad singula sensus." If the mind be intent 
on many objects, its attention is less to single ones. 

1 ' Meditatio est frequens et iterata mentis attentio objecto voluntarie adhibita." 
Meditation is the exercise of frequent and repeated acts of attention in the mind, 
voluntarily directed to an object. 

t ' ' Hli in quibus virtus imaginativa, memorativa, et cogitativa est melius dis- 
posita, sunt melius dispositi ad intelligendum. ' ' (Div. Tbom .) They in whom 
the internal senses, imagination, memory, and the cogitative power are best 
disposed, are best fitted to understand. 



128 LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 

improvement, is often debilitated by disease, is impaired by 
indolence and sensuality, and it grows dull and feeble in old 
age. But, in its ordinary and normal state, it may 'be affirmed, 

First. That memory ?iever deceives per se, i. e., of itself, or by 
its own efficient action. 

Second. It affords certai?ity as to the objects which it recalls 
aind distinctly recognizes. 

The memory never deceives per se; for, either we distinctly 
remember the past thing, or we do not; if we do not distinctly 
remember it, no error is committed, provided we do not judge 
it to be different from what it is remembered to be; and we 
judge it only as it is remembered. It follows, then, that the 
memory, of itself, does not deceive, but that error in its case, 
as in all others, proceeds from the will urging the understand- 
ing to affirm precipitately or imprudently more or less than the 
mind sees. But if we distinctly remember the past thing, we 
are perfectly sure of it, and are not deceived. 

This perfect and unerring certainty of memory is implied in 
all the important affairs of individual life and civil society ; it is 
implied also in all our reasoning ; for, without memory, there 
could be no process of reasoning. Hence, it is false to affirm 
that memory can afford the mind only probability; it gives per- 
fect certainty, as to the most important things. Who can doubt 
that he often heard of London, Paris, Rome, and that he re- 
members with perfect certainty numberless past things? Nay, 
we are as certain as to the objects of that faculty, as we are of 
those of external sense, or any other power, through which the 
understanding comes to know truth.* Memory will seldom 
prove to be even an occasion of error, provided we affirm pre- 
cisely, and only what the memory recognizes in its comparative 
apprehension, and as it recognizes it. 

* ' ' Unusquisque judicat prout affectus est. " " One judges according as he 
is affected. ' ' Feeling and passion greatly influence the judgment, and they are 
frequently the cause of error. 



logic: second part. 129 

ARTICLE VII. 

testimony;* doth it afford a means of philosophical 
certainty in some important matters. 

Philosophical certainty is the reflex certainty which is derived 
from a critical examination or scrutiny of the motives and the 
principles that afford ordinary direct certainty, whether it rest 
on the evidence of the object, or on authority. 

Our senses enable us to know by experience only present ob- 
jects that express themselves in our minds through the organs. 
But objects not known through our own. senses, and which are 
distant in time or place, we can know only through witnesses, 
or by faith in testimony. 

A witness is one who assures another of a fact or truth which 
he either knows of his own knowledge, or on due authority. 
An immediate, or eye-witness, is one who testifies to a fact or 
object which he perceived in its own evidence to him ; a medi- 
ate, or, an ear-witness, is one who gives testimony of a fact 

*In the phraseology of the Legal Profession, or in our civil jurisprudence, the 
consistent testimony of a sufficient number of competent witnesses, is said to 
furnish evidence to the court or jury, or to constitute evidence, of the fact to be 
proved; and in some connexions, the terms evidence and testimony, are employed 
by jurists as synonymous; v. g., "the witness gives evidence," and "the 
witness gives testimony," are expressions which are frequently used by them, 
indiscriminately or as being identical in meaning. 

It is perfectly legitimate for lawyers, in order to secure simplicity, clearness 
and precision, to restrict or extend the application of terms employed by them 
in a technical, and, therefore, an arbitrary sense. But it would be erroneous. 
and not scholarly, to found a philosophical explanation of evidence and testimony 
as motives of certainty, on this confined and special view of the subject, and 
this particular use of those terms in civil courts of justice; this is actually done, 
however, in some books of Logic. It is manifest that to treat the motives of 
certainty philosophically, greater scope must be given to their explanation. It 
should be based, it would also seem, on that signification of those terms which 
is attributed to them by prevailing use among the learned in general. 

The object or truth which is evident to us, we see; that w T hich we know only 
by testimony, we believe, but do not see; for that which is seen, is evident, and, 
vice versa, that which is evident, is seen. This exemplifies the proper meaning 
of the words, according to approved general usage; as the observant reader 
will, doubtless, have noticed for himself. 

In fact, there is seldom a case actually occurring, in which the testimony 
elicited before a civil court possesses all the requisites to constitute it a motive 
that furnishes philosophical certainty; or, in other words, the certainty which 
there suffices, because the best which is practically attainable in juridical mat- 
ters, can rarely fulfill the requirements of philosophical certainty, which ex- 
cludes even the possibility of error. 

9 



130 logic: second part. 

which he heard from others ; whether these others were them- 
selves immediate, or mediate witnesses. 

Proposition: The testimony of witnesses can furnish infalli- 
ble certainty in regard to sensible facts or events. 

The testimony of the witnesses for its credibility depends, 
first, upon their knowledge of the fact or event to which they 
testify; and, second, upon their veracity. Now, if we sup- 
pose the witnesses to be numerous; of different interests, 
habits, education, age, character, etc.; and that they unani- 
mously and constantly testify to the same substantial state- 
ment of the fact, such, v. g., as is the case with regard to the 
existence of such cities as Paris, London, Rome, etc., or any 
other public and notorious fact, to which many bear testimony. 
It is perfectly evident that many persons, under the conditions 
thus described, can neither conspire to deceive in regard to a 
sensible fact, nor could they themselves be deceived.* 

In regard to the facts or events in question, we should sup- 
pose that they are public, sensible, and striking or important. 

When the testimony of witnesses has all the preceding condi- 
tions verified, it is physically impossible for them to be deceived; 
and it is morally inipossible for them to deceive ; or, assuming 
the physical and moral laws in the case supposed, it is meta- 
physically impossible for their testimony to be false; i. e., it 
affords philosophical certainty. 

If error or falsehood could originate from such testimony, it 
must be either because the witnesses are deceived themselves, 
or because they are not truthful, and deceive us ; but neither 
can happen in a case such as that above supposed. For, we 
cannot even conceive the possibility of error or deception un- 
der such conditions without referring it to the Author of the 
physical and moral laws by which human nature is governed 
in its operations, and thereby compromising Divine wisdom 

* ' ' Conditiones quae necessarian sunt ut testimonium praebeat certitudinem, 
sunt praecipue hsetres: 1. Ut sit circa factum possibile et sensibile; 2. Ut testes 
communiter sint plures; 3. Ut evidenter appareat testes non esse in collusione." 
(Philos. passim.) The conditions requisite for the testimony of witnesses to 
furnish certainty are chiefly these three : 1st, that it regard a fact which is pos- 
sible, and sensible; 2d, that the witnesses ordinarily be numerous; 3d, that the 
witnesses be evidently not in collusion. 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 131 

and Providence. Hence, it is evident on every side, that the 
testimony of witnesses can, and does, furnish unerring cer- 
tainty as to many sensible lacts or events. 

Against the truth thus proved it is sometimes objected, as in 
the following specious argument: "The testimony of one wit- 
ness to an extraordinary object affords only probability of its 
truth ; therefore, the testimony of many witnesses gives only a 
sum of probabilities ; but no number of probabilities can pro- 
duce certainty, which is of a different species." Answer : the 
testimony of one witness, in se, or in itself, is often both phy- 
sically and morally certain as to the wit?iess himself; but, in case 
of a solitary witness to a fact, owing to special contingencies, 
which have no existence when the witnesses are many, his tes- 
timony to the certainty which he has himself cannot be ac- 
cepted as such by us. These extrinsic and special reasons or 
contingencies which afford cause for doubt or fear, are : ist, 
he ??iay have deceived himself by haste, imprudence, or other 
cause ; 2d, he may intend to deceive us purposely. But these 
special grounds for apprehending deception are entirely removed 
when the witnesses, besides being numerous, have the other con- 
ditions above specified ; for, the fulfillment of all these condi- 
tions entirely removes any and ev p ery possibility of deception. 

Hence, the testimony of many concurrent witnesses is not a 
sum of probabilities, in the case supposed; there is the sum, if 
you choose, of as many physical and moral certainties, as there 
are witnesses; but without any one of the special reasons for 
doubt, which we have when there is but a single witness. Yet, 
the truth, as such, in its objective entity, is as perfectly such 
in one eye-witness as it is in all; for the objective truth in such 
case is really one, though seen by many. The fact that many 
see an eclipse of the sun at the same time does not multiply 
the truth in itself that there was an eclipse of the sun; the 
multiplicity and the diversity of the witnesses may and do take 
away extrinsic reasons for doubt, as regards persons who learn 
that fact on their authority. 

The assent which the mind yields to the testimony of wit- 
nesses is faith or belief. 



132 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

The dogmatic or doctrinal teachings of scientific men,* phil- 
osophers, etc., which depend upon the light of natural reason 
for their evidence, are worth no more than are the reasons or 
proofs which can be adduced for them. Hence, such authority 
of itself, or per se, does not always afford certainty, properly 
so-called. 

The judgments of mankind which are based upon good 
common sense, and which regard evident and practical mat- 
ters, are true; v. g., when those judgments regard first princi- 
ples, or the immediate deductions from them. These judg- 
ments, when constant and general, are a certain argument for 
truth ; but they are by no means the general criterion of truth, 
as some authors have erroneously maintained ; nor are they an 
ultimate motive for certainty. 

It is obviously in accordance with the preceding doctrine 
that the documents and monuments of authentic history, under 
proper conditions, afford complete certainty as to the substance 
of important facts of past times. 



ARTICLE VIII. 

scientific knowledge; in what it consists; the sci- 
ences; THEIR SPECIES, WITH THEIR CO-ORDINATION AND 
PRINCIPLE OF UNITY. 

Knowledge, in its general acceptation, includes every species 
of cognition, how perfect or imperfect soever it may be. But 
scientific knowledge, or science, is the evident and certain knowl- 
edge of a necessary thing by its proximate and real cause. The 
object of scientific k?iowledge is a necessary thing in the sense, 

*"Alii sancti hoc tradiderunt, non quasi asserentes, sed sicut, utentes his 
quae in philosophia didicerunt; unde non sunt majoris auctoritatis quam dicta 
philosophorum quos sequuntur, nisi in hoc quod sint ab omni infldelitatis suspici- 
one separati." (Div. Thorn, in 2 sent. disp. 14, art. 2, ad. 1.) Other holy 
authors taught this, not as asserting it positively, but as using what they learned 
in philosophy; hence, they have no more authority than the sayings of the phil- 
osophers whom they follow, unless in this that they are free from all suspicion 
of infidelity. 



logic: second part. 133 

that it is a conclusion which necessarily follows from its pre- 
mises, or an effect which proceeds necessarily from its cause. 
We truly know a thing only when we know it in its principles, 
or cause; not the cause as a fact only; but the cause as pro- 
ducing it or giving to it its being or existence as an effect. 

Science has for its object, then, the ontological causes of 
things, their causes, essendi. 

A demonstration* is a legitimate argument that gives an evi- 
dent truth which necessarily follows from evident premises : 
such conclusion is, therefore, scientific knowledge, since it is an 
effect known to follow necessarily and immediately from the 
premises by which it is produced. 

But distinguish between the ontological order, and the logical 
order; or, the order in which effects are produced by their 
causes, and the order in which reason knows them, or learns 
them. In a priori arguments, we reason from cause to effect ; 
that is, the argument proceeds in the ontological order; and in 
this case, the logical order agrees with the ontological order. 
In a posteriori reasoning, the ontological order is inverted, since 
we argue from effect to cause. When we conclude Irom effect 
to cause, and then reflexly see the effect as truly and neces- 
sarily produced by its cause, such knowledge of that effect is 
scientific ; for it is the knowledge of an effect as produced by 
its proximate and true cause, i. e., its ontological cause, {causa 
essendi. ) 

When we say an effect necessarily follows from its cause, the 
necessity referred to is either that which arises absolutely from 
the essence of things; or that which is consequent upon suppos- 
ing physical or moral laws, according to the nature of the 
matter which furnishes the premises and conclusion. 

The proximate cause is that nearest cause which directly and 
im??iediately produces the effect; it is real, because it is distin- 
guished from an apparent, or accidental cause. 

* " Demonstratio ea est ratiocinatio quae scientiam efficit: et scientia est de- 
monstrationis conclusio seu effectus." Demonstration is reasoning which pro- 
duces scientific knowledge; the scientific knowledge, then, is the conclusion or 
the effect of demonsti-ation. 

1 ' Scientia est syllogismus /aciezw scire. ' ' 



134 logic: second part. 

A reasoning mind does not rest quiet in the mere facts of 
experience, or in causes which are known merely as facts, or 
in remote causes; but it seeks to know why the thing is so, 
why it exists as seen : this it finally learns in its causa essendi, 
its dependence on its ontological or real and immediate cause ;* 
and this the inquiring mind seeks for in all the objects of cog- 
nition. 

Here it might be objected that a cause is extrinsic to its effect ; 
whereas, perfect knowledge should represent the intrinsic or 
essential constituents of a thing; and, therefore, the knowledge 
of a thing by its cause, is not rightly called scientific knowl- 
edge. 

Before answering this objection it is proper to observe that 
by cause we mean a principle on which a being depends for its 
existence. 

Also, it must be borne in mind that all causes are reduced 
to four principal kinds ; namely, the final, efficient, for??ial and 
material. The final cause and efficient cause are really extrinsic 
to the effect ; the formal and material causes are intrinsic to 
the effect, and by their union constitute the effect. 

The efficient cause is that which produces the effect; v. g., 
the builder who makes a house, is its efficient cause ; the final 
cause is that e?id, or purpose, on account of which the efficient 
cause produces its effect, or operates : v. g., the house, for the 
sake of a home ; or, as regards the builder, for the price ; the 
material cause, is that thing out of which the effect is made; 
v. g., the stone, brick, wood and other material, out of which 
the house is made; the formal cause is that by which the 
essence or particular nature of the effect is determined to be 
what it is; as, v. g., the plan, design, or form of the house is 
that which determines or constitutes the material, a house, in 
the example supposed. The marble is the ?naterial cause; and 
the shape the formal cause, of the statue or bust. 

Now, for knowledge to be perfect and adequate, all the 

* ' ' Cognitio rei perfecta in causis est nobilior quam cognitio in effectu. Ordo 
causarum est nobilior quam ordo effectuum. ' ' The perfect knowledge of a thing 
in its causes, is nobler than the knowledge of it in its effect; for the order of 
causes is more noble than the order of effects. 



logic: second part. 135 

causes on which an effect depends should be known; which, 
however, it is not possible for man to know, with completeness 
at least ; yet, though our knowledge be not adequate, we may- 
approximate perfect knowledge within degrees which satisfy 
rational longing. For this object, any one of the four causes 
may suffice, according to the nature of the effect contemplated. 

The definition * which gives the formal and material cause 
of an object is usually selected, when possible, to enunciate 
scie?itific truth; as the scientific definition aims to assign the 
formal and material causes of the object defined, whenever the 
nature of the matter permits it. 

A definition which assigns the matter and form is preferable, 
when it is possible ; because they are the intrinsic constituents 
of an object: genus and specific difference, assign the quasi 
matter and form. 

We may define by all the four causes, either all given, or 
some only. Their proper order is : ist, by the ?natter; 2d, by 
the form,] which is the principal, as the form determines and 
perfects the matter; 3d, the efficient cause, or agent; 4th, the 
final cause, which though last in the execution, is the first in 
the intention. The final cause is not demonstrable a priori ; 
because it is first, there is none prior to it, and it is the cause 
of the other causes. The form, is the cause why the matter is 
perfect ; the agent or efficient cause, is the cause why the form 
perfects the matter; and the finis, or end, is the cause why the 
agent produces the form in the matter; no further cause can be 
assigned why the finis, or end,\ moves the agent or efficient 
cause. 

A collection or system of demonstrated or scientific conclu- 
sions, regarding many objects of the same species, constitutes a 
science; v. g., the body of demonstrated conclusions in regard 

* ' ' Definitio est oratio explicans rei naturam . ' ' The definition is a discourse 
which explains the nature of a thing. 

t ' ' Forma est principium agendi in unoquoque. Seu unumquodque agens agit 
per suam forman." The form is the principle of action in everything, or, 
every agent acts by virtue of its form. 

% "Finis est prima et altissima causarum." The end is the first and the 
highest of causes. 



136 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

to the heavenly bodies, constitutes the science of Astronomy ; 
and similarly for other classes of scientific objects. 

It is evident that the sciences have their species determined, 
and are to be classified, according to their objects ; or, it is 
their objects that specify them. 

But it would serve the uses of philosophy to coordinate them 
according to some clear law or principle of unity. 

Philosophers in all ages regarded the reducing of all sciences 
to unity as a matter of importance ; though, in striving to ac- 
complish this object, they did not agree upon a principle of uni- 
fication. Some sought for this principle of unity in the genera 
of objects ; others looked for it in the powers of cognition ; 
but they discovered no principle by which they could unify the 
sciences, without d stroying their specific differences; they 
failed to make them one, and yet preserve their species. 

Some make a general classification of the sciences, accord- 
ing to the degree of abstraction which the intellect employs 
when contemplating and determining the objects of those 
sciences. There are three principal degrees of this abstrac- 
tion : ist, we may know sensible objects, as such; as trees, 
crystals, animals, etc.; 2d, we may prescind from all sensible 
qualities, except quantity ; continuous quantity, as lines, sur- 
faces, etc.; or discrete quantity, as numbers ; 3d, we may ab- 
stract from all sensible conditions, and go to the super-sensible; 
v. g., to the essential prototypes of objects, to spirits, to God. 

These grades of abstraction correspond to physics, mathe- 
matics and metaphysics. The principle of unity is abstraction ; 
and the sciences are divided into classes by the different degrees 
of abstraction required to know scientifically the different classes 
of objects about which each science is conversant. 

The general principles on which this theory rests are these : 
ist, sensible things taken as singular and in concrete are the 
objects of the senses ; their essence is the object of the intel- 
lect, and this object it attains by means of abstraction ; 2d, 
scie?ice has for its object universals; the singular belongs to 
history, to the testimony of the senses; history is not a science, 
because its subject matter is contingent truth, or facts; it 



logic: second pakt. 137 

pertains to science, however, to assign the proximate and neces- 
sary causes of facts, when this is possible; 3d, universals are 
the work or product of abstraction ; and the more perfect this 
abstraction, the higher is the science. 

In the sciences which depend merely upon the natural light 
of reason, metaphysics is supreme, or it rules all other sciences; 
for it furnishes the ultimate principles by which they are finally 
judged, and from which they receive their last decisive proof. 
Therefore all mere human science is subject to metaphysics. 

" No science proves* its own first principles." For, as science 
is from demonstration, either those first principles are known 
per se, i. e., are self-evident, in which case they cannot be dem- 
onstrated; or they are demonstrated conclusions from another 
science ;t in which case their demonstration pertains to the 
science in which they are conclusions from first principles ; so 
in either case they are assumed. 

It suffices for scientific demonstration that the mediu7?i be 
analogical unity only. The medium of demonstration for the 
existence of God, i. e., creatures, as effects, has only analogical 
unity; for God and creatures, when included under the gen- 
eral concepts, cause, being, etc., agree only by analogy. If this 
unity of analogy did not suffice for demonstration, then the 
existence of God could not be demonstrated a posteriori. 

It will not be out of place here to distinguish between the 
different species of intellectual cognition, or the perfections in 
the understanding, usually termed, mtelligence, science, i. e., sci- 
entific knowledge, and wisdom, or philosophical knowledge; 
they are also called, intellectual virtues. These different species 
of cognition in the understanding have speculative matter only 
for their object ; or, in other words, they do not directly re- 
gard the merely cortingent and practical at all, as such, but 
they directly consider truth only as it necessarily is in itself, 
apart from its practical application to the feasible, and to moral 
ends. Art and prudence have for their object the practical, not 

*" Nulla scientia sua probat prmcipia." No science proves its own first 
principles. 

t" Ad scientiam sufficit unitas analogica." (Div. Thorn. 4 met. ; lect. 1.) 
Analogical unity suffices for scientific knowledge. 



138 logic: second pakt. 

the speculative. Art enables its possessor to accomplish 
what is feasible, or physically capable of being effected; pru- 
dence enables one to choose that which is morally best, in re- 
spect both to means and end; or, as it is briefly said in 
an axiom, " ars, est factibilium; prudentia, agibilium." Art is 
of that which can be done physically ; prudence, of what can 
be done morally. 

Intelligence, is not the intellect itself, but it is a perfection of 
this faculty, by which it is strengthened, and directed in assent- 
ing to the true, and dissenting from the false. It is sometimes 
termed lumen intellectuale, the light of the understanding ; it 
was called by the old philosophers, a habit, "intellectus est 
habitus primorum principiorum." The understanding, as thus 
empowered by the habit or perfection termed intelligence, has 
for its object only self-evident truth, "verum per se notum;" 
or, intelligence has for its object, evident first principles. Sci- 
ence, or scientific knowledge, as already explained, has for its 
object the necessary conclusions derived from evident first 
principles, "verum per aliud notum;" or, it has for its object, 
demofistrated conclusions from evident first prificiples. It is 
manifest, then, that scientific knowledge is essentially the pro- 
duct or fruit of reason, since it attains its object, not immedi- 
ately, but through the medium of demonstration. 

But principles may be first either in a particular genus of 
cognitions only, as v. g., the first principles of Geometry, of 
Astronomy, of Logic, of Physiology, etc. ; or, they may be 
first in respect to the whole sphere of man's knowledge. Now, 
the principles that are first in the particular genera of man's 
cognitions classified according to their objects, together with 
the necessary conclusions deduced from them, constitute the 
objects of the sciences* and the knowledge of them is science ox 
scientific knowledge. But the knowledge of particular genera 
of first principles as compared among themselves, and aLo 
their conclusions, all as tested and judged by the highest prin- 
ciples of man's knowledge, is philosophical knowledge, or wis- 

* " Secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi habitus scientiarum ; sa- 
pientia non est nisi una. ' ' 



logic: second part. 139 

dotn* Hence, wisdom considers both all scientific knowledge, 
and its principles ; and, therefore, its conclusions are the highest 
and most universal of all that reason can attain to. Although 
its principles are the last which the mind comes to know, they 
are absolutely first; or are objectively first.t 

Hence, philosophical knowledge, or wisdom, has for its object 
the highest and most universal causes. They possess the 
greatest of all objective certainty, " necessitatem essendi:" they 
are not only necessary and immutable, but they are presup- 
posed objectively to all scientific truth, though they are the 
last learned by human reason, which attains to them only by 
rising from that which is lower. 

Philosophical knowledge, or wisdom, is at the same time 
scientific knowledge, in as much as it demonstrates conclusions 
by their principles ; but it has this in addition to mere scie?ice, 
and peculiar to itself, that it judges of all, not only the conclu- 
sions, but the principles also ; and this is the respect in which 
it goes higher than science does, strictly as such. Hence, it 
may be said that philosophy begins where the sciences end ; 
and it is, therefore, justly styled the science of the sciences 
whose principles are furnished by natural reason. 

An example will help to make the preceding distinctions 
clear to the mind; the axioms of geometry may be regarded 
as first principles; for, they are self-evident ; they are, there- 
fore, an object of intelligence. 

The following thesis, "the solid contents or geometrical 
quantity of any cube is equal to the product of its three dimen- 

♦"Sapientia est habitus intellectualis circa altissima occupata." Wisdom 
is a habit of the intellect which is concerned about the highest things. 

t " Ea quae sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora et magisnota secundum 
naturam; ideo, id quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanse, est id 
quod est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam;- circa hujusmodi 
est sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas." (Div. Thorn. 1, 2, p., qu. 57., art. 
2.) Those things that are last known as regards us, are according to their 
nature first, and they possess most of what makes knowledge, or most to be 
known; therefore, what is last in respect to the whole of human knowledge, is 
what is first and greatly the most capable of causing knowledge, according to 
its nature: Avisdom, which considers the highest causes, regards such objects. 
That which is in itself the highest and greatest truth, is the last known to us, 
because the medium of knowing is extrinsic to it, and obscure. 



140 LOGIC : SECOND PAET. 

sions," is a demonstrated conclusion, and is, on that account, an 
object of scientific knowledge* The question, "is quantity, as 
extended in space, absolutely separable from material sub- 
stance?" proposes philosophical matter. For a determinate 
answer to this question, we must consider qua?itity as geome- 
trical, quantity as material, and also the essential and metaphysi- 
cal conditions which are prerequisite for matter to exist at all : 
the conclusion which logically follows, is philosophical truth, 
or, is an object of that virtue in the intellect which we termed, 
wisdom. 

It may be affirmed, then, that Philosophy, which embodies 
and explains the teachings ot wisdom, is entitled to the rank 
assigned it, as " Queen and Moderatrix of the Sciences." The 
name, Philosophy, is directly and appropriately due to Meta- 
physics alone, since Metaphysics alone has for its proper object 
the most universal truths and principles. 

* ' ' The terms science and philosophy, are employed by many popular "writers 
in a vague and indeterminate sense, for whatever pertains to any species of 
superior learning. Even with not a few well educated authors, these words 
seem to have no fixed or precise signification, but are made to include a number 
of undefined and undistinguished generalities; by them, the terms appear to be 
used indiscriminately, so that all philosophy is science, and conversely, all 
science is philosophy. 

But the discerning student of philosophy will quickly discover for himself the 
fact that, among exact writers on these subjects, the distinction between science 
and philosophy , which is based on their wholly distinct objects, is clearly made 
and is strictly maintained. As defined by their proper objects, philosophy seeks 
for the highest and the most universal causes of things ; science has for its ob- 
ject, the necessary and proximate or immediate causes of things. Their objects 
are, therefore, determinate, and it is clear that they are specifically distinct 
kinds of knowledge. 

Hence, it is an inept use of language, and a confusion of things that should 
be kept distinct, to give the name philosophy to physics, or the collective branches 
of physical science which explain the causes of natural phenomena. The philo- 
sophical study of physical and material nature, is properly, and in accordance 
with long established usage, named cosmology, in a course of philosophy. 

It was believed that these remarks should be here made, in the interests of 
learners: since precision of language, correctness of cognitions, and accuracy 
of judgment, mutually aid each other in the work of mental discipline. 



APPENDIX. 



disputation; or practical exercise in reasoning. 

In many colleges and higher institutions of learning, the stu- 
dents of Logic and Metaphysics, or the class of Philosophy, 
have regularly some practical exercises in argumentation, last- 
ing for half an hour at a time, or longer, and occurring two or 
three times a week, and even oftener, when the class is suffi- 
ciently numerous. These disputations usually begin soon after 
the class has reached the second part of Logic, or Logic 
Applied. So important is this practice judged to be by many 
instructors of youth, that, in a large number of well-couducted 
institutions of learning it is never dispensed with. 

The form or manner of conducting this useful exercise, 
which, in familiar language, is usually styled the " Circle," is 
here briefly described, for the information of those readers who 
are unacquainted with it. 

A day or more in advance of the exercise, one proposition, 
or even two propositions, the proofs of which may be gathered 
from what was already seen in the text book, or was ex- 
plained in class, are assigned to a student, to be proved and 
defended in class by him. In some cases several propositions 
are divided for this purpose between two students; and occa- 
sionally the disputation takes place in presence of a select 
audience of educated persons, in addition to the class. Also, 
two or three other students are selected beforehand to prepare 
objections to be brought by them against the assigned theses. 
These objections are required to be brief, and in correct logical 

form; for, an objection which is not i?i logical form, is not 

141 



142 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

regarded as legitimate in the "circle," and, therefore, care 
should be taken never to offer in argument a syllogism which 
is not inform. 

On the appointed day the exercise begins by one of the ob- 
jectors or opponents denying the proposition which he intends 
to assail, which is equivalent to asking for the proofs of it. 
The defender then enunciates the thesis or proposition, dis- 
tinctly, and somewhat deliberately. He may begin either by 
explaining briefly the precise meaning and scope of his thesis, 
or, if that be judged unnecessary for it, by stating his princi- 
pal argument in the form of a syllogism, or in any of the 
legitimate forms of argument which are recognized in Logic; 
though the simple categorical syllogism is generally preferable. 
In such case, his further proofs and explanations, in which he 
should have some latitude to dispense with strict syllogistic * 
forms, will generally regard the minor or second premise. In 
order not to perplex the attention with matters of only sec- 
ondary importance, it is a sufficiently approved practice always 
to call the first premise of a regular syllogism the major, and 
the second the minor premise, without regard to its technical 
propriety. 

After the brief proof, or proofs by which the truth of his 
thesis is demonstrated, the objections against it immediately 
begin. In answering them he should suppress excitement or 
anxiety, avoid precipitancy, and strive to avail himself of the 
advice given to him who defends the truth, by the well-known 
axioms of the "circle;" "raro affirma, saepe nega, semper dis- 
tingue;" rarely affirm, often deny, always distinguish. .A 
plausible objection to the truth, besides being in logical form, 
will generally contain both something that is true, and some- 
thing that is false. 

The defender always begins his answer by repeating the 
argument of the adversary, just as it was stated by him; it is 
then repeated a second time, the answer being given to each 
proposition as soon as it is enunciated. In the solution of the 
objection, either some one, or more terms, will be distinguished, 
so as to grant what is true, and to deny what is falsely affirmed 



logic: second pakt. 143 

by them ; or else one or both premises will be denied. The 
objector, in his next argument, having in his preparation before- 
hand anticipated the answer given to his first objection, will be 
ready to bring an argument to prove what is denied ; and thus 
the contest may be continued at pleasure. Practice will speedily 
render the disputants skillful in finding arguments, extempora- 
neously, or "at the spur of the moment." 

Either the teacher, or some one else who is competent for 
the task, presides as moderator at these exercises, and sees both 
that the objections are rightly put, and that they are accurately 
and satisfactorily solved ; it is also his duty to see that the 
whole exercise is conducted with decorum, and that the dispu- 
tation be not uselessly or unduly protracted. 

When both parties prepare diligently beforehand for their 
contest, it is found by experience that the " circle " always 
proves to be both a highly interesting exercise for advanced 
students, and a profitable one. 

An example will help to render the form of conducting this 
exercise more clear to the mind : suppose the thesis to be de- 
fended is the following ; " The external senses furnish to the 
mind an unerring motive of certainty, as to their proper ob- 
jects." 

The defender might here first explain the scope and mean- 
ing of the thesis; v. g., ist, that it supposes the senses to be 
in a healthful or normal state; 2d, he might mention some 
conditions to be complied with for prudently using the senses ; 
3d, he might distinguish between inducing error, per se, i. e., 
causing, or physically effecti?ig error ; and erring accidentally, in 
which latter case, error happens through precipitancy in judg- 
ing, etc. He may then state in form one of his principal argu- 
ments; v. g., "No agent that acts only by natural or necessary 
physical law, can be false ; but the external senses act only by 
natural or necessary physical law; therefore, the external senses 
cannot be false." In explaining and proving the premises, he 
may employ the syllogism, the enthymeme, the sorites, or any 
legitimate form of argument, that may occur to him; and 
it would be appropriate to the argument, as above given, 



144 logic: second part. 

to show how false action in natural or physical agents, if con- 
ceived to be at all possible, would be referable to God, etc. 
His proofs may proceed till finished ; or they may be sus- 
pended, at the discretion of the moderator, in order that the 
objections may be given. 

The objector, when the proofs are finished, begins at once; 
v. g., " Those organs cannot be said to furnish unerring cer- 
tainty, which mislead the judgment; but the external senses 
mislead the judgment ; therefore, the external senses do not 
furnish the mind unerring certainty." 

The objection having been repeated, in order to prevent 
misunderstanding as to its precise meaning, is then answered 
by parts; v. g., "Those organs cannot be said to furnish cer- 
tainty which per se mislead the judgment, or by their own 
action necessitate error in the mind, I grant; but that their 
accidental connexion with error, really and properly causes 
that error, I deny; similarly I distinguish the minor, and, 
therefore, I deny the consequence and consequent — or, I deny 
the conclusion." 

Objector insists, "To cause error even accidentally, is really 
and truly to cause error; but, as you admit, the senses cause 
error accide?itally ; therefore, the senses really and truly cause 
error." 

v Answer, after repeating the objection; " I distinguish; that 
to cause error per se, that is, physically and efficiently to cause 
it, is really and truly to cause it, I grant; that to cause error 
accidentally, is really and properly to cause error, I deny, and, 
therefore, I deny the conclusion." 

Objector insists, "Whatever has the nature of a cause, has its 
own proper effect, which it brings about; the accidental cause 
has the nature of a cause; therefore, it has its own proper 
effect which proceeds from it." 

Answer, after repeating the objection, "That the cause per 
se, or cause that really and positively influences action, has its 
own proper effect, which it positively brings about, I grant; 
that the accidental cause really and positively influences in the 
production of any effect, I deny ; " etc. 



LOGIC : SECOND PART. 145 

Here the defender might be required to explain more pre- 
cisely what this accidental cause is, and under what respect it 
is termed a cause at all. 

The foregoing example is by no means offered as a model of 
argumentation; but, though imperfect, it may serve to illustrate 
by something visible, the form or ma?iner of conducting logical 
and metaphysical disputations in the class-room, or the college 
hall. It is hoped that even this outline description of the 
exercise will suggest reasons to prove its importance and value 
for cultivating the reasoning power, and as a means of acquir- 
ing precise notions and judgments. When a proposition stands 
either as a premise or the conclusion of a well conceived syllo- 
gism, to which, by the nature of its matter, it belongs, its full 
meaning and value are then distinctly appreciated. 

It was said above that in the regular disputation, no objec- 
tion was regarded as valid or legitimate, unless it be in logical 
form: the reason for thus absolutely excluding these vrcious 
or spurious arguments, is manifest. For, if the disputation 
were permitted to turn merely upon fallacies in the form of 
argument, it would thereby become degraded to the rank of 
sophistry; which, considered as an exercise of reason, possesses 
little more value or dignity than the trivial practice of punning. 

Logic, which is the means of ascertaining and imparting 
truth by discourse of reason, would thus be rendered practi- 
cally aimless ; for its natural tendency as a study would then 
rather be to make the mind astute and disingenuous, than to 
develop and cultivate in the understanding healthful and nor- 
mal habits of thought, or give it facility in demonstrating and 
maintaining truth by its reasons. 

It would be erroneous, however, to infer from what is said, 
that all exercises in the fallacies or sophistical methods of rea- 
soning, which are adapted to give readiness in detecting and 
refuting errors in the form of arguments, are to be condemned, 
or are intended thereby to be censured. The " circle," which 
may be considered an exercise that is, under some respect, 
public, is designed to represent the contest for truth, so far as 
practicable, just as it is conducted by sincere and upright op- 
10 



146 LOGIC : SECOND PART. 

ponents. Hence, the objections offered to the proposed thesis, 
which thesis may perchance happen to be really untrue, should 
by no means be limited to feigned difficulties against the doc- 
trine defended : but if valid arguments can be adduced which 
refute it, they are not to be withheld ; for truth should prevail, 
even if the defender of the assigned proposition be discomfited. 

But the practice of giving exaggerated, and even exclusive 
attention to the mere forms of argument, or of making all exer- 
cise in Logic consist in the various transformations or conver- 
sions which are possible in these forms, employing for the pur- 
pose only abstract, algebraic formulas, or the related parts of 
certain diagrams, is, perhaps, as much a mechanical, as it is 
an intellectual operation; and while the limited use of such 
methods is not without its advantage, yet excessive attention 
to these extrinsic devices has not a beneficial effect upon the 
mind. The rules of correct argument are, for the mind that is 
loyal to truth, few and simple. It is the ignoble office of per- 
sistent error to employ subterfuge, obscurity, equivocation, and 
all the vices of false reasoning. 

It cannot be justly doubted that the direct proofs of truth, 
and its positive criteria, as explained in Applied Logic, and 
the principles of General and Special Metaphysics, furnish the 
most profitable subject matter, for exercising the young mind 
in Practical Logic. 



End of Logic 



ONTOLOGY 



OR, 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 



«47 



ONTOLOGY; 



OR, 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 



The metaphysical* transcends the conditions of material and 
sensible existence, as the term metaphysical, i. e., beyond the 
physical, implies. It considers truths and principles in the pro- 
totypes of things; or, as they are contained or implied in the 
essential concepts of things, abstractedly from the existence of 
those things, or, also, as verified in their existence. Hence, it 
has for its object the most universal attributes of beings ; and 
the laws and axioms of all the sciences are subject to it, and 
are tested by its principles ; since error is refuted, and truth 
demonstrated, only by means of principles that are known per 
se, i. e., are self-evident, necessary and immutable. In a more 
special sense, it also includes whatever is immaterial, as spirits, 
God; since we naturally know spirit only by metaphysical 
principles and reasoning. 

As ontology or general metaphysics, which is the science of 

* " Metaphysicus considerat rerum essentias et modoa essendi ; Logicus con- 
siderat praxlicationes seu modos prredicandi." The Metaphysician considers 
the essence of things, and their necessary modes of existing ; the Logician con- 
siders predicables, or modes of predicating. 

' ' Metaphysica in objecto sno includit ens universalissimum et ejus attributa 
essentialia. ' ' Metaphysics includes for its object, being as most universal, and 
ita essential attributes, or properties. 

149 



150 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

being in the most general sense of the term being* furnishes to 
the mind the fundamental and ultimate principles on which all 
philosophy rests, and by which all science must be finally 
tested, its importance is very great. Its neglect cannot but 
prove disastrous to all sound method of philosophizing, and 
thus result in vague hypotheses and dark theories, instead of 
certain and genuine science. By a careful study of it, the 
educated mind comes finally to rest quiet in its conclusions ; 
for it sees them as they flow from their first and necessary 
principles. 

* " Metaphysica speculator universalia entis attributa; quae videlicet enti pel 
se insunt, et quaecunque spectant ad eadem ilia, sive per oppositiouem sive per 
counexionem: Ex. gr. in ente, unum, verum, bonum, essentiam, existentiam," etc. 
Metaphysics regards the most universal attributes of being ; namely, whatever 
is essentially in being, or pertains to its essential attributes, whether by oppo- 
sition or connexion; v. g., its unity, truth, goodness, essence, existence, etc. 



CHAPTER I. 



ARTICLE I. 

WHAT THE NOTION BEING IN ITS GENERAL SENSE INCLUDES; 
ESSENCE OF THINGS; EXISTENCE; UNITY; IDENTITY; DIS- 
TINCTION. 

Being, in its most general sense, includes in its concept .what 
actually exists, and what has any sort of entity, whether it be 
substance or accident, Creator or creature. Being, thus un- 
derstood, is the material object of ontology. Being, in this 
general sense, is not generical in its meaning when applied to 
different objects, v. g., mineral, animal, substance, accident; 
here its signification is not univocal, but analogical. For, genus 
requires the term which stands for its essence to be univocally 
applied to its inferiors or subjects; v. g., "the horse is ani?nal; 
the lion is animal; man is animal." In these examples, animal 
expresses precisely the same concept in all the objects termed 
animal. But in the examples, " accident is being, substance is 
being, matter is being, spirit is being; " the word being has not 
the same, univocal significance in its application to these ob- 
jects; for, accident as compared to substance, or matter to 
spirit, is being, only by analogy, since they are in their real en- 
tity generically different, therefore essentially and wholly differ- 
ent, and we cannot say that the one is the other, except by 
some relation of analogy. 

The word being, which stands for the simplest and most 
universal of our ideas, cannot be defined, nor does it require a 
definition. It cannot be defined, for, genus and specific differ- 
ence are both being, and even every synonym of the term is 

151 



152 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

also being; hence, being, when thus understood, cannot be sub- 
jected to definition. 

The general concept of being (en/is), does not expressly say 
for its object, either substance or accident, Creator or creature; 
but all of them, as in some manner one, i. e., as being; of 
course, they are one, or are being only by a sort of analogy, 
As observes Suarez, "To the formal concept* of being, corres- 
ponds one objective concept, adequate and immediate, which 
does not expressly say either substance or accident, either God 
or creature, but says them all as one : namely, as being similar 
in some respect, and as agreeing in this, that they are all 
beings "\ 

Hence, it may be inferred that being is not predicated equi- 
vocally of God and creature, for then nothing could be demon- 
strated concerning God from creature, since the medium, or 
middle term, would be equivocal; it is neither predicated uni- 
vocally, for in this case God and creature would be of the same 
species ; it is predicated of them only analogically, owing to a 
certain similarity by which they are, in some sense, united in 
the same concept of being. 

The word nothing, taken absolutely, expresses the exclusion 
of all being or entity; yet the mind can make of nothing a quasi 
object, by its relation to something, which it excludes. But, con- 
sidered as an object, it is merely a creature of the mind, ens 
rationis, whose only foundation in reality is the relation referred 
to. 

When, by a reflexive judgment, the mind affirms, "whatever 
exists, is ; what does not exist, is not," it thereby employs the 
principle of identity, for the purpose of giving more reflex cer- 
tainty to the proposition. 

When, for the same purpose, we affirm that "it is impossible 
for the same thing to exist, and not exist at the same time ; " 
we thereby employ the principle of contradiction. When we 

* See Article I, Log. , I Part, p. 16. 

t " Conceptui formali entis, respondet unus conceptus objectivus, adaequatus 
et immediatus, qui expresse non dicit substantiam neque accidens, neque JDeum 
neque creaturam; sed hzec omnia per modum unius; yiz. , quatenus sunt inter se 
aliquo modo similia, et conveniunt in essendo. " (Metaphys. Disp. 2, Sect. 2.) 



GENEEAL METAPHYSICS. 153 

put the affirmation under this disjunctive form, namely, " either 
the thing is, or it is not," it is called the principle of the excluded 
middle; since no medium is possible between being, and not 
being; or, as applied under the same respect, and to the same 
thing, all middle or medium is excluded, in a complete disjunc- 
tion. 

The essence of a thing includes all that by which the thing 
is what it is, and without which it could not possibly exist at all; 
v. g., a triangle is constituted such by having three angles, 
and three sides. Its constituent elements are the three angles, 
and three sides, and if any one of these essential constituents 
be wanting, its essence is thereby destroyed, and it ceases to be 
a triangle, for they are all and each necessary for the very con- 
cept of it. The essence, therefore, is that without which a 
thing can neither exist, nor be conceived, and which makes 
it what it is, when it exists. Essence of a thing, is the real 
answer to the question : " What is it ? " 

When the essence* of a thing is considered as active, or as a 
principle, capable either of eliciting or putting acts, it is in that 
sense the same as the nature of that thing ; the esse?ice consti- 
tutes the being what it is ; its nature is the essence viewed in 
reference to its operations, or as empowered to act That which 
constitutes a being immediately operative or able to act, may 
be considered as the complement of essence.t This complement 
of essence consists of all the powers, or active and passive vir- 
tues, that belong to that essence. 

Hence, since the ?iature% of a thing is its essence as empowered 

♦"Essentia est in ordine ad esse, natura, principium agendi." "What is 
essence, in respect to existence, is nature, when regarded as a principle of ac- 
tion. 

t" Nulla substantia creata est immediate operativa." No created sub- 
stance is immediately operative. 

X ' ' Potentia definitur per actum. ' ' Power is defined by its act. 

" Definitio est oratio explicans reinaturam." Definition is a discourse ex- 
plaining the nature of a thing. 

' ' Actus specificantur ab objectis. ' ' Acts are specified by their objects. 

"Substantia rei cognoscitur ex operatione; operatio vero ex, objecto circa 
quod versatur." (Lessius opuscul. de immort. animae,, Lib. 2, No. 55.) The 
substance of a thing is known by its operation; the operation is known by the 
object which it regards. 

" Praeterea nulla forma materiae immersain essendo et operando, potest re- 



154 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

to act ; and, also, since powers, i. e., nature as operative, are 
defified by their acts, and acts are specified by their connatural 
objects, it follows that we know the species of any thing from 
knowing the species of its acts, and this we know from the 
connatural objects of these acts; when, therefore, two acts are 
specifically different, the powers or natures that c put these acts 
are also specifically different. 

The following demonstrative argument exemplifies both the 
force and the application of this undeniable principle, namely, 
that by knowing the species of the acts, we thereby know the 
species or kind of the nature that puts those acts : " the human 
intellect has for the connatural objects of its acts the true, the 
universal, the abstract, the super-sensible; but these objects of 
its acts are absolutely immaterial ; therefore, the intellect or 
ifitelligent nature which by its acts attains to them, is absolutely 
immaterial also." Or, in fewer words, that is immaterial, the 
connatural objects of whose action are immaterial. 

The essence may be considered as physical, or metaphysical. 
The genus and specific difference, assign the metaphysical essence 
of an object ; as v. g., material a?id inorganic substance. These 
terms, substance, material, inorganic, give the metaphysical con- 
stituents of the object. The physical essence includes the con- 
stituent attributes, or elements, as they are actually and con- 
cretely, in the object. 

The human mind may understand and quite clearly com- 
prehend the essence which it constitutes for itself out of genus 
and specific difference, which it founds on the realities of objects 
as known to it; but the physical essence of objects, as they are 
actually existing, it can know, not immediately and intimately; 
but only mediately or through their extrinsic action and effects. 

This is evident, when we reflect that we depend for our 

flectere supra suam operation em; t. g., oculus non videt suam visionem, etc., 
anima autem rationales reflectit supra propriam operationem. Ergo anima 
rationalis est superior omni materia? in essenclo et operando." (Philosophi. 
passim . ) No form which is dependent on matter, both in existing and in opera- 
ting, can reflect on its own act; v. g. , the eye cannot see itself seeing, etc. ; hut 
the rational soul can reflect on its own act. Therefore, the rational soul i3 
superior to matter, both in its essence and its action. 

"Actus et potentia sunt ejusdem generis." Act and the power are of the 
same genus. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 155 

knowledge of the objects around us, upon the senses, which 
are acted on by those objects through their qualities; and, 
therefore, the mind does not perceive their essence imme- 
diately, but by experience, comparison, reflexion and abstrac- 
tion, it forms its concept of that essence, as the nature of the 
object. But, on the other hand, it is very erroneous to assert, 
as Locke does, that we know nothing of the physical essence 
of things ; for we do know physical essences, at least so far as 
they manifest themselves in their properties and operations. 

The essence of an actual being is true because it is conform- 
able to the type of that being, as it exists in the Divine Mind. 
The essential prototypes, or essences of things, as in the Divine 
Mind, are eternal, indivisible, and immutable. For if they 
could be divided, or diminished, and thus changed, they would 
thereby become something else ; some other essence, or cease 
to be what they are, which, in reality, would be to conceive 
other essences, not to change these. (Vide page 61 et seq. and 
note page 63.) 

IN WHAT REAL MUTATION CONSISTS. 

It will help towards a fuller comprehension of this whole 
matter, if we distinguish the different senses in which the ex- 
pressions "mutation," and "change of one thing into another," 
are understood by philosophers; v. g., as, conversion, transub- 
stantiation, alteration, annihilation and creation, all of which 
operations imply some sort of change in the terms, or objects 
of them. 

For the conversion of one thing into another, the fulfillment 
of the following rules and conditions is essential : 

First: There must be two terms, both of which are positive; 
i. e., not mere privations or negations, but some positive and 
real substance. The first one of these terms is called the ter- 
minus a quo, or conversus; i. e., the term, object or thing that 
is changed ; the other term of the conversion is called the 
terminus ad quern, or convertensj i. e., the term or thing into 
which the first one is changed, or which, in some manner, 
replaces the first one. 



156 GENEKAL METAPHYSICS. 

Second; There must be a subject either in which, or in 
respect to which, the change is made, this subject in itself 
remaining unchanged; i. e., what is intrinsical to one term is 
changed into what is intrinsically of another term, something 
receiving that change as a subject, or at least as a quasi sub- 
ject, this subject thereby passing from the one to the other 
without being itself otherwise changed. 

Third: The terminus a quo must cease to exist in the sub- 
ject, and be succeeded by the terminus ad quern, the cessation 
of the one and the succession of the other having some rela- 
tion of dependence on each other; this ceasing of the one 
term and beginning of the other can be effected only by some 
real physical action. 

Fourth : Hence, there must be a double mutation : one by 
which the terminus a quo passes from existence to non-exist- 
ence; and the other, by which the terminus ad quern passes 
from non-existence to existence, a subject receiving the one, 
after giving up the other; this subject is the matter, or quasi 
matter. 

An example, though it does not perfectly embody these con- 
ditions, yet may help to illustrate for the young mind what is 
thus far said : suppose an orange and an apple be placed near 
to each other on the table. Now, if all that specifically or 
essentially constitutes the orange what it is, were caused to 
pass into the apple, in such a manner as to force all that spe- 
cifically or essentially constitutes the apple to give way, or 
cease to remain in the matter in which it dwelt, and thus be 
succeeded therein by the corresponding constituents of the 
orange, thereby making that which was an apple become an 
orange, such change would be the convetsion of one thing into 
another, and, in this instance, it would be the conversion of an 
apple into an orange. The apple would be the terminus a 
quo, and the orange would be the terminus ad quern. The 
matter in which the essence of the apple ceased to be, and into 
which the essence or specific nature of the orange subsequemly 
came, is the subject of the conversion. 

As to whether there is any conversion, as thus described, of 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 157 

one material substance into another, by natural laws and 
agency, is a question which, in the opinion of some great 
minds, is not yet demonstratively and definitively settled by 
philosophers and physicists. 

The misfortune of the Alchemists was the assuming as a 
general principle, such conversion of material substance to be 
naturally possible; and hence their many futile and disastrous 
attempts actually to convert base metals into gold. But all 
agree that absolutely and intrinsically the conversion of one 
substance supposed to consist of a dual principle, as implied 
in the idea of conversion, into another, is not impossible to 
Infinite Power; still more evidently is there no repugnance 
when that change of one thing into another is a transubstan- 
tiate n. 

In this case it is not alone the formal, or specific principle 
of the dual constituents of material substance that is converted 
into another, the material principle remaining in itself un- 
changed as the subject of two successive substantial forms; but 
in transubstantiation the whole substance, both as to matter 
and substantial form, ceases, and a complete new substance 
succeeds it, the accidents which are sensible, or the sensible 
species alone remaining unchanged, except as to their relation 
to the substance. 

In the case of Eucharistic transubstantiation, the sensible 
species exist without a subject of inhesion. This transubstan- 
tiation is not effected by natural, but by supernatural agency. 
There seems to be no proof, however, that such transubstantia- 
tion can be effected by any merely natural agency. 

Alteratio?i expresses change of one quality into another ; the 
terminus ad quern, in alteration, is quality; in conversio?i, the 
terminus ad quern, is substance, as already said. 

There is alteration in the most strict sense, only when some 
quality of a given substance is changed into a contrary; v. g., 
when black is changed into white, they being conceived as 
contraries. In this case, the whole substance, which is the 
subject of alteration, passes from a positive quality which ceases, 
to a new and contrary quality, which succeeds it. Accidents 



158 GENERAL METAPHYSICS, 

that perfect their subject, are not said to alter it, since it is not 
consistent to say that a thing is altered, or becomes, in any 
proper sense, another* by being perfected. 

In creation, a thing is produced from nothing; i. e., it is not 
educed in any sense from a preexisting subject, but derives its 
whole being from a purely efficient cause. By annihilation, a 
being is totally reduced to non-existence, so that nothing of it 
that is either substantial or accidental, is remaining. 

Since the essence of a thing includes precisely those constit- 
uents that are necessary to make it what it is individually, and 
which, at the same time, render it conformable to its archetype 
in the divine mind, it is per se evident that neither this type of 
it in the divine mind, nor the truthful copy of it in the actual 
being, can be intrinsically changed. 

The mutations above described as conversion, alteration, etc., 
include all real changes in a being that are possible, or con- 
ceivable ; but in no one of them is there change of intri)isic 
essence. Even existence, and non-existence, are only different 
states or conditions of a being or essence, which include no 
intrinsic change of essence i?i itself. Hence, all mutation is 
limited to the existence or non-existence, and to the real rela- 
tions, of its terms ; and, therefore, essences are intrinsically 
immutable. 

Essence is eternal: Essence, in the possible or intelligible 
order, could have had no beginning ; for it was always true 
that if a thing of a given or determinate essence ever existed 
afterwards, it must have such or such essential constituents; 
since this eternal possibility depends on God, who is eternal, is 
the cause of truth, and knows in His own essence the essential 
prototype of every possible creature, from eternity; therefore, 
essence, regarded as a concept of the divine intellect, must be 
eternal. 

Existence is affirmed of those essences that are actual, or 
that have passed from possibility into the order of-^eal things ; 
and they are then said to exist. It is manifest that existence 

*" Conversio terminatur ad aliud; alteratio ad alterum." The term of con-? 
version is. another substance; that of alteration, another quality. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 159 

cannot be strictly defined ; and yet nothing is more clear to 
the mind than it is. 

Essence, as possible, being logically presupposed to its 
actual existence in the real order of things, metaphysicians 
amuse themselves with the subtle question, " Is actually exist- 
ing essence truly different from its real existence ? " Though 
the question is not practically important, and perhaps turns 
partly on an equivocal use of terms, it may, however, exercise 
mental acumen in the inquisitive student of philosophy, to 
state it briefly in this place. 

One side, interpreting in their favor the expressions often 
employed by the "Angel of the Schools," St. Thomas of 
Aquin, v. g., "essentia entis perfectissimi, absoluti, necessarii, 
etc., est suum esse; " the essence of absolutely perfect being 
includes its existence; "essentia entis contingentis non est 
suum esse;" the essence of contingent being does not postu- 
late in its concept actual existence; "in creatis, est compositio 
inter essentiam et esse ; " in created things, there is composition 
between essence and existence, etc., argue that the two are 
different ; that is, that real essence and its actual existence are 
different objectively. They hold that the term of every creative 
act must be actually received by a subject, since all created essence 
is participated or derived. Hence, in this theory, existence is 
the actuality, and essence is the subject that receives it ; some 
saying that the existence is a substantial form educed from the 
essence; others, that it is modal only. It thence follows, there- 
fore, that essence and its existence constitute a dual principle, 
like to that of matter and form, in corporeal substance, the 
essence being the potentia, or quasi matter, and existence being 
the form. 

The other side, who maintain that it is a distinction without a 
difference, answer that this theory, thus applied, presents a less 
simple and perfect concept both of the creative act, and the 
nature of uncompounded or simple substance ; that, for the 
existence of corporeal substance, it necessitates the admission 
of a double dual principle ; namely, matter and form, essence 
and existence. They argue, moreover, that their adversaries' 



160 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

theory being true, namely, that all actual being must be received, 
no sufficient reason can be given why the series of dual prin- 
ciples should be limited at all ; that this hypothesis is obscure, 
and difficult to be comprehended ; that it is susceptible of no 
positive ox conclusive proof; that it is a multiplication of entia, 
which rather perplexes than simplifies philosophic thought, and 
that it, therefore, is introduced without logical necessity.* 

From this imperfect outline of a few arguments adduced by 
each side, some idea may be formed, at least, of the point on 
which the dispute turns. 

Possibility : Whatever creature exists is capable of existing, 
and was capable of existing before it existed at all. A thing is 
intrinsically possible, when its essential constituents have no re- 
pugnance or contradiction among themselves; as v. g., it is 
possible to construct a locomotive that is impelled at a given 
velocity by steam. Extrinsic possibility, besides presupposing 
the intrinsic possibility, implies also that there is a sufficient 
cause that can actually produce the effect ; v. g., the builders, 
material, etc., of the locomotive, in the example supposed. 

Possibility, taken simply or adequately, includes both the 
extrinsic and the intrinsic possibility. 

Corresponding to this double respect of possibility there is a 
twofold impossibility ; intrinsic and extri?isic impossibility. All 
things that are intrinsically possible, are, in respect to the power 
of God, also extrinsically possible. In respect to the power of 
creatures, many things which are intrinsically, and, therefore, 
extrinsically possible to God, are for them physically impossible; 
v. g., it is physically impossible for men to stop the motion of the 
earth, and still more is it physically impossible for a creature to 
create from nothing. A thing is morally impossible which, con- 
sidering the moral nature of man, cannot be done by him ; v. 
g., all parents cannot hate their offspring; all men cannot unite 
in a lie. 

Intrinsic possibility does 'not primarily proceed either from 

* This question is argued acutely and at great length by Suarez (Metaphysics, 
Disput. , 31) ; Avhere he defends the latter opinion, and denies that there is any 
real difference between actual essence and Us existence. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 161 

the power or the will of God; but from the essences of things 
as seen by the Divine Intelligence; or, in other words, they 
have their origin in the Divine Essence itself. 

It is obvious that both power and will presuppose the possi- 
bility of the thing to be done or effected, since intelligence 
must logically precede both volition* and the power that fol- 
lows, or obeys volition. Otherwise, one might say, " God can 
make a circle that is not round, if its possibility depends formally 
on his will, or his power; " whereas, the supposition is absurd ; 
for contradictions mutually destroy themselves, and, in the 
case supposed, leave no term of action. It would be the same 
as saying, God can make a circle and not make a circle at the 
same time and under the same respect ; which is actually say- 
ing nothing at all, as an object of thought or real term of ac- 
tion. 

Hence, it is easily seen that, as before stated, intrinsic possi- 
bilities, or, what is virtually the same, the essences of things, 
are immutable, and are, therefore, incapable either of increase 
or diminution. 

Every being is one. Unity is the negation of division in a 
being.t For, every being is either simple, or it is compound ; 
if it is simple, it is indivisible ; if it is compound, it ceases to 
be a being when divided, and becomes not a being, but be- 
ings. Yet, a thing may be one in some respect, and many in 
another respect; v. g., the essence of a thing is one; but its 
integral parts may be many. The universal is actually one, but 
capable of becoming many, under a certain respect.f 

Identity^ is founded on unity, and signifies the agreement of 

* ' ' Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum,, ' ' That which is wished must have heen 
previously known ; or, more litterally, nothing is wished unless what is fore- 
known. 

j- ' ' Omne principium est unum. ' ' Every principle is one. 

1 ' Ab uno non nisi unum. ' ' 

X ' ' Universale, unum est actu; muita in potentia. ' ' The universal is one ac- 
tually, but many, potentially. 

§ ' ' Unum in substantia facit idem ; unum m qualitate facit simile; unum in 
qantitate facit cequale, seu aequalitas fundatur in imitate quantitatis, servata dis- 
tinctione extremorum. " To be one in substance, makes identity; one in quality, 
makes similarity; one in quantity, makes equality; or, equality is founded on 
unity of quantity, keeping the distinction of the extremes. 
II 



162 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

a thing with itself. Identity may be generic, as, animal, in 
man and brute ; or specific, as man, when applied to different 
men ; or numerical, as a man compared with himself. 

Similarity* is connected with identity and unity, since it is 
founded on unity or identity under some respect. 

Similarity is an agreeme?it of distinct tilings. This agree- 
ment is in some quality or perfection, and it may exist in ob- 
jects of different species ; " the child resembles its mother ; 
the color of the evening sky is like to that of gold ; " " vices 
in the evening of life, like shadows at the decline of day, grow 
great and monstrous." The resemblance between the objects 
in the last example is properly that of analogy, though the 
comparison be termed simile. Agreement in all respects is 
peculiar to objects of the same species, as, Peter is like Paul ; 
this is specific identity. 

Leibnitz and Clark disputed as to whether two objects of the 
same species could be so completely alike as to differ only 
numerically; Leibnitz denied the possibility of it; Clark main- 
tained it to be intrinsically possible; and in this he was correct. 

Distinguish between similarity and analogy; similarity is 
founded on the specific identity of some one or more qualities 
or properties in objects which are otherwise different, and which 
are, therefore, predicated of the objects univocally. These ob- 
jects, or the subjects of the like qualities, may be either of the 
same or different species. Analogy, on the contrary, properly 
supposes its objects or the terms of it, to be of different species. 

Analogy is not founded on specifically ide?itical quality in its 
objects or terms ; but on a certain proportion between its ob- 
jects, or their proper effects, by which the one becomes related 
in the mind to the other. 

This proportion is not that which is in parity, which is reduc- 
ible to mathematical quantity, and' which, being of the same 
species, is predicated univocally of its terms ; but the propor- 
tion which makes analogy is not reducible to mathematical 

* " Ut duo dicantur perfecte similia, debent habere secundum eamdem ratio- 
nem id in quo conveniunt. ' ' For two things to be called perfectly similar, they 
must possess that in which they agree, in the same manner. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 163 

quantity ; it is a relation or agreement which has no proper 
unit of measure, is neither uni vocally nor equivocally predi- 
cated of its objects or terms, and yet they have that basis of 
somewhat indeterminate resemblance which founds for the 
mind a relation of the one to the other. 

Both similarity and analogy, therefore, are founded on like- 
ness of objects, and hence, they may be considered as agreeing 
generically, though they differ specifically. 

Distinction* is opposed to identity. Real distinction is either 
substantial or accidental; the distinction between an apple and 
a pebble is substantial; also, that between the body and soul in 
man, though constituents of the same compound. The dis- 
tinction between substance and its accidents, or among the acci- 
dents themselves, is, under different respects, either accidental 
distinction, or substantial distinction. 

The distinction of reason\ is so called, because it is made by 
the reason, and exists only in the reasoning which the mind 
employs in its efforts to comprehend or explain certain difficult 
objects in which, being unable to use the real, it helps itself by 
this artificial distinction. 

This distinction of reason is two-fold ; it is either virtually 
founded in the object; or, it is purely mental. The distinction 
of the attributes in God, as all-wise, all-powerful, free, mer- 
ciful, just, etc., since his absolute perfection contains in a cer- 
tain pre-eminent manner what we thus denominate, is a dis- 
tinction of reason founded in its object; though God and his 
attributes are really identical. 

The distinction between man and ratiojial animal, or Cicero 
a?id Tully, is purely mental, or of reason; one being the other 
differently expressed. The mind employs these distinctions of 
reason in its operations that regard objects, whose unity and 
simplicity, or greatness, it is unable to express by one direct 
and adequate concept of those objects. 

* ' ' Distinctio est carentia identitatis. ' ' Distinction is a want oi identity. 

t ' ' Distinctio rationis est duplex: distinctio rationis ratiocinate, quae fit cum 
fundamento in re; et distinctio rationis ratiocinantis, quae est sine fundamento in 
re. ' • The distinction of reason is twofold : the one is founded in the object ; the 
other is not founded in the object. 



164 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

To this head we may likewise refer various mere figments 
of the imagination: "ens imaginabile latius ampliat quam 
ens possibile;" the fancy extends its action even beyond the 
possible object, to the impossible or absurd. 



ARTICLE II. 

TRUTH. 

Truth* is a predicate of every being ; and is, therefore, enu- 
merated among the transcendentals, or the transcendental pre- 
dicates : it consists in this, that every being agrees with the 
essential type, or concept of itself. Truth, thus understood, is 
now more commonly called, metaphysical truth. 

All truth, as already declared in speaking of logical truth, is 
a relation of agreement between intellect and object. t When 
Leibnitz defines it to be, order in the constituents of being his 
definition pertains rather to the goodness or perfection of being. 

Absolutely speaking, things are true because they agree with 
the intellect that constitutes them ; that is, when they agree 
with the archetypes, or essential ideas according to whose 
exemplar they are made. Thus all actual things agree with 
their exemplars in the Divine Mind; and, similarly, artificial 
things made by man are true, as agreeing with the precon- 
ceived idea of them in the mind of him who devises and makes 
them. Hence, it is easily seen that falsity \ in beings, or real 
things, is nothings but falsity, or not being, is predicated of them 
by a concept of reason, which attributes to them what is really 
in the judgment, or in the mind only. 

A statue is said to be false, which fails to express the intended 
likeness; a deceiver is called a false friend; objects are called 
false, which give occasion for false judgment, as " fools' gold," 
etc. But falsity, formally taken, is the negation of truth, and 

* ' ' Omne ens est verum. ' ' Every being is true. 

f ' ' Veritas est adsequatio intellectus et rei . ' ' Truth is the equation of intel- 
lect and object. 
X ' ' Falsitas in rebus nihil est. ' ' There is no falsity in real things. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 165 

in. its primary or radical sense, is to be referred to will and 
judgment, or, to finite cognition, but not to things or beings, 
as positive. 

After a little attention to the preceding considerations, the 
following propositions will be readily admitted : 

First : There is truth in all real things, and that independently 
of our knowledge of them. For they are conformable to their 
archetypes in the Divine Intellect ; and this relation of agree- 
ment' is metaphysical truth. Also things are principally or 
primarily true by their relation to the Divine Intelligence, to 
which must be referred the origin of ail essences. 

Secotid : No object is false, in respect to the Divine Intellect. 
For God is infinite in intelligence in which they originate, and 
freedom which wills to create, and power which actually effects 
them, or gives them their real being; therefore, all things that 
exist must agree with their essential exemplars, as they are in 
His intelligence : this is truth in those things; since they must 
be what they are seen, willed and made to be, by Him. 

Ttiird : Every being is true: (pmne ens est verum.) For so 
far as any thing is being at all, so far forth is it true; since we 
can predicate not true only of that which is not. 

Fourth : In respect to the Divine Intellect, created things are 
as the measured to the measure ; but in respect to the human 
intellect, on the contrary, creatures are as the measure to the 
measured. That is, Divine Intelligence is the cause of created 
things ; but these created things are the cause of the human 
intellect knowing them; for, as objects, they specify the acts of 
human knowledge which they cause ; and without their active 
concurrence, the human intellect could not know them. 



ARTICLE III. 

GOOD AND EVIL. 

Every thing that exists may be conceived as having for its 
object a certain good which is connatural to it, and to which 
it tends, therefore, by the law of its nature. This propensity 



166 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

or positive tendency to that good which is an end for each 
being, is often called, under different respects, its appetite, or 
its power of appetition. 

Appetite, then, is the propensity or positive tendency of a 
being to its connatural good. Elicited appetition is this pro- 
pensity or tendency to a known good; and since knowledge may 
be either sensible or rational, it is obvious that appetite may also 
be either sensible or rational. Rational appetite, which is the 
will, tends to a good which is apprehended by the intellect, as 
the sensible appetite tends to good which is known through the 
organs of sense. 

An act is elicited by a power when it proceeds immediately 
and physically from that power ; or, when that power is the 
active principle that gives origin to it. Thus, the will elicits 
its own acts, or they are immediately and physically from the 
will. Owing to the authority of the will over our faculties 
and members, their acts which are put, in obedience to the 
will, are co?nmanded or ordered acts. Objects which have not 
a vital principle of action in them do not elicit acts; but are 
moved to action only by an efficient and extrinsic cause. 

IN WHAT THE LIBERTY OR FREEDOM OF THE RATIONAL 
APPETITE, OR THE HUMAN WILL, CONSISTS. 

That power is free, which, all things being put which are 
required for its action, can either act, or not act.* Hence, 
when the objects which are subject to the will's free choice are 
actually presented to it by the intellect, it is truly indifferent in 
respect to them ; i. e., its election or choice is not determined 
by the objects proposed to it, but is determined by the will 
itself, by its own proper act. 

* " Potentia libera ilia est, quae, positis omnibus requisitis ad operandum, 
potest operari et non operari. ' ' 

"Omnia bonum appetunt; malum est praeter intentionem. ' ' All things 
desire their good; evil is beside intention. 

" Voluntas est appetitus intellectus, seu est inclinatio ad bonum per intel- 
lectual apprehensum. " 

' ' Appetitus boni cum ratione. ' ' 

The will is the appetite of the intellect, or it is inclination to good which is ap- 
prehended by the intellect; it is the appetite of good with reason. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 167 

As there are two distinct classes of objects which the action 
of the will regards, the liberty or freedom of the will may be 
considered under two corresponding respects: ist, it maybe 
considered as exempt from force, or forced action, but not 
exempt from necessity, or necessitated action ; 2d, the action of 
the will may be considered as exempt, both from force and 
necessity. It is liberty or freedom of action in this second 
sense alone, that is specified in the preceding definition of lib- 
erty. In this case, therefore, even all things being supposed 
which are required for its action, the will can either act, or not 
act, the final choice being strictly its own act. 

Distinguish, therefore, between the will's action as thus free, 
and its necessitated action. Beings that see God intuitively 
are necessitated by that vision of perfect good, to love God 
supremely; but they are wot forced to do so, since force im- 
plies violent and compulsory action. For, it is manifest that 
force, or forced action, comes from an extrinsic principle, and 
the subject which is compelled by it is entirely passive, and, 
therefore, does not positively or efficiently contribute to the 
forced action. 

It is essential to the very concept of appetite, or power of 
appetition, and above all to a rational appetite, that it tend by 
its natural action only to what is apprehended as the good of 
its subject ; and that it avert from evil, when it is apprehended 
precisely as such. For, if the appetite could tend to evil, as 
evil, it would itselt be physically and essentially evil, for, in 
such supposition, it would tend to evil as its connatural object, 
and, therefore, its evil action would be in obedience to the neces- 
sary physical law of its nature. The appetite would, in such 
case, be intrinsically evil, as is evident ; but this would dis- 
honor God. Therefore, an appetite must, of its very nature, 
tend to what is, at least in some respect, the good of its sub- 
ject. 

Hence, it must follow that the will can, by its natural action, 
tend to no object which is not apprehended as, under some 
respect, good for its subject. And this is, at the same time, 
as a little observation and reflexion will verify, an obvious fact 



168 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

of experience, as regards the operation of all those agents 
which have natural to them these principles of action termed 
appetites, or powers of appetition. 

The will, when considered as exempt from force or compul- 
sory action, but yet as necessarily tending, in all its action, to 
good, is often termed a natural agent; in the sense that, like 
all physical and second causes, its action is spontaneous, i. e., 
springs from itself, or its own nature as operative : its action is 
still voluntary, or of the will, but it is not free. 

The term spontaneous, is used in several distinct senses : ist, 
the action even of inanimate beings, as minerals, stones, etc., 
is said to be spontaneous, in the sense that their action is their 
own, or really proceeds from them, as a principle that puts, or 
produces it ; 2d, that species of choice, in a wide and analogi- 
cal sense of the term, which irrational animals make by virtue 
of sensible power in them, among the objects of their appetites, 
is often termed spo?itancous action in them : 3d, the action of 
the will as necessitated to desire good, is termed spo7itaneous 
action ; and, in the same sense, it is often called voluntary ac- 
tion, as opposed to free action, inasmuch as the will is its 
principle, or it is elicited by the will ; 4th, the free action of 
the will is also termed spontaneous, as opposed both to forced 
and necessitated action. 

Hence, spontaneous action, in the primary sense of the word 
from which its other meanings are derived, is opposed to forced 
action ; or, spontaneous action is that action which is wot forced, 
but is put by the agent as its principle. 

The will is properly termed free, as already observed, only 
when it is exempt both from force and necessity or necessitated 
action. As subject only to necessity, it is still the formal prin- 
ciple of its own action, or it elicits its volitions : but it does so, 
in obedience to physical and necessary law. Every agent, 
truly such ; the intellect, the senses, irrational animals, inani- 
mate substances, can all act, and do act, with some sort of 
spontaneity, or without being forced to operate, as above ex- 
plained; but yet, they are never exempt from necessity/ or, all 
their actions are necessitated, for they are determined by their 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 169 

objects. The intellect in its three principal acts of simple 
apprehension, judgment of composition, and judgment of illa- 
tion, and every other cognoscive power, all depend for action 
on the objects, for the objects must detennine them to act ; 
and when their objects actually influence them, they must 
necessarily act. 

But no object, in regard to which the will is free, ever deter- 
mines its action ; it determines its own free action for itself. 
Over its election between those objects which are subject to its 
choice, it has complete empire ; but no other power ever has 
any such control over its own action. 

In respect to the relation which the will may have to the 
different objects which are subject to its choice, its liberty or 
freedom is distinguished into that of contrariety or specifica- 
tion, and that of contradiction or exercise. 

Liberty of contrariety or specification implies capability in the 
will of selecting between species of objects which are subject 
to its choice; v. g., if the matter or objects which are pro- 
posed to it be, " will I write a letter now, or go into the grove, 
or visit my friends? " The actual choice between these objects 
may be considered the exercise of liberty as to the contrariety 
or specificatio?i of its action. But when the terms are employed 
more strictly and precisely ; liberty of contrariety regards ob- 
jects which are contrary, as good or bad; liberty of specification, 
regards merely the species of the objects. 

But if the question be, " will I answer the letter, or not answer 
it ? " This is to determine between acting, and not acting ; 
which is exercising liberty of contradiction. In virtue of its 
liberty of contradiction or exercise, then, the will can either 
positively choose, or not choose, a certain good object pro- 
posed to it. 

Liberty thus to choose between species of acts, and between 
acting and not acting, or liberty of exercise, necessarily requires 
indiffere?ice in the will; i. e., that it be imdetermined to one 
side or another, whether by the object proposed, or by any 
other principle which is extrinsic to itself, thus leaving it so 
disposed that the choice actually made will come from itself. 



170 GENETCAL METAPHYSICS. 

The powers which act only when determined by their objects, 
are not i?idifferent to action, nor to the species of their acts ; but 
when the objects are sufficiently presented to them, and actually 
influence them, their action is necessitated, and, at the same 
time, their acts are specified by those objects. 

THE WILL, WHEN FREELY CHOOSING, IS NOT DETERMINED BY 
THE GREATEST MOTIVE. 

It must not be supposed that the will, in choosing among 
objects that are subject to election, is determi?ied by the greatest 
motive, as some authors erroneously affirm. In such a suppo- 
sition, the will would really not be free at all; for, in that case, 
its action would be necessitated by the motive or object, just 
as it always happens in respect to the powers of cognition. 
Hence, the theory which teaches that among the objects which 
fall under election, the one which furnishes the greatest jnotive 
to the will is thereby predomina?it and necessarily determines 
the will to choose it, is repugnant to the very concept of liberty 
and destroys its essential character. In truth, the will can, in 
such cases, yield to the less motive; nay, it can abstain from 
any positive action at all in respect to the proffered objects. 

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IS KNOWN TO ALL, AS AN 
EVIDENT FACT. 

The freedom of the will is known to be a fact, in its own 
immediate or objective evidence, to every rational man, on 
the direct testimony of his own consciousness, just as every 
sane man knows that he perceives, reasons, remembers, etc. 
The liberty of the will is, therefore, a primitive fact, in the 
same sense in which the direct acts of cognition, of conscious- 
ness, of judgment, of sensation, etc., are primitive facts. 

Facts are not inaptly denominated " stubborn things ; " for 
they are independent of man's trustless words, they overturn 
his most specious theories, and they defy his keenest sophistry. 

Any difficulty of reconciling the evident fact of man's free- 
dom with other truths, which are sometimes artfully made to 
appear as contradicting it, can proceed only from ignorance of 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 171 

those other truths, or else from failure to detect a logical fallacy. 
But a full treatise on the will, properly pertains to Psychology. 

As figure and color constitute the object of vision, sound 
that of hearing, truth the object of the understanding, so, the 
good* forms the object of the will. As man has many appe- 
tites by which he is drawn to various objects presented to him 
under the form or respect of good, sub ratione boni; in a simi- 
lar manner, his highest appetite, that is, his rational appetite, 
or will, loves the good which is of a corresponding and supe- 
rior order ; and, in one respect or another, his will tends neces- 
sarily to that good. 

The goodness of a thing is founded on that required and 
befitting perfection which renders that thing desirable to the 
power of appetition, whose connatural object it is. Sensible 
good is the connatural object of sensible appetite, and is perfect in 
its species when the sensible appetite is satisfied by it, and rests 
quiet in its enjoyment. A similar proportion exists between 
the superior or rational appetite, the will, and its connatural 
objects. 

The good is presupposed to the appetition of it, and it acts 
on the mind by way of a final cause. When good is thus un- 
derstood ; that is, absolutely, as the formal and essential object 
of the will or rational appetite, without which it cannot act 
at all, under this respect it is not subject to choice or election ; 
but the will tends to it necessarily, as to its only end. The 
means to that end, however, does fall under the election or 
choice of the will. The will cannot love evil as evil, {?nalum 
sub ratione mali); its only object, therefore, is good. 

When all objects are regarded as subordinate to this end ; 
that is, as giving connatural exercise to the powers of appeti- 
tion, the good that is in those objects may be divided, relatively 
to that end, into the beco7ning, the useful, the pleasa?it. The 
good that is becoming, or fit, is good that is in accordance with 

* " Bonitas est prior uatura quam appetibilitas; agit per modum causae fina- 
lis." " Finis non cadit sub electione ; quia electio versatur circa media, non 
autem circa ipsum finem. ' ' Goodness is by nature prior to appetibility ; it acts 
by way of final cause . The end does not fall under election ; for election regards 
the means, not the end itself. 



172 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

right reason, and it includes, therefore, moral good; good as 
pleasant supposes cognition and power of fruition ; the useful, 
which is loved, not for itself, but for something ulterior to it, 
is a means to that end. As to what constitutes the summum 
bonum* or chief good which is the ultimate end of man as a 
rational being, it pertains to another treatise to investigate. 

Hence, it follows, that good is absolute, or relative; physical 
or moral. Every being is good; both in itself and in respect to 
other being than itself. f Good is diffusive of itself, for its end is 
to be possessed and loved. All good is from God.\ 

Evil is the privation of good; or, it is the want of some due 
perfection in a being. Evil is physical or moral; or, it is the 
absence of some due physical or moral perfection. 

Physical evil is the privation of some natural good ; as sick- 
ness, blindness, ignorance, etc. 

Moral evil is the privation of moral good, and, as is mani- 
fest, can - be found only in agents that are intelligent and free. 
It consists in a defection of the free will from what is morally 
right or good. 

According to Leibnitz, there is also metaphysical evil ; which 
is finiteness, or limitation of perfection. But this is not pro- 
perly an evil ; for, when a created being is perfect in its spe- 
cies, it possesses all due perfection ; and it is confusion of lan- 
guage to say that finiteness, or not being identical with God, 
is evil, when viewed under such a respect. 

There is no evil, except in a subject that is good; and, as 
already seen, every being, as such, is good. Since evil con- 
sists in privation of good, what has no being, can have no evil; 
that is, it must be nothing; which, properly, is neither good nor 
evil. The efficient cause of evil is good,§ as a being; and no 
will can wish evil purely as such, or purely for itself; but it 
may wish evil which is presented to it as good ; v. g., as gain 
or pleasure. 

♦VideDiv. Th. IP., Qu. 5, Art. 6. 

t ' ' Bonum est diffusivum sui. ' ' Good is diffusive of itself. 
X ' ' Deus est omnis boni bonum . ' ' God is the good of every good. 
§ ' ' Malum non agit nisi virtute boni . ' ' Evil does not act except in virtue of 
good. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 173 

ARTICLE IV. 

BEAUTY. 

As the goodness of an object depends on its having all the 
perfections of its species or essence, together with all the qual- 
ities that complete and adorn it ; so, the beauty of that object 
depends on the same conditions. The object of love, and con- 
templation, therefore, is the same, though it respects different 
powers of the soul ; good being the object of appetition, and 
beauty that of contemplative, or cognoscive power.* 

Beauty is intellectual, moral and sensible. Philosophers have 
found it difficult to give a definition of beauty, which clearly 
and satisfactorily includes all its species. Some have defined 
it to be, " unity with multitude and variety." But we can con- 
ceive an object to possess " unity with multitude and variety," 
which is yet misshapen or deformed. 

Unity, multitude and variety may be necessary conditions 
of beauty in most cases; but they are not its only constituents. 
Nor are " order and utility " its specific characteristics, as some 
allege ; since " order and utility " refer to perfection and good- 
ness A 

Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his admirable lecture before the 
Royal Academy, December 14, 1770, said, that in each of the 
various species of God's works, there is a perfect " central form 
which nature most frequently produces, and always seems to 
intend in her productions; and from it, every deviation is 
deformity." This central form is more or less beautiful, accord- 
ing to the perfection of its species. 

His observation is acute and suggestive of happy thoughts 
as to the nature of beauty. But the question may be asked, 
what constitutes the beauty of this ce7itral form ? In accord- 
ance with his theory, his answer should be, its perfection is its 
beauty. 

*' ' Pulchrum ad visum, bonum ad appetitum spectator; seuqaxe visa placent. ' ' 
Beauty pertains to vision, the good to appetite; "What is seen gives pleasure. 

t ' ' Pulchrum et bonum in subjecto sunt idem ; quia super eamdam rem fundan- 
tur, viz. : super formam. ' ' (Summa 1 p. , qu. 5, art. 4.) The beautiful and the 
good, in the subject, are the same thing; for they are founded upon the same 
thing, namely, the for m. 



174 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

Beauty does suppose perfection in its object, and hence, it 
is obvious that different species of objects have, in themselves 
considered, greater or less beauty, according to their degrees 
of essential and accidental perfection; v. g., man has more 
specific beauty, and that, too, of a higher order, than the brute 
has; and similarly for animals in comparison with inferior 
forms in material nature. 

Since beauty pertains to cognoscive power, and, therefore, to 
contemplation, and not, as such, to appetition, we may, per- 
haps, with some appropriateness, define beauty to be "propor- 
tion, that is perceived '/" i. e., proportion and light. 

Proportion, in its proper concept, includes unity, together 
with the order and variety of parts, appropriate to each par- 
ticular object, and its light or evidence makes it an object of 
contemplation ; since a thing is perceived by its light or evi- 
dence. 

Moreover, since deformity and incompleteness in an object 
are incompatible with perfect proportion ; and since beauty has 
that clearness or brightness which is essential to it, when the 
proportion from which it emanates is evident ; it follows that 
the pleasing effect which we attribute to the beauty of an ob- 
ject, proceeds immediately from the contemplation of its light, 
and proportion. 

Intellectual beauty exists in objects of the intelligible order. 

Plato defines beauty to be the "splendor of truth; " "splendor 
veri;" or, as Boileau interprets it, "the beautiful is the true" 

Truth, as a relation or proportion between mind and object, 
and between object and its essential prototype, is beautiful. 
Truth also in its similitude and proportion to another truth is 
beautiful ; this proportion of truth to another truth is expressed 
in metaphors and similes, and it attributes to them their exqui- 
site beauty ; there is still higher beauty also, in the more exact 
proportions of the necessary and universal truths to which the 
sciences and philosophy lead the mind. 

If the decision made by authority, in matters of taste, forbids 
the denial of the aesthetic principle, according to which obscurity 
may become an element of genuine beauty in painting, music, 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 175 

poetry, and other works of fancy ; it must, however, be borne 
in mind that the concurrence of obscurity in the production of 
the beautiful is merely negative; i. e., it terminates or limits, 
and thereby diversifies the shades or the proportion of light 
and color as to quantity and intensity. But it would be wholly 
absurd to apply this principle to truth, in which any obscurity 
which lessens certainty, is essentially, or by its very nature, 
imperfection, and is, therefore, deformity. 

Beauty, in the works of art, as such, depends upon their 
verisimilitude ; that is, their truth to nature, which they imitate 
or reproduce. 

Sensible beauty* as visible, has for its matter, figure and color; 
their proportion made clear to the vision, which renders the 
object to which they belong, beautiful. In this proportion, 
are included symmetry, unity, variety. 

Proportion in melody and harmony constitutes the beautiful in 
music. A particular note or sound has its pitch, quality, and 
intensity; and when in a certain proportion, they cause even 
that single sound or note to be musical in its undulations or 
vibrations; a succession of such notes, of various pitch, intensity, 
quality and motion, all of which preserve a certain proportion 
to the key note or tonica, forms a beautiful melo'dy ; beautiful 
harmony is added to the melody by accompanying notes, whose 
differences of pitch, quality, etc., are always according to some 
determined proportion which they bear to the melody. Hence, 
beauty in music consists in proportion of sounds which have 
various pitch, quality, and intensity. 

The other senses being farther removed from intelligence, or 
being less perfectly cognoscive, their objects are not said to be 
beautiful ; a beautiful taste, beautiful smell, beautiful feeling, are 
expressions that are not used. Sensible impressions which are 
so gross, are less fitted to furnish the mind suitable objects of 
contemplative knowledge, than are the impressions received 
through the sight and hearing. 

* ' ' Sensus est qusedam ratio ; cognoscit ordinata, quae visa placent. ' ' (Sum. 
lp., qu. 5, a. 4.) The sense is a sort of reason; it knows ordered things, which 
being seen, please. 



176 GENEEAL METAPHYSICS. 

Moral beauty is in virtue, or moral goodness. The law com- 
manding some things, and forbidding others; the great diffi- 
culties to be surmounted; the noble soul, the heroic will, the 
pure intention, are all harmonized in the acts of persevering 
virtue, and constitute an object justly considered to be of the 
highest order of finite beauty which can be contemplated in 
this world. 

The eloquent and philosophic Cicero, pronounced the heroic 
acts of the noble virtues to be divine, in their beauty and gran- 
deur: "Animum vincere, iracundiam cohibere, victoriam tempe- 
rare, adversarium nobilitate, ingenio, virtute praestantem non 
modo extollere jacentem, sed etiam amplificare ejus pristinam 
dignitatem, haec qui facit, non ego euro cum summis viris com- 
paro,sed simillimum deo judico." (Oration for Marcus Marcel- 
lus.) " The man who conquers his own soul, who suppresses 
resentment, who is moderate in victory, who not only raises 
from a fallen estate an adversary illustrious for his birth, his talent 
and his bravery, but even amplifies his former dignity : I do net 
compare the man who does these things to the greatest of 
human beings, but I judge him to be most like to a god." 

The science of the beautiful is termed cesthetics ; and the 
power of rightly discriminating and appreciating beauty, is 
called taste, from its analogy to the palate in distinguishing 
objects as sweet, bitter, etc. 

The sublime is akin to the beautiful) the objects that possess 
it are grand, or such as, by their greatness and power, which it 
exceeds the capacity of the mind to comprehend, excite the 
strongest emotions; for instance, wonder, astonishment or awe. 

Obscurity, in objects which are fancied to be great, mighty 
or awful, helps to intensify the strong feelings naturally caused 
by what is thus conceived to be grand, wonderful or terrible ; 
ignotum pro magnificoj "the unknown is magnified! 1 But ob- 
serve, however, that emotions which arise merely from obscur- 
ity in the object, or ignorance of its nature, are ignoble in 
their species, and, therefore, it is only evident grandeur of the 
object, at least as manifested in the effects, or action of the 
object, that constitutes sublimity, properly so-called. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 177 

Here it might be asked, what definitively constitutes that 
proportion which renders an object beautiful? It is, perhaps, 
not possible to assign more precisely, in a general proposition, 
the degrees and relations that constitute it, than is done by the 
term as above explained ; for its combinations are too numer- 
ous and various. But the proportion in which beauty consists, 
is that which supposes a high degree of perfection in the beau- 
tiful object; and yet, variation in that degree of perfection 
may make the same object, under different respects, better 
fitted to the capacity of different tastes. Perfect proportion 
requires unity, variety, order and fitness, which are according 
to the nature or species of the object. 

No definition of the beautiful has yet been given, which 
reduces its constituents to unity; or, in other words, no gen- 
eralization of its properties has ever been made, which enables 
us to define its essence by one distinctive mark or attribute. 
Some great minds have concluded that such generalization is, 
therefore, not possible. But the proof of this conclusion is 
negative only; and hence, it is perhaps too much to affirm 
absolutely that a specific definition of beauty is simply impos- 
sible, or is a work, the ultimate accomplishment of which, has 
been demonstratively proved to transcend the natural power 
of human reason. 



>t 



CHAPTER II. 



ARTICLE I. 

substance; accidents; substance as opposed to 
accident. 

Substance is a being that exists /<?r se, i. e., by itself, ox alone, 
without inhering in another being as a subject that sustains it. 
Sub-stans, here expresses that which stands under all the qual- 
ities or accidents which the mind perceives through the differ- 
ent powers of cognition, in various concrete beings, and which 
is constant, though its accidents are mutable. The notion of 
substance, which is acquired by experience, is first learned at 
the dawn of reason. A child in its earliest exercise of judg- 
ment can practically and truly distinguish between substance 
and accidents, in familiar objects; v. g., that apples of different 
sizes, taste, smell, ripeness, are still apples. 

The concrete nouns, and adjectives, which are essential to the 
framework of human language, show how universal and invin- 
cible this judgment is, that accidents exist dependently upon 
their subject, and that substance, as it were, stands alone,* or 
does not depend on a subject to support it. The testimony of 

* ' ' Substantia est ens quod per se est, seu quod non indiget alio entetanquam 
subjecto cui inhsereat." Per se, has four distinct senses ; but when applied to 
existence, or when it defines a mode of existing, it means alone; or, without a 
companion. 

" Res est per se, quae sedet solitaries id est; qua? non eget alterius consortio, 
cui inexistat. Per se, in aliis modis perseitatis, respicit modum pra?dicandi, vel 
causandi; sed perse in hoc casu, respicit modum existendi." 

To exist a se, means to exist independently of all cause : this, of course, is 
verified only in Infinite Being, in God; hence distinguish between existence per 
se, and existence a se. To exist per se is to exist without inhering in a subject; 
to exist a se, is to exist independently of any cause. 
I 7 8 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 179 

consciousness affords us complete certainty that the mutations 
which occur in ourselves, i. e., of thoughts, feelings, different 
states of the body, etc., are extrinsic to essence, and are acci- 
dental ; and that they depend for their existence on something, 
as a subject, which exists independently of them, and is in 
itself immutable or constant under them. Nay, the line of 
distinction between substance and accident is clearly traced by 
the mind, and it does not confound one with the other. As 
we are now constituted, the mind does not immediately per- 
ceive any substance at all, but sees it only through its opera- 
tions or accidents. Yet, the mind perceives that this substance 
is essentially distinct from its accidents, and is presupposed to 
them. Locke errs when he says, that, in our idea, substance is 
a mere "congeries of qualities perceived by the senses, the mode 
of their existence being entirely unknown to us." The distinc- 
tions between substance and accident are the clearest cogni- 
tions which the mind has of singular and sensible objects. 

Substance is simple or compound; complete or incomplete. Simple 
substance does not consist of parts annexed to parts, and is, 
therefore, indivisible and unextended. 

The compound substance consists of parts joined to parts, 
which, by their union, form a whole ; and, as each part is in 
itself a whole, the compound can be resolved or divided into 
its component parts. 

A complete substance is one whose nature does not require 
union with another substance, but contains all in itself which 
is necessary for its natural action ; as tree, man, angel. 

Incomplete substance is one which connotes, and requires 
another substance in order to complete it for natural existence 
and normal action; v. g., the members of the body; the 
branches of the tree ; the soul and the body in man. 

It is evident that it is not naturally possible for the sensible 
qualities or accidents of material substance to exist apart from 
their subject, which is the substance in which they physically 
inhere. But, is their separate existence intrinsically impossible, 
so that even Divine Omnipotence could not effect it ? 

It is by no means impossible for God to preserve accidents, 



180 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

at least such as are in themselves positive realities, in existence 
separate from the substance to which they belong. Because, 
what a second and dependent cause can do, for a still greater 
reason can the first cause effect; if substance, which depends 
both for its existence and for its efficiency on God, can sustain 
the accidents, it is still more obvious that God can do it by a 
direct and immediate exercise of his power. To deny this 
reasoning in respect to that class of accidents that have a spe- 
cific i-eality of their own, would be absurd. 

With regard to those accidents that are purely modal, and, 
therefore, have no positive and distinct entity, as rest, relation, 
motion; as also those attributes or properties that flow imme- 
diately from the essence, as their principle; v. g., vital power, 
intellect, etc., there is no question ; they cannot exist apart 
from the subject on which they intrinsically depend, and they, 
therefore, have no real entity apart from the subject to which 
they belong. The positive effects, or actual impressions and 
immutation, produced upon the senses, by corporeal substance, 
are proximately from real and distinct accidents, or, such as 
have distinct and positive reality ; v. g., color, taste, smell, 
quantity, etc. These properties, at least with the exception 
of quantity, have a peculiar activity, which affords proof con- 
clusive that they have real and distinct entity, apart from the 
substance in which they naturally inhere; and that they are, 
therefore, really added to substance. 

It may be said, consequently, that there are two classes of 
accidents which are distinguishable in reference to the preced- 
ing questions: ist, there are certain accidents which have no 
entity apart from a subject — " sunt entitates adeo debiles " — and 
cannot exist, therefore, unless in a substance, or in another 
accident as quasi subject; v. g., motion, union, relation, etc. 
Also, vital powers and other essential attributes are inseparably 
affixed to their subject, and could have no existence or entity 
apart from it. 2d, Those accidents which naturally inhere, 
but which, by infinite power, can exist apart from their sub- 
ject : quantity, qualities such as color, taste, smell, etc. 

From the preceding observations it is manifest that substance 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 181 

and accident differ essentially or specifically. Therefore, being 
cannot be predicated of them univocally ; but only analogi- 
cally; v. g., as being is predicated only by ajialogy of spirit and 
matter. 

PROPERTY IS AN ACCIDENT; BUT IT DIFFERS FROM COMMON 
ACCIDENT. 

Property is an accidejit that is proper; or, it belongs to its 
subject ; hence its name, property. It differs from accident 
that is common, in this : property belongs to the species of the 
object; i. e., agrees with an object on account of its specific 
nature or form; the common accident agrees with an object or 
individual in virtue of its matter, or quasi matter; v. g., "-Man 
limps, because Peter is lame; Peter laughs, because man is a 
laughing being." Zameness is an accident that is common to 
individuals of many species of animals that walk; laughter, 
strictly so-called, is peculiar or proper only to man. 

Property is said to flow from the essence or form ; as do the 
powers of intelligence, sensation, volition ; in this, it differs 
from common accident, which accedes from without or extrinsi- 
cally, and is common to many species on account of their 
matter; v. g., quantity, in man, wood, mineral, etc. 

Since property necessarily flows from the essence of its sub- 
ject, wherever the essence is, there is the property ; " convenit 
omni, soli, semper." It is, on that account, regarded as con- 
vertible with essence, and may be employed to define essence 
or species. 

Property, thus explained, is found only in the proximate or 
lowest species of things ; for, only in the individuals of a spe- 
cies is found the form or specific principle which really consti- 
tutes substantial and actual essence; yet, by a certain analogy, 
higher genera are said to have properties; v. g., one, true, good, 
are termed properties of being* 

* ' ' Juxta aliquam analogiam, nmim, bonnm, verum, dicuntur entis proprie- 
tates; suscipere contraria, est substantias proprium; progressio, animalis per- 
fects motus ab intrinseco, viventis; quantitas, corporis," etc. By a certain 
analogy, one, good, true, are termed properties of being; to receive contraries 
is a property of substance; progressive motion, a property of the perfect ani- 
mal; quantity is a property of bodies, etc. 



182 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

Though, in strictness, property stands for an attribute that is 
always found in every individual of the whole species, yet the 
term is often applied to one that is more purely accidental; v. 
g., to be an orator, in respect to man, which is proper to man, 
but not to all men; to be biped, which is proper not only to all 
men, but to some other animals, etc. 

But the proper and the common accidents agree in this, that 
they are both extrinsic to essence; "sunt extra essentiam rei;" 
hence it is that they both agree in being accidents. 

Although property or the proper accident is sometimes made 
convertible with essence, is necessarily and intimately con- 
nected with it, and defines it; yet it is only adjacent to essence, 
not its constituent. 

The commofi accident can never define an object, from the 
fact that it is common to many species of things on account of 
their matter. 

Properties, which, as already observed, flow from, or result 
immediately, from the essence of objects, are the same in fact 
as the specific difference* of those objects; they most inti- 
mately inhere in their objects, and are inseparable from them. 
Hence, properties are said to be predicated per se of their sub- 
jects ; i. e., they necessarily, or of their nature, inhere in their 
subjects, and are not in them per accidens, or accidentally, as 
happens in the co?n?non accide?it, which is a predicate of this or 
that subject, not per se, as flowing from its essence, but per acci- 
dens, or accidentally. 

COMMON ACCIDENT THE SAME AS THE FIFTH UNIVERSAL PRE- 
DICABLE, CALLED ACCIDENT; ACCIDENT AS OPPOSED TO 
SUBSTANCE, IS PREDICAMENTAL ACCIDENT. 

The word accident is used not only as expressing one of the 
five universals, in which sense it means commoti accident, and 
is distinguished from property or proper accident; but it is em- 
ployed also to express all that is not substance, or as opposed 
to substance. In this sense, it not only includes all property, 

* "Differentia essentia et proprietas, sunt idem re." (S. Thorn. Metaph. 61, 
iect. 2, lit. c.) Essential difference, and property or attribute, are really the 
game thing. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 183 

but it likewise comprehends nine out of the ten categories, or 
ultimate genera, substance alone being excepted.* 

Therefore substance and accident, as thus opposed to each 
other, reduce all the ten categories or predicaments, i. e., all 
real things, to two categories; namely, to substance, and the 
category or predicament accident, which in this division includes 
under it, as just said, nine out of the ten categories or ultimate 
genera.f 

Actual inhering in a subject is essential to the existence of 
properties which are predicated per se, and which are, therefore, 
convertible with specific dijference; but aptitude for inhering in 
a subject is all that is absolutely essential for other accidents, as 
such; for they can absolutely be sustained in existence without 
their actually inhering in their subject, at least such of them as 
have positive entity or reality of their own; i. e., those accidents 
that are not purely modal. 

In further elucidation of this doctrine it may be said, that 
the subject of properties is for them really a principle ; from it 
they result, or take their origin; on it they depend for begin- 
ning, and continuing to exist. 

But, since the co?nmo?i accidents accede extrinsically to their 
subject, the subject is not, in the same sense, their principle ; 
and hence their connexion with it, and dependence on it, are 
not intrinsic, but extrinsic, and they are, therefore, more purely 
contingent/ i. e., they are more immediately and completely 
dependent on the free cause of their subject. 

* "Accideris est xelprcedicabile, rel prcedicamentale; accidens praedicabile per- 
tinet ad omne prcedicamentum ; accidens praedicamentale, pertinet ad unum 
aliumve novem prasdicamentorum. ' ' 

tWhen it is said, " substantia categorica est univoca, respectu inferiorurn;" 
"accidens est analogum;" "substance is univocal throughout its category; 
accident is analogical;" this holds of accident as distinguished from substance, 
or as predicamental, not of accident as one of the five universale, or as a pre- 
dicate, for as the universal it is predicated univocally of its inferiors. 



184 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

ARTI CLE II. 
quantity; quality. 

All the ten categories, or predicaments, except substance, 
have only accidents as their inferiors; for every real being that 
is not substance, is accident. 

Quantity, as extended, consists of parts adjoined to parts, in 
which case it is called continuous quantity, or extension. The 
parts are either actually such, or potentially such; i. e., parts 
into which the object having quantity can, absolutely, be 
divided. 

The old philosophers maintained that quantity* is the nearest 
or most adjacent accident to matter; that it is, in some sense, 
presupposed to the other accidents, which pertain to its form, 
or that which perfects the matter in its species, and determines 
its nature. 

EXTENSION. 

Perfect extensioji consists of length, breadth, and thickness, 
or has three dimensions; but length, or length and breadth, 
also form quantity. The termini, or limits of continuous quan- 
tity, are not positive, but privative being. Extension in space, 
is a property of matter, but it is not so essential to it, that the 
separation of material substance from it in existence is intrin- 
sically impossible. 

In other words, it is not repugnant to reason that material 
substance should exist in a more simple and perfect species of 
relation to space, than bodies possess, as they now actually 
exist, subject to our senses. But the full explanation of this 
subject belongs to another treatise. 

Extension is of two species, circumscriptive and definitive ; 
in the circumscriptive extension the extended object occupies the 
whole place included within its boundary, and each part of the 
object fills a proportionate part of the whole place; v. g., a 

* ' * In materialibus, quantitas sequitur materiam ; qualitas sequitur formam. ' ' 
"In viventibus quantitas sequitur formam, saltern quoad terminum magnitu- 
dinis seu parvitatis. " (Suarez Metaph. ; Disp. 42, sect. 1.) In material things 
quantity follows the matter, quality follows the form. In living things quantity 
follows the form, at least as to the limit of its size, as great or small. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 185 

cubic block of marble occupies a cubic space of the same size 
or extension, and a fourth part of it fills a fourth part of that 
extent, a half occupies a half, etc. 

In definitive extension, the substance is complete in the whole, 
and is whole in each part of its extension ; y. g., the soul is 
whole in the entire body, and whole in each part of it. 

Quantity is either continuous, as above defined, or it is dis- 
crete; if extension be divided into parts, the number which 
expresses or includes the whole collection of those parts, is 
discrete quantity. But abstract number, or that which does not 
express actual parts of a divided quantity numerically, does not 
belong to the category or predicament that is called quantity ; 
but is transcendental, i. e., may enter any of the categories, ex- 
press their units, or unities, or be applied to any beings. 

To say with Zeno of old, that lines consist of indivisible 
points; surfaces are formed by lines, and solids by surfaces, 
would be erroneous; continuous extension cannot be thus gen- 
erated. 

IS QUANTITY INFINITELY DIVISIBLE ? 

Quantity is infinitely divisible in potentia, or potentially. To 
this proposition the objection will at once occur: "what is 
infinitely divisible, can be thus divided actually, at least by 
infinite power; and thereby it can be resolved into an infinite 
number of parts." 

But if its divisibility were thus exhausted, then it was not 
infijiitely divisible by hypothesis ; since that which is finished 
is not infinite potentially. Similarly, quantity may be increased 
infinitely in potentia or potentially ', by addition or multiplica- 
tion ; but yet infinite extension, or infinite number, cannot be 
actually generated by successive increments ; for that which 
begins and ends, is not actually infinite, but may receive further 
increase. 

Hence, to conclude from the potential infinite, to the actual 
infinite, is not valid illation ; for the infinite in potentia cannot 
pass to the infinite in actu, and thus become completed \ as that 



186 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

would destroy the hypothesis ; i. e., the supposition that it may 
be increased sine fine, or without end of increase* 

The actual infinite is all, without the possibility of more ; or, 
as the axiom expresses it, tot ut non plura; the potential infinite 
does not actually contain all, without the possibility of more; 
it is non lot quin plura. 

QUALITY. 

Qualities are accidents which are superadded to created sub- 
stance in order to perfect it, both in its existence, and its action; 
or, qualities intrinsically ornament and perfect actually existing 
substance. Quantity pertains rather to the matter, as such ; 
quality follows the specific essence f of the matter, its Jorm. It 
is the specific essence of a rose which makes it different from 
a pink, as it is also the specific essence of the pink that makes 
it what it is, and not some other form of matter. 

It may be said, then, that qualities follow the species of sub- 
stantial objects. It is on this account that substances are often 
defined by their qualities, which is legitimate, when the genus 
and specific difference are not known, or cannot be assigned. 

Figure\ pertains to quality when it is considered as determin- 
ing an object as to its proper and specific form, or shape ; but 
considered as extended, it is qua?itity. Material objects depend 
much for their specific nature, on their figure or shape; it 
beautifies them, and perfects them also in action as well as in 
strength. Hence, figure or shape is intimately connected with 

* ' * Ab infinito syncategorimatice, seu in potentia, ad infinitum categorima- 
tice, seu actu, non valet illatio. ' ' ' ' Infinitum actu est, tot ut non plura; infini- 
tum in potentia est, non tot quin plura." From the infinite syncategorimatic- 
ally, or the potential infinite, to the infinite categorimatically, or the actual 
infinite, illation is not valid. The actual infinite is all without more; the poten- 
tial infinite, is not all without more. 

f ' ' Qualitas sequitur formam, quia forma complet et perficit essentiam rei et 
confert principalem vimagendi." (Suarez Met., Disp. 42.) Quality follows 
the form, because the form completes and perfects the essence of a thing, and 
confers on it its principal power of action. 

$"Figura, quatenus mater ialiter extensa, pertinet ad quantitatem; sed qua- 
tenus ornamentum substantias, et quatenus deserviens ad actiones et naturales 
motus, pertinet ad formam. ' ' (Suarez Met. Disp. 42, sect. 1.) Figure, as mate- 
rially extended, pertains to quantity; but as ornament of substance, and assist- 
ing action and natural motion, it pertains to form; i. e. , to the formal principle 
of the substance. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 187 

specific nature, and results from that specific nature, as one of 
its distinctive qualities; v. g., organic beings, also crystals, all 
have their peculiar and determinate figures or shapes. 

Sensible qualities are either permanent or transient ; the ruddy 
hue of the cheeks, when lasting, is ordinarily a sign of health, 
and is, in that case, a permanent quality; a blush, from sudden 
emotion, is transient. A happy combination of the sensible 
qualities, figure and color, makes visible beauty. 

NATURAL POWERS OF SUBSTANCE J THEIR ACTS. 

Natural powers are qualities that perfect a substance for 
action. Power is either active, ox passive; as active, it can cause 
a mutation in another object, as when you move your book. 
As passive, the power receives an action; v. g., the senses, which, 
under different respects, are both active and passive, receive the 
impressions which external objects make on them.* 

Immanent acts, are such as remain in, and perfect their sub- 
ject; v. g., acts of the understanding, as perceiving, judging, 
reasoning; these acts do not, as such, pass out of the mind, 
but physically they remain in the powers that elicit them. None 
but living agents are capable of immanent action ; the action 
of lifeless objects is transient; i. e., it passes from them to the 
extrinsic object which is its term ; and they must be moved to 
action by an efficient cause which is really distinct from them ; 
for, having no immanent action, they are absolutely inert, or, 
are incapable of self-motion. 

Hence, it may be said : all immanent action is vital, and all 
vital action is imma?ie?it; or, the distinctive characteristic of vital 
action is that it is immanent. But observe that the term, life, f is 

* " Actio aliquando dicta effectus, quatenus est ab agente, tamen magis pro- 
prie, est via ad effectum. ' ' Action is sometimes termed an effect, inasmuch as 
it is from an agent: yet, more properly, it is the way to the effect. 

t ' ' Vita aut sumitur in actu secundo, et sic dicit operationem; aut in actu 
primo principals et radicali, et sic est ipsa natura seu substantia rei viventis. 
Nos non aliter possumus intelligere rem viventem, nisi in ordine ad efficien- 
tiam, quatenus scilicet potest sese movere aut agere aliquo modo; et censemus 
rem aliquam antea viventem amisse vitam, quando omnem intrinsecam motio- 
nem amisit." (Suarez Metaph. disp. 30, sect. 34.) Life is either taken as 
something actual, and thus it says operation; or, it is taken as something pri- 
mary and radical, and in this sense it is the nature or substance of the living 



188 GEISTEKAL METAPHYSICS. 

understood in two senses : ist, as expressing the living sub- 
stance itself; 2d, as expressing vital act or operation. We 
usually conceive life as the living act, and when we actually 
form a concept of it as a substance, it is always by the relation 
of that substance to its living operation or action. Life, there- 
fore, which is directly known to us only as action, pertains exclu- 
sively to those agents that can move themselves;* and capability 
of being moved only by an extrinsic efficient cause, is peculiar 
to non-living agents. Motion is here used in its widest sense, 
and includes all immanent operation of any principle which is 
intrinsically active, i. e., which can proximately or immediately 
move itself to act.\ 

The principal acts of life J are, ist, self-movement; 2d, nutri- 
tion by the intus-susception of food; 3d, sensation; 4th, intel- 
lection. The first named may be regarded as generic, and, 
therefore, as including all vital action ; vegetable life is limited 
in its sphere of operation to nutrition, growth by assimilation 
of food received, and reproduction; animal life, in addition to 
these operations, is capable of acts of sensation; man, besides 
all these operations, has acts of intelligence, which absolutely 
transcend the sphere of sensible or organic action, as is proved 
in Article I of the preceding chapter. 

It may be said, therefore, ist, power of action is common to 
all substance; 2d, vital or immanent action is common to all 
living substance, and is limited to the powers of living agents ; 
3d, the immanent or vital action merely sufficient for knowing 

thing. "We understand a living thing only, by its having order to efficiency: 
namely, as capable of moving or actuating itself in some manner; and wc judge 
a thing that once lived, to have lost life, -when it has lost intrinsic motion. 

* " Ilia proprie sunt viventia qua? seipsa, secundum aliquam speciem motus, 
movent." (Div. Thorn. I p., qu. 18, art. 3.) Those things are properly living 
things, which, according to some species of motion, move themselves. 

t ' ' Vivens eificit suam operationem per veram causalitatem et motionem, qua 
seipsum movet." (Suarez Disp. 30, sect. 14.) A living thing effects its own 
operation by a true causality and motion, for it moves itself. 

% ' ' Vita dicitur et substantia vitalis, ut est anima, et natura angelica ; et opera- 
tio vitalis, quae nimirum in operante, a quo emanat, manet; quaiis est intelligere, 
amare, sentire, etc. ' ' (Lessius de Perfect. Divin.) Life means both vital sub- 
stance, as the soul, angelic nature; and also vital operation; namely that opera- 
tion that remains in the agent which elicits it; as, to understand, love, feel, etc. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 189 

singular, concrete and material things is proper, as such, to 
animals only ; 4th, the power which elicits the immanent acts 
of knowing universal or abstract truth, distinguishes intellectual 
substances from all the rest. 

The power of action which is common to lifeless substance, 
is pure potentiality ; i. e., it has no power of motion except that 
which is implied in a mere capability of being efficiently deter- 
mined or moved to act by an extrinsic cause, the state of rest, or 
inaction, being co?inaiural to it. On the contrary, in respect to 
living beings, actuality, or immanent action positively going on, 
and which, therefore, excludes complete rest or non-action, is 
essential to their life, so that its total absence is evidence of 
death. Power is defined by its act; the act is known by 
means of its object. 

HABIT. 

Habit, in its general sense, pertains to operative nature,* and 
it gives facility of action to the power in which it resides. In 
its species, it is a quality which is stable, or which cannot be 
removed from its subject without difficulty, t Because all 
created substance acts only through the powers of that sub- 
stance, it is justly inferred that the proper subjects of all opera- 
live habit are only the powers of substance. J 

*" Alise qualitates, v. g., sanitas, pulchritudo. etc., disponunt subjectum ad 
bene esse; sed virtutes animi seu habitus operativi disponunt ad bene operari." 
(Gotti. torn, vii.) Other qualities, v. g., health, beauty, etc., dispose their 
subject for existing well ; but the virtues of the soul or the operative habits, dis- 
pose it for operating well. 

t Disposition, in its general signification, imports order in objects which, in 
some respect or other, consist of parts. When active power is its subject, 
it also gives facility of action. But it differs from habit in this, that it is easily 
removed from its subject, for it is per se, or in itself, unstable, or, it is never 
firmly radicated in a power. In the acquisition of a habit by repeated acts, it 
may be said that the first acts, with the accompanying preparation, dispose the 
subject for the subsequent permanent effect; i. e., for the habit. (Div. Thom., 
1, 2, qu. 49.) 

J " Subjectum habitus operativi, est potentia operativa . ' ' (Philos. passim.) 
1 ' In ipsa essentia animse immediate nullus est habitus ad naturam naturaliter 
ordinatus, quia substantia non est immediate operativa; sed tamen est in ea 
habitus supernaturalis, nempe gratia sanctificans." (Div. Thom.) The subject 
of operative habit, is operative power. There is no habit naturally designed 
for nature which is immediately in the essence itself of the soul, because sub- 
stance is not immediately operative; but yet there is in the essence of the soul a 
supernatural habit; namely, sanctifying grace. 



190 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

The powers which are most susceptible of the superadded 
perfections termed habits, are the understanding, the will, and, 
in an inferior degree, the imagination, the sensile memory, and 
also the senses in general, at least for that action in them which 
is under the direct control of reason. 

Habits are either in/used, or acquired. The knowledge which 
Adam received immediately after his creation, was infused into 
his mind; Christian Faith, Hope and Charity are infused habits. 

Intelligence, regarded as a natural ability in the understand- 
ing to see clearly and promptly the truths that are known per 
se, or are self-evident, was termed by the old philosophers, a 
natural habit; a much higher degree of which may be acquired 
by prudent exercise of the intellect. But this is less properly 
termed habit; for the capability of immediate action pertains 
to the very essence and entity of a natural power.* 

Yet, on the other hand, the intellect is capable of receiving 
superadded perfection which gives it increased facility of action, 
and this increased facility of action has the nature of the virtue 
which is termed habit, whether it be acquired by exercise, or 
be in itself the gift of nature. 

Acquired habits are permanent effects usually produced in a 
power by repeated acts or continued exercise of that power. 

* ' ' Omnis naturalis propensio et inclinatio potentiae ad actum, est per ipsam- 
met naturam et entitatem potentiae: et non per habitum disthictum, et illi a 
natura inditum." (Suarez Met., Disp. 44, sect. 13.) All natural propensity 
and inclination of a power to action, is of the very nature and entity of the 
power, and not by a distinct habit which is given to it by nature. 

" Intel ligentia (seu intellectus) est habitus primorumprincipiorum. , ' In- 
telligence (or intellect) is the habit of first principles. 

' ' Prudentia et ars sunt in operativa parte animae, et circa contingens aliter 
sehabent; sapientia, scientia et intellectus sunt habitus speculativi, et conside- 
rant necessaria quae impossibile est aliter se habere.' * (Div. Thorn., I, 2, qu. 
57.) Prudence and art pertain to the operative part of the soul, and they have 
for their object the contingent, which they consider under different respects ; 
wisdom, scientific knowledge, and intelligence, are speculative habits, and they 
consider necessary things, or those which cannot be otherwise than they are. 

' ' Prudentia, magistra virtutum, est agibilium; ars, factibilium. ' ' Prudence, 
the ruler of virtues, concerns those things which can be done, morally; art, what 
can be done, physically. 

' ' Habitus alii dant simpliciter posse, alii dant facilius posse. ' ' Some habits 
are essential for acting at all; others, give facility of action. 

' ' Intuitio primorum principiorum est intellectus . ' ' Intelligence is the intui- 
tion of first principles . Intuition is the actual exercise of intelligence. 



GENEEAL METAPHYSICS. 191 

In the understanding, intelligence, knowledge, wisdom, which 
are speculative; prudence and art, which are practical in their 
objects, are all habits or intellectual virtues which may be ac- 
quired in a greater or less degree of perfection. In the will, 
all the moral virtues, and also their opposite vices, may exist as 
acquired habits, but not simultaneously ; for, moral virtue and 
vice are opposites, or are contraries, and, therefore, the one ex- 
cludes the other. 

Habit, on account of its stability, or the difficulty of eradi- 
cating it from its subject, is sometimes called "a second nature." 
The capability of the natural powers of cognition, and superior 
appetite, to acquire these habits, or superadded qualities by exer- 
cise, is one of the peculiar perfections of those powers as they 
exist in rational natures. 

Though brutes are not capable of habits, in the sense in 
which habits are conceived to pertain necessarily to rational 
powers, or, at least, to powers which are immediately subject 
to the empire of reason, as expressed by the old philosophical 
axiom, " habitus est quo utimur cum volumus," " habit is some- 
thing which we use at will ; " yet, the perfect brute animals, 
or such as have memory, and are capable of learning some 
things by experience, can be made, at least when under the 
tuition and control of man, to acquire what seems to possess 
the physical requisites of habit. 

The axiom in respect to habits, "habitus quo utimur cum 
volumus," appears, as Suarez remarks, to regard rather the 
moral character which habits may have, than to express their 
physical nature. (Metaphysics, disp. 44, sect. 3.) 

It will be useful for better understanding the nature and 
function of habits, to distinguish more precisely between the 
subjects capable of them, and those which are not susceptible 
of habit at all. 

God cannot receive habit ; for, being infinitely perfect, he 
cannot be the subject of additional perfection; and being pure 
act, he cannot be in a state of potentiality, i. e., he cannot pass 
from the condition of non-action to action, as is possible to 



192 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

beings that are perfectible, or which can pass from the state 
of potentiality into that of action. 

Habits can be acquired by those agents only which are per- 
fectible by immanent actio7i ; i. e., agents which intrinsically 
elicit their own action, it remaining in them, and perfecting 
them. The powers of such agents are not only the proximate 
and active principle of their own operation ; but they are, at 
the same time,* passive in respect to this same operation; i. e., 
their immanent action affects them, for it perfects them. Hence, 
it is quite natural that, in powers whose action is immanent, the 
repetition of acts having the same or. similar objects for their 
term, should gradually produce and complete for them the 
permanent effect, which we call habit, whose peculiar virtue is 
to give strength, promptness, and facility of action. 

Those objects whose action is wholly transie?it, or which 
have no immanent action, do not receive any increase of perfec- 
tion from their own acts, but they rather give it to the exterior 
object which is the term of their operation. Hence, such 
agents are not susceptible of that influence of immanent action, 
which causes the acquisition of habit. 

* " It is necessary that the power in which habit resides, be both active and 
passive; for, it cannot be the proximate principle of eliciting acts, unless it be 
active; nor can it receive into itself habits, unless it be passive. But only that 
power is at the same time active and passive, which is able to elicit immanent 
acts: hence the subject of habit, must be capable of immanent action. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the act leaves the habit in that power in which the act 
is; because, it renders that very power, and not another one, prompt to operate. 
But, the habit remains in that power which is the proximate principle of such 
act; and, therefore, the act remains in the same also; hence, both the act itself 
is immanent, and the power, which is its principle, elicits immanent action. 
Whence it follows that the acts by which habits are produced, are such as, strictly 
speaking, have no effect outside of their own powers ; which is proper to immanent 
acts." 

' ' In brutes there are not habits distinct from the images in their fancy or their 
sensible impressions. The general reason of this is, that in all their acts they 
are determined to one thing (i.e., ai'e necessitated to one, uniform mode of action, 
over which they have no real choice, or rational empire,) by force of the objects, 
just according as those objects are presented to them. But it seems more pro- 
bable that the internal sense of man, cogitative power, (see page 87 of Applied 
Logic,) can acquire habit distinct from sensible ideas, giving facility, and in- 
clining the power determinately to some acts. The reason is, because this sense 
in man is not absolutely determined to one thing, like fancy in the brute; for, it 
can be made, obediently to reason, to operate, or can be moved to determinate 
action." (Suarez Metaph., Disp. 44, sees. 1 and 3.) 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 3 93 

It must be observed, however, that not all beings which 
have vital or immanent action, are susceptible of habits, in any 
univocal sense of the term. It is a fact well proved by general 
experience that the capability of acquiring habit, necessarily 
implies also the capability of experimental knowledge in the 
subject. Hence, since man has intellectual cognition, and 
brutes have that of sense alone, it is manifest that acquired 
habits in them can resemble only by analogy; or, these habits 
in them are proportioned in perfection to the respective cog- 
noscive powers of man and brute. 

It is manifest that when we consider the different powers in 
man as subject to his will, or to the empire of his rational 
nature, even his senses, under that respect, are less determined 
to one mode of action, or are less limited in the sphere of their 
action, and less subject in regard to their objects, than are the 
corresponding sensible powers of those agents, which have 
not this rational empire over their own acts. On this account, 
men's sensible powers are more susceptible of the acquired vir- 
tues, termed habits, than are those powers as they are in irra- 
tional animals. 

INTENSITY OF QUALITIES, ACTS, ETC. 

Compound sensible qualities, i. e., such as beauty or ornaments, 
which consist of several qualities, as color, figure, order, etc., 
coalescing into one; or, quality which is composed of them; 
also, habits and acts are all capable of degrees, or of more or 
less intensity* 

The intensity^ or intension of a quality is said to be increased 
in degree when it is augmented or becomes more deeply radi- 

* ' ' Intensio actus fit per additionem gradus ad gradum. ' ' Action is intensi- 
fied by the addition of degree to degree. It is convenient thus to conceive in- 
tensity to be increased, though it does not take place by degrees of increment 
which are actually distinct. 

t "Intensio accipitur, prius et maxime usitato, pro rautatione ilia per quam 
eadem qualitas magis ac magis in eodem subjecto secundum eamdem partem sen 
entitatem perficitur." (Suarez iletaph. Disp. 46.) Intensity, in its primary 
and most usual sense, stands for that mutation by which the same quality is 
more and more perfected in the same subject, according to the same part or entity 
of that subject. 
13 



194 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

cated in the same subject, or in the same part of the subject ; 
as when heat is increased in a part only of the hand. But it 
is remission of the quality when the quality is correspondingly 
diminished in the same subject. There is increased extension 
of a quality, when, without leaving the former part of its subject, 
it passes or spreads to other parts; v. g., when heat spreads 
from the hand to the arm, without, however, leaving the hand ; 
if it leave the hand, and go to the arm, this would not be ex- 
tension, but transmigration of quality; if the quality leave 
some part, or parts of a subject, without leaving the whole 
subject, it would be restriction of quality. Hence, color, sound, 
etc., may be more or less intense, or remiss, may extend, migrate, 
etc. 

General experience attests the fact as evident to all minds, 
that the vital acts whose direction is immediately under the 
will's control, are susceptible of a higher or lower degree as 
to intensity; and that their intensity or remissness much 
depends, in general at least, on the free action of the will 
itself. But since, as before observed, the action of the will is, 
by its nature, less evident to the understanding, ceteris pari- 
bus, than are the acts of cognition, it may often happen that, 
even when we know the species of its act, we are unable to 
see precisely and determinately the degree of its intensity; 
this does not occur in the same manner as regards the acts of 
cognition, which, being more evident, are more fully and accu- 
rately perceived. Yet, whenever the will's act is positively 
put, although remiss in degree, the nature or species of the act 
is completely determined, as is also its essential moral charac- 
ter, according to the nature of the objects. It is likewise im- 
possible, in many cases, to decide with certainty as to whether 
the will has positively consented or acted at all, even when the 
objects proposed to its choice are evident before the mind. In 
important and practical matters, however, obscurity or rational 
doubt as to the will's fully deliberate choice, is scarcely possible. 

The study of these obscure operations of the will is fre- 
quently called the study of the heart; and it is the chief means" 
of becoming proficient in the knowledge of human ?iature. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 195 

Figure, as such, is incapable of degree; it may be larger or 
smaller ; but this is difference of quantity, not a change in the 
degree of the figure as such. It requires no proof that habits 
and acts may be more or less i7ite?ise ; or, more or less exten- 
sive, in respect to their objects. 

Substance, as such, is incapable of degree, but it may be 
greater or less in quantity;* and is capable of receiving suc- 
cessively contrary qualities; this, however, does not imply a 
difference of degree in the matter or essence of the object 
extended. 

Difference of degree t does not change or destroy the essence 
of the quality of which it is predicated, or in which it obtains ; 
no more than difference of quantity destroys or changes the 
essence of matter. % 

* " Substantia non suscipit magis et minus ; est substantias suscipere contrar ia. ' ' 
Substance is not, as such, susceptible of more or less, but it is capable of receiv- 
ing contraries. 

t ' ' Gradus non mutat essentiam rei. ' ' The degree does not change the essence 
of a thing. 

"Magis et minus, secundum quod causantur ex intensione et remissione 
unins formoe, non diversificant speciem. Sed secundum quod causantur ex 
formis diversorum graduum, sic diversificant speciem." (Div. Thorn. Sum. I 
p. , qu. 50, a. 4, ad. 2.) More and less, when caused by the intension and remis- 
sion of oue and the same form (quality or property) , do not change the species of 
the object. But when they are caused by forms in different grades (different 
species) of being, they do diversify the species. As for example,, the different 
degrees of density in air and water arise from the specific difference of air and 
water; so, in other words, the same quality may, in different objects, have dif- 
ferent degrees of intensity, arising from the essential or specific difference of 
those objects, and thus furnish a means of distinguishing the species of those 
objects. But greater or less degree of the same color, v. g. , in the same object, 
does not imply a change of the subject of that color in its specific nature; greater 
or less density of air under different degrees of pressure, does not imply a 
change in the nature of air; the same habit is not changed in its nature or spe- 
cies by being more or less deeply radicated in its subject, etc. 

J Mr. Darwin, in his ''Descent of Man," part 1, chap. 2, says: '* We must 
admit that there is a much wider interval of mental power between one of the 
lowest fishes, as a lamprey, or a lancelet, and one of the higher apes, than 
between an ape and man. ' ' In this he assumes the power of sensation and that 
of intelligence to be different degrees of the same power ; whereas, in fact, they 
have a specific difference. The organ is material in its functions, while intelli- 
gence is absolutely immaterial, and entirely super-sensible. A more rational 
contrast, and one founded on plain facts, could be made between a metallic toy 
monkey, and a real one, on the one hand ; and a real monkey and a man on the 
other; in both cases the contrast would be very wide; but it woidd prove nothing 
in favor of his hypothesis. This is not the only instance in which Mr. Darwin 
is at fault in elementary first principles. 



196 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

The doctrine of quantity and quality may here be summed 
up in terms that will now be readily comprehended : quantity, 
in the primary and general acceptation of the word, is an acci- 
dent which is extensive of the substance which is its subject, 
giving it parts placed outside of parts, whence result greater or 
less size, and equality or inequality. As thus understood, it 
can properly be said to exist only in bodies which have dimen- 
sion, or in material substance ; from it there results real and 
substantial size, " quantitas molis," in these bodies, as greater 
or smaller. By translation, however, quantity is attributed to 
other objects, as virtue, habit, act, power, etc.; it is then quan- 
tity of perfection, "quantitas virtutis; " v. g., "Aristotle's genius 
was greater than that of Pyrrho." 

But in the explanation here given, quantity is defined and 
described rather by its properties or accidents, than by its 
intrinsic essence. Quantity, strictly as such, or quantity, con- 
sidered as to its essence, requires for the precise concept of it, 
only extension of parts, or parts outside of parts, in respect to 
themselves, not as circumscriptive ty occupying actual extension 
in space, though this circumscriptive extension in space is 
requisite for it to become subject to our senses: "quantitas, in 
essentia sua, est extensio partium in ordine ad se, non in 
ordine ad locum." 

Quality includes under it all the positive accidents which 
are superadded to created substance, the effect of which is to 
give to it, when constituted in being, perfection and complete- 
ness in its mode, both of existing and operating. Powers, vir- 
tues, habits, and the like, which, it is evident, are necessary 
appendices of the substances to which they are connatural, are 
nevertheless extrinsic to the essence of the substance in which 
they reside, and are qualities, or they pertain to the category 
of quality. Quality, is by some defined to be, a certain abso- 
lute accident, adjoined to created substance, as the comple- 
ment of its perfection, both in existing and acting: " qualitas 
est accidens quoddam absolutum, adjunctum substantias creatse 
ad complementum perfections ejus, tarn in essendo, quam in 
agendo." 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 197 

Hence, quantity may be aptly termed the measure of sub- 
stance ; quality, the disposition of substance.* Quality is the 
disposition of substance, in that it disposes or constitutes it in 
such condition, that it is thereby perfected both in existing 
and operating. 

RELATION. 

Relation is the respect which one thing has to another; or, 
it is the order in which one thing is referred to another.t A 
relation implies a subject which is related or referred to another, 
the term to which the subject is related; and the foundation or 
basis of the relation; from it the relation really results; v. g., 
suppose two different bodies that have the same shape or figure; 
and the two bodies are respectively the subject, and the term 
of the relation ; and the same figure or shape is the foundation 
or basis of the relation; v. g., "this orange has the shape of 
that lemon; " orange is the subject, lemon the term and shape, 
the foundation or basis of the relation, and the relation con- 
sists in the two being alike. 

Relation is either real or logical. Real relation is that which 
objects have to each other independently of any knowledge or 
judgment we may have of it; as the relation of cause and its 
effect. The order, connexion, and mutual dependence, which 
exist among the works of creation are real relations, which 
exist independently of our knowing or understanding them. 

Logical relation is one which the mind devises; as when it 
compares; v. g., a real thing to itself; or, conceives a thing as 
related to itself. In this case, the mind apprehends one object 
twice, and refers it to itself, as if it were two. 

When the relation is real and identical in the subject and the 
term, it is mutual; v. g., "this lily and this rose are alike, since 
both are white; " " white," is really in both, and, therefore, the 
relation is mutual, and is said likewise to be of the same denom- 
ination. The mutual relation between cause and effect, father 

* " Quantitas est roensura substantia ; qualitas est dispositio substantias." 
(Div. Th. , 1 p. , qu. 28, a. 2.) 

t ' ' Esse relativi est ad aliud se habere. " The essence of the relative is that 
it is referred to another. 



198 gp:^eral metaphysics. 

and son, which are also said to be co-related, is not of the same 
denomination. 

Relation is predicamental, or as one of the ten categories, 
includes only those relations which are between real objects. 
All the relations, likenesses, or respects of one real thing to 
another, which properly pertain to this category, are reduced 
by metaphysicians to three principal classes : ist, relation of 
unity and number ; 2d, of action and passion ; 3d, of measure 
and measured. 

Observe that all the ten categories or ultimate genera, in- 
clude none but real entities; and hence, from among their 
proper subjects are excluded all entia rationis, or those entities 
that are merely creatures of the mind, though they be virtually 
founded in real objects; also such as have only objective being, 
i. e., which exist only in the intelligible concepts. Whence it 
follows that the relations that are devised by the mind, but 
which have no real being, as that between genus and species, 
between a thing and itself, and all the transcendental relations, 
are to be regarded as not properly pertaining to the category 
of relation. 

Transcendental relations regard terms that transcend actual 
existence, or they are metaphysical; and, therefore, they run 
through all the categories. The relation between scientific 
knowledge and its objects, is transcendental; and by some it is 
also termed a logical relation; but the relation between a power 
apprehending, and the real object that determines its act, is 
real. 

Much of our most valuable, as well as most interesting 
knowledge, regards these different species of relation. One 
of the most important of all these relations which furnish the 
mind objects for congenial exercise, is that of cause and effect, 
under the head of action and passion; it will be explained at 
some length, in the following chapter. 



CHAPTER III. 



ARTICLE I . 

PRINCIPLE OF CAUSATION J OR, CAUSE IN GENERAL. 

Whatever influences efficaciously in the production of a being, 
or a mutation in being, is a cause;* and the result which is 
brought about by its agency or concurrence, is its effect. 

The relation of cause and effect is not that of mere succes- 
sion in time, or place, but it is that of dependence of the one 
on the other. The fact that the simplest minds can distinguish 
between mere sequence in time, or order, and the dependence of 
one thing upon another as its cause, shows how obvious to the 
human understanding is that distinction. It is not only evi- 
dent that an effect cannot exist without a cause, effect and 
cause are co-relatives ; but it is also evident to the mind that 
many things which are perpetually under our observation, 
actually have that relation of dependence. 

Hume and other sceptics have denied all causation, and 
affirmed that what is thus understood is mere succession with- 
out any agency in what precedes, or any dependence in what 
follows after it. 

The Occasionalists deny all efficiency in second causes, or 
creatures: and maintain that the reason or necessity for the 
existence of the effect, gives the occasion for God to produce 
that effect. 

We know, however, on the testimony of consciousness, that 
we can act so as to produce results, or mutations, that really 
proceed from us; our senses receive influences that produce 

* ' ' Causa est principiiun per se influens esse in aliud. ' ' Cause is a principle 
"which per se, i.e., by its own real operation, influences the existence of another 
thing. 

199 



200 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

changes or effects in them, and they give testimony to similar 
action and change in objects distinct from us. Since these 
facts are so manifest, and the conclusion so immediate, it is 
not wonderful that even a child understands clearly what is 
meant by "make," "do," or "cause." 

While we have so distinct a notion of cause and effect as to 
their relation, we do not know in what the causality intrin- 
sically consists. As substance and its powers are hidden from 
us, except so far as they are manifested by their operations, we 
can perceive their efficiency or causality in results only. We 
clearly distinguish between the two facts, " this comes after 
that," and " this comes from that," without being able to see 
how the action intrinsically proceeds from the power that pro- 
duces it. But to deny this principle of causality, which is so 
clearly known under other respects, is to upset not only all 
science, but all our knowledge of anything. 

Experience and the exercise of reason give among their first 
conclusions, the notion of dependence of one thing on an- 
other ; and this relation is that of cause and effect. But limited 
reflexion suffices for coming to the general conclusion, " nothing 
is done without a cause ; whatever has a beginning, must have 
had a cause." For, the mind readily perceives that whatever 
begins to exist, thereby acquires what it had not before; and 
this thing that it had not before, and which it acquires, must 
come to it from some agent that is distinct from itself; i. e., it 
comes from a cause. The peculiar and distinctive action of a 
cause, therefore, is, that it gives to another being what that be- 
ing had not in itself, and which it thereby receives from with- 
out itself. 



ARTICLE II. 

DIFFERENT SPECIES OF CAUSES. 



Since the influence of causality is exerted in very different 
manners ; or, because the objects of its influence are specifi- 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 201 

cally different, cause is divided into four distinct species, cor- 
responding to the modes in which it produces its effect : 
namely, the efficient cause, the fi?ial cause, the for?nal cause, 
the material cause. They all agree in the general concept of 
causality, inasmuch as they all concur or influence in the pro- 
duction of effect ; but, as said, their modes of influencing are 
specifically different. 

The general distinction between the four causes will be best 
understood by an example in which their different modes of 
effecting or influencing will clearly appear; we shall, therefore, 
repeat a little more explicitly an illustration already given : A 
man makes a statue; ist, he has an end in view which causes 
him to make the statue; 2d, he must have material out of 
which to make the statue, and that material or marble helps 
in its way to the making of the statue : it is the material cause 
of the statue; 3d, there must be an agent who can make or 
produce this statue out of the matter;, this agent, or artist, is 
the efficient cause ; 4th, the agent must put into that marble 
the perfect form which makes of it a statue; or, in other 
words, which determines its specific ?iature, as statue ; and it is 
obvious that this form influences, in its way and degree, 
towards the making of the statue; it thereby becomes the for- 
mal cause of the statue. Hence, the end intended, the age7it, 
the matter, and the form, all effectually help to produce the 
statue ; but as their modes of concurring in the production of 
the effect are quite different, this gives rise to a division of 
cause in general into the four species above named. The statue 
is made by the agent, of the marble, through (by means of) 
the form, for the end intended or proposed. 

The efficient cause is extrinsic to the effect ; it is the first one 
that moves physically; for the end acts only morally, and the 
matter and form are dependent on the action of the efficient 
cause for their union ; that is, for the effect. Hence, :n mate- 
rial action, the efficient cause is that agent whose physical ac- 
tion begins the mutation in the object extrinsic to itself, which 
we term the effect. The subsequent union of the formal and 
material causes is dependent on this action of the efficient 



202 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

cause ; therefore, as said, it begins the physical action, whose 
final term is the effect intended. 

Hence, in maitiial action, all four causes always unite, the 
final, efficient, formal and material. 

In the action of simple or immaterial substance, only two 
causes may concur: namely, the final, and efficient; but an effect 
can not be produced by one cause alone. 

The efficient cause must be either immediately, or mediately 
and virtually present to the object on which it acts, for nothing 
acts at a distance, " nihil agit in distans." It is evident that 
an agent cannot act where it is not, any more than it can act 
whe?i it is not ; for in either case it is really non-existent in 
respect to that object as a term of action. Hence, since nothing 
can act when and where it absolutely is not, a cause must be 
either immediately or mediately and virtually present both in 
time and place to the object on which it efficiently acts.* 

Substantial matter and form cannot really compose the effect 
of man's spiritual or intellectual action; i. e., the mind cannot 
per se, by its own physical action, transform material substance. 
Judgment and reasoning have for the object of their action 
truth, which by analogy is called matter, and the understand- 
ing attributes to it logical form \>y action which is analogous to 
that by which an agent produces effects upon substantial sub- 
ject matter. 

A created agent cannot produce f new being, or cause a real 

* ' ' Motum et movens sunt simul . ' ' That which moves , and the agent moving 
it, are, as such, simultaneous. 

" Agens et patiens sunt immediata, i. e., immediatione vel suppositi vel vir- 
tutis." That which acts, and that which receives the action, are immediate, 
either substantially or virtually. 

t ' ' Deus solus causat gradum essendi ; quia primus omnium effectus est esse 
quod supponitur a ceteris tanquam fundamentnm : sed Deus solus producit esse; 
sen illud esse quod diffusum est per omnes omnino perfectiones debet procedere 
ab altiori principle quam creatura. Agens particulare facit hoc ex non hoc, sed 
non facit ens a non-ente." (Div. Thorn., Summ. 1 p., qu. 105, art. 5.) God 
alone causes a degree of being ; for the first of all effects is being, AYhich is pre- 
supposed as the foundation of all else: God alone produces being; or, that being 
which is diffused throughout all perfections whatever, must proceed from a 
higher principle than a creature. A dependent agent can make this out of non 
this; (or transform one thing into another) ; but it cannot produce being from 
non-being. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 203 

grade or degree of essence ; for this is, in its strict sense, crea- 
tion, which is pure efficiency, or the action of the first cause, i. 
e., God. Second causes, i. e., created causes, being dependent, 
are not purely efficient; they can only change or transform sub- 
ject matter; in other words, they require an object which 
actually determines and specifies their acts or efficiency. 

The various manners in which the efficient cause acts will 
be readily and clearly understood if they be contrasted; for 
this purpose consider the following opposite modes in which it 
may operate : ist, as principal, and as instrumental cause, which 
acts in virtue of its principal; 2d, as necessary and Jree ; 3d, 
physical and ?noral; 4th, remote and proximate; 5th, total and 
partial; 6th, adequate and inadequate; 7th, first* and second; 
8th, univocal; i. e., whose effect is of its own species, as father 
and son; equivocal, i. e., whose effect differs from it in species, 
as architect and the house which he builds; 9th, cause per se, 
i. e., which directly, and of its own real action, produces its 
effect; v. g., "a vocalist sings;" *'a penman writes;" accidejital 
cause, or cause per accidens ; as w r hen a vocalist paints ; he 
does not directly as vocalist paint, for vocalist is only accidental 
to one as painting, and has no influence at all on the effect. 

The cause per se,\ which really influences in the production 
of an effect is one; but the cause per accidens or accidental cause, 
which does not really i?ifluence the effect, is said to be infinite; 
the meaning of which will be readily understood by an example 
of it : if one should go from home for the purpose of buying 
something in the market, and on his way be attacked by robbers, 
his intention of buying could not be considered as the one, cause 
per se, of his falling into the ha?ids of i-obbers; for, any number 

* " Cansaprima, quae nulli subordinatur; secunda, qvueprirrue subordinatur." 
The first cause is subordinate to no cause; a second cause is subordinate to the 
first. 

t " Causa per se est una, etproprie dicta causa; causa per accidens nee est una, 
sed infinita, sed nee proprie dicta causa, sed secundum quid, sen per accidens : 
non est proprie dicta causa, quia effectus per accidens non habet esse proprie dic- 
tum." (Philos. passim.) The cause per se is one, and is properly termed a 
cause; the cause per accidens is not one, but infinite, nor is it properly called a 
cause, but is such only under some respect, or by accident ; it is not properly 
termed a cause, for the accidental effect has not any existence properly so-called. 



204 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

of reasons could have induced him to go to the market at that 
time; i. e., the cause per aecidens of his being then attacked 
by robbers is not limited to this or that motive for his going 
from home. 

It is in this sense that an occasion is sometimes rightly called 
an accidental cause* But it not unfrequently happens that an 
occasion or opportunity approaches more nearly to the nature 
of a cause per se, yet, however, without actually becoming a 
complete cause ; in this case it is said to be an imperfect cause, 
since it induces, or persuades to action ; but it is not a perfect 
cause, for it does not produce the effect. (D. Th., 2. 2., qu. 
43, a. 1, ad. 3.) 

The only reason why cause per aecidens is denominated 
cause at all is that, whenever it occurs, it is in such case always 
conjoined with the thing which is really and properly the cause, 
and is then not separable from it. But neither the cause per 
aecidens, as such, nor the effect per aecidens, as such, has any 
real entity; f it is more correctly a certain respect only, of that 
which has reality and is a cause properly so-called. 

The final cause, or end intended.^, which is objective good, ap- 
prehended as such, acts first as a cause on "the will, or rational 
appetite ; for the end is an object of appetition, on account of 
its goodness, or it is a good which is desired and sought for, 
when it becomes an object of cognition. § The e?id intended 
for irrational or necessary agents, must be referred to the author 

* " Omne quod est per se, habet causam ; quod autem est per aecidens, non 
habet causam, quia nou est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim 
causam habet, similiter et musicum; album musicum non habet causam, quia non 
est vere ens, neque vere unum." (Div. Thorn., I p., qu. 115, art. 6.) What- 
ever truly is, has a cause; what is, only as accidental, has no cause, for it is not 
truly being, since it is not truly one. White, has a cause, and music has a cause; 
but white music has no cause, for it is neither truly being, nor truly one. • 

t " Eflectus per aecidens proprie non generantur, nee corrumpinitur, nee sunt 
simpliciter, sed secundum quid. ' ' Effects per aecidens, are not, properly speak- 
ing, produced, nor destroyed, nor do they simply exist, but only under a certain 
respect. 

J "Finis est potissimum in unoquoque; i. e., llnis est id quod principaliter 
intenditur in unoquoque." The end is chief in every thing; i. e., the end is 
what is principally intended in every thing. 

§ '.' Nihil volitum nisi prsecoguitum. ' ' Nothing is wished, unless first known. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 205 

of their nature, by whom it is determined for them. The end 
or the final cause is the first of the four to act, and it causes 
the others to concur and to execute, the e^cient cause being 
the second to operate. The end is the first* in the intention; 
but it is the last in the execution ; i. e., it is the effect intended, 
and the effect intended is the end which is last attained, and 
in which all rest. 

The end, when considered as to the different relations it may- 
have to the intention, is proximate or remote; mediate or imme- 
diate; and ultimate or not ultimate. These opposite relations 
will be easily understood, if it be borne in mind, that an end 
may be desired either for its ow?i sake ; or, on account of some- 
thing else, that is desired; in the first case, it is strictly and 
properly an end ; in the second, it is really a means to an end. 

As the will by its own spontaneous natural action can wish 
good only, since good, as such, is its essential object ; it is not 
free to wish evil, as such ; or, in other words, by its nature it is 
necessarily determined to desire good; and, as regards the de- 
sire of this good in general, it is not free, but obeys the neces- 
sary law of its nature.f Hence, it is evident that this good as 
absolute, or good in general, is strictly an ultimate end, which is 
presupposed to all other ends, which can be intended or 
desired by the will. These truths being understood, it will be 
easy to perceive the consequent truth, that there can be no 
choice or election as to this ultimate end, since the will is pre- 
determined to it by the necessary law of its nature as a power 
of appetitio:i. The will is physically unable to love evil for 
itself or as evil; it can love evil only when apprehended and 
presented to it, as good, under some respect. In respect to this 
ultimate end, all other ends are mediate, or have the nature of 
means in reference to it. In regard to certain intermediate ends, 
the will can deliberate, suspend or change. Hence, man's 
responsibility for his actions depends upon the use he makes 

* "Primum in iutentione, est ultimnm in executione." What is first in the 
intention, is last in the execution. 

f ' ' Minus malum, est aliquod bonum. ' ' Less evil, is some good. 
' Malum sub ratione boui, potest fieri objectum volitionis." Evil, under 
the respect of good, can be the object of volition, 



206 GENEKAL METAPHYSICS. 

of his power freely to choose the means of good; and he 
becomes morally good, or bad, accordirg as there is, or is 
not, real rectitude in his intention as regards those means 
which he employs for the attainment of this good. Hence, 
the obligation arises also for him to know what is good, and 
what is evil, in all the objects thus subject to election or 
choice. 

Distinguish between the end of the act or work, and the end 
inte?ided, or the good to be gained by the work. 

Distinguish, also, between the end which necessitates action 
in the will, and the end which it can freely elect or choose. It 
is good which causes, as an end ; but its apprehension is an in- 
dispensable condition* 



ARTICLE III. 

MATERIAL CAUSE; FORMAL CATTSE. 

As the terms, matter and form, material cause and formal 
cause, are much used in philosophy, law and ethics, for the 
most subtle, as well as for the most important distinctions, it 
is necessary that they should be clearly understood. For this 
object, it is deemed useful briefly to state in this place the 
philosophical theory that gives origin and meaning to these 
terms. 

According to the Aristotelian or peripatetic philosophy, which 
has had much to do in moulding both the thought and the 
higher language of all civilized nations, material substance, of 
which the earth is made, consists essentially of two principles, 
niatter and form. Matter, without the form, could have no 
determinate existence at all; it would be a mere potentiality 
for actual existence ; but could not, as such, really exist. The 
form, which is the principle of activity, and of all specific 
nature or essence, unites by composition with matter, and actu- 
ates it into real existence ; and, at the same time, gives to it 

* " Bonum ut apprehensum est objectura appetitus." Good as apprehended 
is the object of appetition. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 207 

its determined and specific essence; i. e., makes, by union with 
it, material substance.* 

At the beginning of the world matter and form were con- 
created; i. e., passed from their causes into existence at the 
same time. Taken separately, they are both incomplete being; 
they are for each other, and, when they have the essential 
conditions for actual existence, they necessarily unite ; and, 
being united, they remain in union, unless separated by force. 
Some forms are more deeply radicated in matter than others 
are. 

Matter, as such, therefore, has no species ; it is the form 
that determines species, and constitutes it such. Hence, since 
there exist many species of material substance, there must be 
many species of forms, that are actually existing. To under- 
stand this, it must be observed that, when the world was first 
created, material substance was diversified with many species 
or forms, and made to possess within itself at the same time 
many other forms potentially ,f which may be educed from it by 
a competent efficient cause. 

Matter, therefore, is the subject in which are contained poten- 
tially^ like an effect is precon tamed in its actually existing cause, 
many substantial forms, which may be educed from it by an 
efficient cause; and these forms that are educed from the mat- 
ter, where they existed potentially, take the place of, or displace 
actual forms ; which actual forms are not thereby simply anni- 
hilated, but are re-immersed in the matter, or they revert to the 
state of potential being, in matter. 

The vital principle in organic beings, is a substantial form; 
v. g., the vegetative princ'ple in plants, the brute soul, anima 

♦"Materia, quatenus est priraum subjectum, est una et eadam in omnibus 
rebus." (Suarez Metaph.) Matter as the first subject in material substance, 
is one and the same in all things . 

t ' ' Materia est infinita in potentia ad formas. ' ' (Summ. I p. , qu. 7, art. 2.) 
Matter is infinitely capable of receiving its forms. 

% ' ' Esse in potentia, hie non est ea mera possibilitas, quae est potentia objectiva ; 
sed esse in potentia involvit subjectum aliquod reale, cujus sinu res sit contenta, 
quae dicitur esse in potentia." To exist potentially, is not that mere possibility, 
which is only objective, (exists only in the concept of it) ; but to be potentially, 
involves a real subject, in which it is actually contained. 



208 GENERAL METAPHYSICS* 

belluina in brutes, or animals of every species, man excepted, 
are substantial forms educed from n'tatter; as also the principle 
that gives to crystals their specific nature, is substantial form. 
They return to matter, or are re-immersed in it, when dissolu- 
tion, or death takes place. This eduction of new forms from 
matter, and the re-immersion of old ones into it, always sup- 
pose the agency of an efficierit cause. 

Since the operations of the brute soul, anima belluina, are 
purely organic* brute actions do not transcend the power of 
purely viaterial substance ; and, therefore, they are entirely 
from matter, and wholly for matter; and hence, brute souls 
cannot exist separate from matter. But the actions of intel- 
ligence and volition in the human soul, are from a principle 
that is not organic; they are inorganic or entirely super-sensiblej 
in their species, or transcend the powers of material nature; and, 
therefore, the substance that possesses intellect and will, is 
essentially and specifically immaterial Hence, though the 
human soul does inform or actuate matter by entering into 
composition with it, yet it is not educed from matter, and 
at death by dissolution, it is not re-immersed into matter ; but 
it is a substantial form that can and does exist separate from 
matter, or, then exists per se; or, to use the term by which this 
mode of existing is expressed, it subsists ; it is not said, how- 
ever, in that state of existence, to be a person, because it does 
not completely subsist, being by its nature ordained to union 
with the body. 

The human soul is by its nature fitted and ordained to unite 
in composition with matter ; but yet it does not, like inferior 
substantial forms, completely depend for its existence on matter. 

It follows, therefore, that there are forms which are complete, 

* ' ' Natura uniuscujusque rei ex ejus operatione ostenditur. ' ' (Phil, passim.) 
The nature of a thing is known by its action. 

t" Anima humana non est forma in materia immersa, vel ab ea totaliter 
comprehensa, propter suam perfectionem. Icleo nihil prohibet aliquant ejus 
virlutem non esse corporis actum. ' ' (Div. Thorn. , 1 part, qu. 76, art 1, ad. 4.) 
The human soul is not a form that is immersed in matter, or that is totally com- 
prehended by it, on account of its perfection. Therefore, nothing prevents 
some of its virtue from being no act of the body; i.e., some of its action is not 
action of the body, or the body has no share in it. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 2C9 

and subsist, but do not inform matter, and, therefore, have no 
relation to, or dependence on, matter; as, angels. For, if there 
are incomplete farms, a fortiori, complete ones should actually 
exist ; and there are forms that are incomplete, and yet can sub- 
sist, but they inform matter, and are by their nature or essence 
ordained for union with matter; as, the human soul; it can 
exist separate from matter, but its only connatural and normal 
state is that of union with matter. 

All accidents whose presence in, or absence from, material 
substance does not change the species of their subject, are 
accidental forms; as, quality, greater or less extension, figure, 
features, etc. 

From this brief and incomplete outline of the peripatetic 
theory of material substance, it must appear evident that matter, 
as a cause* is receptive, and passively retentive; or it sustains, 
as a subject; and \\\2Xform,\ causes by giving determinate exist- 
ence, nature and action to the compound which it constitutes 
by union with matter; and thence it is, that all specific nature, 
and all action, are attributed to the form. 

Hence, the material cause, is the subject upon which the 
efficient cause acts, to produce its intended effect. 

'['he formal cause, is that reality, of whatever kind it may be, 
which the efficient cause by its action induces, or brings into 
actual being in that subject matter. 

The change produced in the subject by the efficient cause, 
may be either substantial or accidental, i. e., the form induced, 
may be either substantial or accidental. 

By analogy, other objects, as metaphysical and logical truth, 

* " Quemadmodum materia est in toto (composito) principium patiendi; itaet 
forma est principium agendi ; seu totum, ratione materke, patitur, et ratione 
forma? agit, seu totum agit ut quod, forma ut quo. Est totum quod existit, est, 
subsistit. etc. ' ' As matter is the principle that receives action, in the compound; 
so, the form is the principle of action; or, the whole object, acts, in virtue of 
the foim, suffers action in virtue of its matter; or the whole is that which acts, 
the form that by which it acts; the Avhole is what exists, subsists, etc. 

t " Omnis ratio boni. pulchri, ordinis, perfectique a forma venit; quia eo ipso 
quod est actus substantialis luec omnia ipsi conceduntur. ' ' (Div. Thorn. , 1 p. , 
qu. 7(5, art. 1.) The whole nature of the good, beautiful, order, perfection, 
comes from the form; for, since it is the substantial act, these are all attributed 
to it. 

14 



210 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

genus, species, etc., are termed matter, and, therefore, are con- 
ceived as susceptible of form; v. g., "rational animal," may be 
regarded, as having animal as matter, and rational as form; 
since " rational " constitutes with animal as quasi matter, man. 
Hence, matter and form are regarded by analogy as likewise 
having causal influence in objects of the intelligible order. 

These terms, therefore, have extensive application; but the 
mode in which the matter and form cause, is always the same; 
i. e., by composing the effect; the form giving its denomination 
or specific name to the effect, and the matter receiving and 
sustaining the form. 

An example will illustrate the analogical use of these terms : 
a man, who is uni?itentio?ially unjust to another person, does 
material injustice, but wot formal injustice; for, it is the inten- 
tion, as right or wrong, that gives to actions their specific moral 
or formal nature. 

From the preceding observations, it is manifest that the 
definition of cause has its most proper application to the efficient 
cause. It was, perhaps, on this account that the ancient stoics 
contended that the efficient cause is the only one which is 
truly and properly a cause at all. But it is undeniable that, as 
already shown, there are more causes than one, truly distinct 
from each other, and which have, in their mode and degree, 
real influence in producing many effects. 

There cannot be an actual effect* which is produced by only 
one cause ; for there can be no efficient cause, without the final 
cause ; and vice versa, there can be no final cause without the 
efficie?it to which it is presupposed, as the first of all causes ; 
and hence, for the production of an actual effect, both must 
concur. 

The cause, by its nature, is prior to its effect ;t but as to the 

* ' ' Nullus est effectus in rerura natura qui unicam tantitm habet causam, for- 
maliter loquendo." (Suarez Met. disp. 26, sect. 3, no. 3.) There is no effect 
which strictly has but one cause. 

t " Causa est prior effectu prioritate a quo, seu ratione dependentiae." The 
cause is prior to the effect, in the relation of dependence. 

• • Causa in actu, et effectus actu, sunt simul. ' ' The cause aud effect as actual, 
are simultaneous. 

' ' Posito f undamento et termino , consurgit relatio . ' ' When the basis and term 
are put, the relation simultaneously regards them. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 211 

relation actually existing between them, they are simultaneous ; 
or they begin to exist formally as such at the same time ; for, 
when the basis and term of a relation are put, it simultaneously 
relates the two to each other ; or, it arises at the same time for 
both the actual cause and its actual effect. 

Every effect has within it some degree of perfection, which 
gives to it a certain similitude to its cause ; but the resemblance 
may be only that of analogy, as when the cause is equivocal; 
v. g., the architect and the house which he builds with its 
design; the perfection which is in the house, resembles the intel- 
ligent mind) by analogy only. 

The effect is either virtually or formally precontained in its 
cause ; and, therefore, it is really from the cause. In the first 
case, the cause is equivocal, i. e., of a different species from the 
effect ; in the second case, the cause is univocal* i. e., of the 
same species as the effect. 

An effect that has the material cause, requires the three others 
also. But we may actually know one or two causes, and yet 
be ignorant of the remaining ones. Since no being can act at 
a distance, "nihil agit in distans," it is an essential condition, or 
a conditio sine qua non, that the agent and object acted on, be 
either ??iediately or immediately connected. But, take care to 
observe that a condition, how essential soever it may be for the 
action of a cause, has not itself any real causality; and, there- 
fore, it is an error to confound a condition with the cause that 
depends on it ; or to attribute to it any real agency in produc- 
ing the effect. 

The exemplary cause, or the ideal or type in the mind, by 
which an intelligent efficient cause is directed in producing an 
effect, may be referred, under different respects, to the efficient 

* " Causa univoca, sequalis est effectui in essendo, nobilior ratione dependen- 
tise; causa osquivoca, est vel principalis, vel instrumentalist principalis superat 
effectnm in essendo; instrument alis superstar ab effectu, nisi suraatur ut condi- 
visa principali, tune enim influit per virtutera inferioris ordinis. ' ' (Suarez Met. 
Disp. 17, sec. 2, no. 19.) The univocal cause is equal to its effect in essence, 
but more noble as regards dependence; the equivocal cause is either principal, 
or instrumental; the principal, exceeds its effect in essence; the instrumental is 
inferior to its effect, unless as precisely distinguished from the principal, for, 
thus taken, it influences by virtue of an inferior order, and is a partial cause 
only. It is more noble than its own .proper effect. 



212 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

and to the formal cause ; namely, either as perfecting the agent 
for action ; or as, in some manner, extrinsically forming the 
effect* 



ARTICLE IV. 

PERFECTION OF BEINGS; THE FINITE AND INFINITE; THE 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFINITE IS LOGICALLY DERIVED 
FROM THAT OF THE FINITE. 

A thing is perfect, when nothing is wanting to complete it in 
fulfilling the proper endt of its being; due respect being had 
as to whether that end be temporary, i. e., by way of transition 
to another ; or, fixed, and unchangeable, as a state. The per- 
feclion, and the goodness of a thing, are really the same ; yet, 
in the concept, or logically, the perfect is presupposed to the 
good ; for, in thought, we found the idea of a thing as being 
good, upon its perfection. 

Perfection is absolute or relative; absolute perfection includes 
all realities that can enter into the concept of infinite perfec- 
tion; relative perfection includes all those realities that are re- 
quired to constitute any particular species of complete finite 
perfection. 

Simple perfection is that, from the very concept of which 
is excluded all positive imperfection; as "justice," "intelli- 
gence," etc. The ??iixed perfection includes in its essential con- 
cept the idea of perfection which is mixed with imperfection; 
as, v. g., reasoning, which implies the absence of simple intel- 
ligence. Hence, reasoning is, under different respects both a 
perfection and an imperfection. Reason can come to the 
evident knowledge of truth, not known as self-evident, only by 
demonstration, or by discourse of reasoft; simple intelligence per- 
ceives the same truth intuitively, i. e., without the less perfect 

* tl Dispositio concurrit in genere causas materialis: subjectum facit magis 
receptivum. ' ' Disposition concurs by Avay of the material cause : it makes the 
subject more receptive. 

f " Ultima perfectio rei est in consecutione finis." The ultimate perfection 
of a thing, is in the attainment of its end, or reaching its destined end. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 213 

process of reasoning* to it ; by the simple apprehension of an 
essence it acquires a knowledge of all that can be affirmed, or 
denied, by way of real property, in respect to the object. In 
other words, simple intelligence does not know truth by com- 
position and division, as reason does ; or, what is the same, by 
synthesis and analysis, for it does not know predicate and subject 
first as separate, but sees the one in the other. Distinguish, 
therefore, between knowing a thing after another, in another, 
and from another; the first is common to finite intelligence and 
reason ; the second, pertains to simple intelligence ; the third, 
is the peculiar and distinctive operatw?i of reason. 

The finite is what has limits; the infinite, is what has no 
limits. 

The infinite is either actual, or it is potential infinite. The 
actual infinite actually has all perfection without limit. This is 
possible only in one God. The i?ifi?iite potentially , is actually 
finite, but can be increased without limit. The infinite actually, 
cannot be increased, and cannot be subjected to measure, or 
number. 

Finite added to finite cannot produce infinite ; and, therefore, 
the actual infinite does not consist of extension or multitude. 

No finite being can be conceived so great, but that a greater 
one may be conceived as possible. 

Creation actually infinite is impossible: ist, because that 
which begins cannot become infinite; 2d, because potential in- 
finite cannot become actual infinite; or, neither that which 
can be finished, nor that which cannot ho. finished, can become 
infinite. 

* ' 'Ad discursum intellectualem pi*oprium, et formalem, requiritur quodunum 
cognoscatur ex alio; id est, quod ex alio prius noto deveniatur iu cognitionem 
alter iusposterius noti quod erat prius ignotum; sicque quod una prior eognitio 
sit causa posterioris, sive quod ex priori unius coguitione pariatur eognitio alte- 
rius, prascedatque prior eognitio posteriorem, si non in tempore, saltern natura 
et eausalitate." (Billuart de Angelis, Tract. 3, art. 3, sect. 3.) For discourse 
cf reason, properly and formally such, it is required that one thing should be 
known from another; i. e., from one thing previously known we comj to the 
knowledge of another thing afterwards known, but "which was previously un- 
known; and thus that a prior cognition is the cause of an after one, or that from 
the prior knowledge of one thing is born the knowledge of another, and that the 
prior cognition precede the posterior one, if not in time, at least by nature and 
causality. 



214 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

The philosophers, who teach that the human mind has natu- 
rally a more or less immediate intuition of God, deny the possi- 
bility of knowing the infinite through the finite. 

The chief reason a priori which they allege for this impossi- 
bility of concluding the infinite from the finite, is that " the 
conclusion cannot be greater than the premises from which it 
follows as a consequent." 

But their proof of the hypothesis that the human mind natu- 
rally has an immediate intuition of God, seems to rest mainly 
on two erroneous arguments : ist. the misapplication of a canon 
of logic; 2d, a misconception of the fact of actual experience. 
They argue, that since the idea of an infinite being cannot be 
derived a posteriori, for the conclusion cannot exceed the pre- 
mises, therefore, because as a fact, we have that notion, we 
must have it as an a priori intuition. 

But the canon of logic referred to, forbids a greater exten- 
sion as to quantity in the conclusion than was in the premises ; 
but not greater comprehension. If the prohibition held true of 
both, then there could be no reasoning at all from truth known, 
to truth unknown. Since the conclusion attributes to a subject 
a predicate which is not attributed in the premises, the subject 
of the conclusion has greater comprehension in the conclusion, 
than it had in the premises, especially when the predicate affirms 
perfection, or denies imperfection. 

Also, when we reason a posteriori, or from effect to cause, 
the effect may have been either virtually, or formally precon- 
tained in the cause ; in the case in which we reason from an 
effect to its equivocal, or super-eminent cause, we pass from what 
is inferior in species, to what is eminently superior in species ; v. 
g., when we reason from the house to the architect, from the 
painting to the artist, which is legitimate reasoning, we always 
conclude from an inferior to a superior species of being. 

Hence, conclusion from the finite to the infinite, as its super- 

eminent cause, gives a conclusion of greater comprehension, though 

of less logical extension, than the premises explicitly and directly 

expressed, but yet, it is both consequent and legitimate illation. 

It is to be assumed that no sane philosopher denies that the 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 215 

human mind, as a fact, does reason a posteriori, or from effect 
to cause, by means of the real relation between cause and 
effect. 

There is no object of cognition which the mind perceives 
with more facility, or which is more connatural to human in- 
tellect, than the real relation ot cause and effect. Evidences 
of dependence lead us daily to refer numberless effects to their 
causes, and this we have done from the earliest exercise of 
reason. In the same manner, the mind can see evidences in 
the visible world around us, of its dependent and contingent 
existence ; and, as the idea of limitation or finiteness is most 
simple, its object being so immediate and so obvious to the 
mind, it is clearly within the powers of human reason, to prove 
to itself the finiteness of the visible world, in the same manner 
in which it proves any object to be limited or finite. 

Hence, the mind of man, by its native power of reasoning, 
and without any intuition of God, can argue from what it 
knows and sees for itself: "There is no effect* which is not 
produced by sufficient cause; the visible world is an effect, and, 
therefore, the visible world is produced by an adequate cause." 

The intellect, then, is naturally competent to perceive by 
its own light, both that the visible world \z> finite, and that it is 
an effect ; for it is mutable, therefore, contingent, and, conse- 
quently, may lose or acquire being, which are distinctive marks 
of the finite. It may ask itself, what is a "sufficient cause" 
for such an effect. 

Reason would lead the mind to attribute to that " sufficient 
cause " t perfections pre-eminently superior to those of the 

* " Xon datur effectus sine causa: nihil est quod rationem sufficientem cur 
sit non habeat ; haec axiomata non coufnudeuda sunt. Juxta prirnum, nihil effici- 
tur sine causa; juxta secundum, nihil est, seuexistitsineratione sufficiente: pri- 
mum non pertinet ad Deum, cum Deus non habeat causam; secundum pertinet 
ad Deum, cum sit ratio sutliciens cur debeat admitti quod Deus existit." There 
is not given an effect without a cause; there is nothing which has not a sufficient 
reason why it exists ; these axioms should not be confounded. By the first, no- 
thing is effected without a cause; by the second, nothing is, or exists without a 
a sufficient reason: the first does not apply to God, since God has no cause; the 
second does pertain to God, since there must be a sufficient reason why it ought 
to be admitted that God exists. 

f " Si objiciatur, 'effectus flnitos, quales sunt creaturje, non exigere causam 
infinitam;' id conceditur deeorum causa secundaria, sed non de causa primaria, 



216 GENEKAL METAPHYSICS. 

effect argued from; v. g., priority to all other causes, therefore, 
existence a se, and the infinite perfections of ail kinds, which 
flow logically from admitting a, first cause that is independent or 
absolute. 

The very words, infinite, immense, and all the names of God 
which are negative in form, indicate the natural process by 
which the human mind forms its concept of absolute perfec- 
tion, as expressed in the very structure of language ; for, the 
negative names of God, show that the positive, out of which 
they are formed, was presupposed as affirming the finite prem- 
ises of which they express the conclusion. 

Suarez* observes the fact that, " in all things pertaining to 
God, it is more difficult to know the manner in which they are 
in him, than it is to know the manner in which they cannot be 
in him; " i. e., it is easier to know what God is not, than it is 
to know what he is. This is the reason why it not unfrequently 
happens that negative terms are employed to enunciate the 
divine perfections. 

The accepted significance of these negative names, shows 
also, that the concepts for which they stand, were formed in 
the mind by the removing of imperfection, and the consequent 
addition of perfection. This concept of infinite perfection in 
God, as the first cause, we actually make more and more com- 
prehensive by study, reflexion, and meditation, as we grow in 
years. 

As a matter of experience, we have not that primitive intui- 
tion of the infinite, or immediate intuition of God. 

Had the human mind naturally any such intuition of ens 
creans existentias, as the first great thought, which is the foun- 
dation of all other thoughts, it should have, it would seem, its 
own proper name in every language, which would be known to 

quae sit omnium causa a nulla causata ; hanc enim esse infinitamnecesse est." 
Distinguish the effects in visible nature as proceeding/ro7?i second causes, from 
that respect of them which exacts for them, moreover, a Jirst and unproduced 
cause. No effect absolutely depends on a second cause, for the second cause is 
itself dependent on the first cause. 

*"In omnibus divinis rebus, difficilius est cognoscere quomodo sint, quam 
quomodo non sint. " (Suarez, 2 opuscul, lib. 1, cap. 8.) 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 217 

all, and understood by all; for it would necessarily and most 
distinctly be seen as constituting the basis of all human thought, 
of perception, judgment and reasoning. But, as a fact, it has 
no such name, commonly recognized as pertaining to it, in 
languages, and it fulfills no such function in human thought ; 
on the contrary, the terms employed to enunciate it, which are 
not agreed upon, even in philosophy, offer to us an hypothesis 
which is obscure and difficult to be comprehended, because 
not only it does not declare, but it even contradicts, the facts 
of experience. 

Whatever may be the best philosophical explanation, the 
fact of experience is, thaf the progress of the mind is from the 
singular and co7icrete objects that through the senses determine 
its action, to the intelligible, expressed to it by the idea or con- 
cept; from the indeterminate idea of essence* and being in ge?ieral 
to the indefinitely great ; and, by renwtion of all limit, and the 
addition of all positive perfection, to the infinite, or to absolute 
being, as the only sufficient cause of all else. 

Hence, to affirm that the human mind cannot naturally infer 
the infinite from the finite, is not logically correct; and to affirm 
that the human mind has naturally and originally the im??iediate 
intuition of God, or, of absolute being, or, ens creans existenlias, 
is not true as a matter of fact. 

In the conclusion of a syllogism, the terms may have more 
comprehension, or their concepts include more essential perfec- 
tion, than they expressed in the premises. The infinite, as a 
conclusion from the finite, expresses less logical extension, but 
more comprehension, or perfection, than is explicitly in the prem- 
ises; for, whether the predicate attribute something positive, 
or deny some imperfection, the conclusion is the synthesis of a 
subject and predicate not made in the premises ; and its sub- 

* ' ' Intellectus noster ; dam de potentia in actum reducitor, pertingit prius ad 
coguitionem universalem et confusam de rebus quam ad propriam et specialera 
rerum coguitionem: sed perfectus modus cognoscendi, non prius attingit uni- 
versalem quam specialem coguitionem. ' ' (Vide Div. Thorn. , 1 p. , qu. 14, art. 
6.) Our intellect, when it goes into action, attains to a universal and confused 
knowledge of things before it does to proper and special knowledge; but the 
perfect method of knowing does not first attain to universal, and then to special 
cognition 



218 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

ject is thereby increased in comprehension. The absolute 
infinite is not such by extension; i. e., by continuous or discrete 
or logical quantity ; but it is such by comprehension of all per- 
fection. 

A desire to effect a unification of knowledge, or a coordina- 
tion of all cognitions, by a simple principle, has led many to 
adopt a theory that identifies the ontological and the psycho- 
logical orders; but, as a fact, they are not identical in the 
actual nature of things; i. e., the order of our cognitions is 
not from the first Being, to the works of that being ; but it is 
naturally just in the reverse order ; that is, it proceeds from 
his works to Him. 

The argument by which the existence of absolutely perfect 
and real being, entis realissi?ni, is claimed to be validly deduced 
from the idea of such a being, involves a double middle term; 
v. g., "he that has a true idea of absolutely perfect and real 
being, thereby knows that being to exist ; but there is in every 
mind, which comprehends the expression, absolutely perfect and 
real being, the true idea of such a being; therefore, from the 
very idea of such a being, it follows that the mind may and 
does know it as really existing." 

The phrase, "true idea," is here ambiguous; and, in fact, it 
has two objects in the premises ;* in the first, or in one mind, 
the idea, it must be supposed, formally connotes its object as 
actual or real ; in the second, or in the other mind, it legiti- 
mately expresses only the concept of a?i intelligible object, in 
which actual existence is neither affirmed nor denied; i. e., it 
exists in the second mind only objectively, as it is termed; or, 
for one mind, the existence is real ; in the other, it is ideal 
only : it needs not to be said that, if the existence of the ob- 
ject were merely ideal in both minds, then the argument 
would be simply nugatory. 

* ' ' Ex hoc (ex idea Entis quo majus et melius cogitari nequit) , non sequitur 
quod intelligat, id quod significatur per hoc noraen, esse in rerum natvra, seu, 
ut dicunt, existere in actu exercito; sed existere dumtaxat in apprehensione intel- 
lects, seu, ut dicunt, in actu signato." (Billuart, lp., qu. 1, art. 1.) From 
this idea it does not follow that the intellect perceives its object as real, or as 
actually existing; hut it exists only in the apprehension of the intellect, or only 
in its sign, the concept. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 23 9 

Since the conclusion must follow the weaker part of the 
argument, it can affirm nothing more, in this case, than the 
concept of an intelligible object, whose objective truth, or esse 
in rerum natura, actual being, remains to be proved. Illation 
from the purely ideal, as such, to the real, is not valid; if it 
were, then any absurdity could be logically demonstrated a 
priori, or from the idea of it, to be truth. 

An object in the mind is purely ideal, when the notion of it 
which the mind has is merely a concept of what is not known 
by it as real; the mind acquires this idea by simply appre- 
hending the term or terms by which the object is expressed in. 
language, and its idea is, therefore, not derived from the object, 
as it is in itself really and extrinsically to the intellect, whether 
by means of evidence or testimony. 

If, in the syllogism given above, we suppose the idea to con- 
note the object as in actu exercito, or realm each mind, then, 
considered as reasoning, the argument is still more absurd; 
for, it is a vicious circle in which the same thing, though 
assumed to be self-evident, is proved by itself as reason, 
idem per idem, and it would be equivalent to this : " He that 
knows God to exist, knows God to exist; but Peter knows God 
to exist, therefore, Peter knows God to exist." In fact, truth 
which is intuitively evident, neither requires nor admits proof; 
nor, therefore, can it be directly subject to rational discussion. 

" But," it is further said, "he that has the idea of absolutely 
perfect being, in which the existence, in actu exercito, actual 
existence, of such a being, is not affirmed, but it is included only, 
in actu signato, i. e., only ideally, has a false idea; and thus 
the mind would err per se." The idea in the case supposed, 
would be false by privation, or negatively; but it would not be 
false positively; therefore, the mind would not err per se; for, 
it would simply be ignorant of a truth which is not yet mani- 
fested to it by the evidence of that truth ; this would be igno- 
rance, but not error. From this it would merely follow that 
the existence of God is not, as regards us, per se known, or 
self-evident, but requires proof. 

The old philosophers acutely and precisely enunciate the 



220 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

distinction between that necessity of actual existence, as it is in 
absolutely perfect being, in ente realissimo, i. e., in God ; and 
as it actually is in relation to our intellects or our cognition of it, 
in the following terms: "propositio, Dens est, per se nota est 
quoad se, sed non quoad nos; "* the proposition, God exists, is 
per se known, as regards itself, but not as regards us. 

A proposition is per se known as regards itself, but not per se 
known as regards us, when it has no medium of proof a priori, 
nor is its truth directly and immediately evident to us on first 
apprehending the terms. Such proposition is also said to be 
immediate, in the sense that its predicate is i?n?nediately of the 
subject, or there is no medium between it and the subject, 
through which it agrees with the subject; but the predicate is 
included in the very nature of the subject, as its definition, or 
as a part of its definition. In case, however, that it is not self- 
evident to us, or per se known as regards us, the essence or 
quiddity of the subject does not become known to us, by the 
mere first apprehension of the terms that enunciate it; but it 
must be demonstrated to us by means something extrinsic to it, 
which is better known to us. // evide?ices itself, though our 
minds are not capable of immediately and directly receiving 
that evidence, but it must be conveyed to them through a 
medium which is extrinsic and a posteriori by which this evi- 
dence is. in some respect, reflected upon our minds. 

That which is per se known, as regards us, or is self-evident 

* " Propositio, Deus est, est per senota quoad se, sed nonguoad nos: ilia pro- 
positio non est per se nota quoad nos, in qua quidditas subjecti ex prima et cora- 
muni apprehensione terminorum nobis non innotescit, sed indiget discursu ut 
nobis innotescat, quia tunc non potest statim nobis innotescere an prsedicatum 
conveniat subjecto ; atqui quidditas Dei nobis nonnotescit nisi per discursum. ' ' 
(Billuart 1 p, qu. 1, art. I; vide page 139.) 

' ' Cum ergo propositio per se nota et immediata idem sint, dubitari non 
potest quin multa sint per se nota in se, quse non sunt per se nota nobis. . . Sunt 
quaedam veritates in se immediatae; i. e., sine ullo medio inter praedicatum et 
subjectum, quas non nisi per aliquod medium (extrinsecum) intelligere vale- 
mus: v. g., quantitas est entitas accidentalis." (Suarez Met. Disp. 29, set. 3, 
no. 32.) Since a proposition which is per se known, and a proposition which is 
immediate, are the same thing, it cannot be doubted that there are many things 
per se known, as regards themselves, but which are not per se known as regards 
us; there are certain truths which are immediate in themselves, i. e., without 
any medium between the subject and the predicate, Avhich we are not able to 
understand unless through some medium; v. g. , quantity is accidental entity. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 221 

to us, is seen and assented to by our minds, on first appre- 
hending the terms, and without any reasoning, whether a priori 
or a posteriori) v. g., "A whole is greater than its part." But 
while the proposition which is per se known as regards itself 
but not as regards us, possesses, in itself, the most perfect of 
all objective evidence, and the most absolutely necessary truth, 
in itself; yet, our imperfect intellects do not attain to it imme- 
diately, but do so only by reflex knowledge from other things, 
which are connected with it logically. Of this kind is the pro- 
position, "God exists;" and of this kind, also, are many of 
the highest and most universal truths, as remarked in respect 
to the proper object of wisdom or philosophy, on page 139. 

Hence, to sum up what was said in regard to the argument 
by which the existence of God is claimed to be proved from 
the mere idea of absolutely perfect being, entis realissimi; 
either this idea connotes its object as actually existing, in actu 
exercito, or it does not ; if it does, the argument in proof of it 
is useless, and is nothing more than a vicious circle. If the 
idea does not thus connote the object in both minds, then 
either it thus connotes the object in neither, or in one mind 
only ; in the first case, the argument is simply nugatory ; in 
the second, it is merely an equivocation, as is every argument 
which concludes from the ideal, as such, to the real. 

The existejiu of absolutely perfecl being, or of the infinite, 
must be learned otherwise than from the mere idea of it, 
or by the equally preposterous argument from the possibility 
of such a being; and, in fact, it is strictly demonstrable only a 
posteriori, or by reasoning from effect to cause.* The existence 
of absolutely perfect, necessary or infinite being, cannot be demon- 
strated a priori-, for, there is no principle prior to such being 
from which it comes, it being the first of all principles. 

All the demonstrative proofs of God's existence by natural 
reason are a posteriori -* and they are all reducible to the argu- 

* " Deura esse est demonstrabile non a priori, seu per causas, sed a posteriori 
seu per effectus : prima demonstratio dicitur propter quid; secunda, demonstratio 
quia. (Philos. passim.) The existence of God is not demonstrable a priori, or 
through causes, but a posteriori, or by effects; the first, is called demonstration 
propter quid; the second, demonstration quia. 



222 G-ENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

ment for the necessity of a first and independent cause. The 
proof derived from motion, the argument for. the necessity of 
unproduced being, for absolute being, etc., are, in reality, but dif- 
ferent modes of showing the necessity of a first cause that ex- 
ists a se. 



ARTICLE V. 

NECESSARY AND CONTINGENT BEING; OF ORDER; IT CAN BE 
INTENDED BY NONE BUT AN INTELLIGENT BEING. 

A thing is absolutely necessary* whose non-existence is in- 
trinsically impossible; a thing is contingent, whose non-exist- 
ence is possible. 

God alone is absolutely necessary, in the strictest sense of 
the words; all other necessary being or truth, the eternal 
essences of things, metaphysical truth, as, v. g., "a part is 
less than the whole," etc., must be conceived as, in some 
manner, deriving their necessity, or depending for it on a 
presupposed Being whose necessity is still more strictly abso- 
lute, as it is under all respects underived and independent ; 
and, therefore, their necessity, immutability, etc., are less 
strictly absolute. The necessity which is predicated of them 
is by some appropriately styled, metaphysical necessity. 

Hence, metaphysical necessity belongs to objects, which, in 
their very nature, could not be otherwise than they are ; v. g., 
the triangle; the circle; or necessary truths in general. It is an- 
tecedently and absolutely required that, if they really exist, they 
be conformable to their essential concept; but their actual ex- 
istence as real things, "in rerum natura/' is contingent \ i. e., 
depends on a free cause. 

Physical ?iecessity, is that which is consequent upon physical 
law ; and is, therefore, contingent also, in some respect ; v. g., 

* ' • Necessarium est quod ita existit ut deficere non possit. Contingens est 
quod potest esse et non esse. " A thing is necessary, which so exists that it can- 
not cease to exist. A thing is contingent, which so exists that it can cease to 
exist. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 223 

it is physically necessary that fire burn, that the sun rise to- 
morrow, if the stability of their physical laws be not suspended 
by Divine intervention. It is a physical fact that the sun rose 
yesterday morning ; and, as it now has consequent necessity, and 
is no longer actually contingent being, the truth of that fact 
is really metaphysical, under this respect of it. 

Absolutely necessary being, can neither have a beginning nor 
an end. For, what begins to exist, depends upon some condi- 
tion for its existence ; and, therefore, its being was not abso- 
lutely necessary^ and also, if it cease to exist, its being is not 
absolutely necessary either; for, what comes to an end, could 
have only conditional or dependent being. Hence, being that 
is absolutely necessary, cannot be conceived as actually in a 
state of possibility, and it is, therefore, eternal. But all contin- 
gent being was in a state of possibility before it began to exist. 

Necessity is either antecede?it or consequent \ v. g., it is antece- 
dent necessity for every circle to be round; every rectilinear tri- 
angle to have three angles, whose sum is equal to the sum of 
two right angles ; it is consequent necessity that the sun rose this 
morning, and, under another respect, it is also necessary that 
it will rise to-morrow; the necessity, in the latter case, is conse- 
quent upon the hypothesis that the law of the world's motion 
will not be changed before that time. The circle and triangle 
are continge?it, in respect to their actually existing, as real 
beings. 

No contingent being can exist, unless brought into existence 
by some cause, i. e., some being distinct from itself. The effi- 
cient cause of its beginning to exist, must be extrinsic to itself; 
for, if the sufficient reason of its existence were within itself, 
or intrinsic to it, then its existence would not be coniinge?it, but 
absolutely necessary ; or, in other words, the supposition can be 
made only of unproduced being. 

A thing may be produced 'in two ways : ist, by creation from 
nothing;* 2d, by being formed or made out of something else. 

* * ■ Creatio est rei produetio ex nibilo sui , et subjecti.' ' Creation is the pro- 
duction of a thing from nothing absolutely; i. e., from nothing that is presup- 
posed as subject matter out of which it is formed, or educed. 



224 GEKEKAL METAPHYSICS. 

A being is made or produced out of something else, when 
it is made by the efficient cause, out of some subject matter 
which is extrinsic to the cause; v. g., an oak produces another 
oak ; an architect builds a house, etc. 

A being may be destroyed also in two ways : ist, by annihi- 
lation or absolute reduction to nothing; and 2d, by dissolution 
into the elements out of which it is made, by which the whole, 
as such, perishes. 

Simple substance, or a being that does not consist of parts, 
and that exists per se, i. e., alone, or not as inhering, cannot 
be produced out of pre-existing substance. For, by reason 
of its simple essence, it cannot be formed out of pre-existing 
parts, since parts are incompatible with its simple nature; it 
cannot be produced from material substance ; for that would 
not be its production, since its existence per se in that substance 
must be presupposed to its eduction from it ; and in which, not 
being an accident, it did not i?iher€ ; and on which, not being 
a constituent part, it did not depend for being. Finally, it can- 
not be educed from another simple substance; for since a simple 
substance is not compounded, it cannot separate a substantial 
part from itself. Hence, simple substance that exists per se, 
can begin to exist only by creation from nothing. 

Order* is a perfection, by which multitude is reduced to 
complete unity; it so disposes of its like and unlike constit- 
uents, that each has its appropriate place in respect both to 
the parts and to the whole. When the proportion of relations, 
on which order is founded, is perfect, according to the specific 
nature of the object thereby formed; then that object is, under 
different respects, perfect, good, or beautiful in its own species. 

Order is referable to the relations of time, place, material 
substance; to things moral, social, and intelligible; and, in 
general, to any object in which we conceive relations of parts 
among themselves, and to the whole. 

*"Ordo parium dispariumque, sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio." (S. 
August.) Order is the disposition of like and unlike things, giving to each its 
proper place. 

" Compositio rerum aptis et determinatis locis." (Cicero.) Order is the 
arrangement of things in apt and determinate places. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 225 

Any order in action, proves the author of it to be intelligent; 
because the intention and production of it require the exercise 
ot judgment. By the order in men's actions and conversation 
we perceive daily the evidences of judgment exercised by 
them ; of ends deliberately intended, and of means compared, 
selected, and coordinated for their accomplishment. 

To intend, is properly an act of the will ; it is an efficacious 
desire of an end, which is, therefore, formally sought for by 
appropriate means ; or, it is an act by which the mind tends 
to an end wished for. The selection and arrangement of the 
means to that end, require practical judgment. 

The ape can warm himself at the fire which is made for 
him ; the dog can mount upon the chair that is already near 
the window, and thence jump to the window ; but neither can 
the one select means to keep the fire alive ; nor can the other 
combine separated and absent objects, so as to put them in the 
relation to each other of stiles s ; for both acts would require a 
comparison of abstract and concrete relations; i. e., judgment. 
Instinct deals with certain actually established and concrete 
relations of things, and when those relations cease to exist, or 
are essentially changed, it is powerless to devise entirely differ- 
ent means from its determined ones, or to combine and employ 
a new species of means. 

To select and combine means, to establish new relations, to 
devise means to an end which were not employed before, are 
acts of judgment that are proper only to rational natures. 
Hence, order or design gives complete evidence that its proper 
cause was an intelligent agent. 

There is order also in the works of the beaver, the bee, etc.; 
but they give no evidence whatever of intending it, which is an 
act of intelligence ; or that they exercise judgment in the selec- 
tion and use of the means. 

Cognition which is purely of sense, or organic, and limited 
to singular objects, and concrete relations ; action, which, in 
respect to the production of order, as such, is merely mechan- 
ical; fully explain their causality, and are all that can be attri- 
buted to them as agents. The intelligence and judgment, 
J 5 



226 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

clearly discernible in their work, we must refer, through the 
law of their nature, to the author of that nature. They can 
accomplish an end determined for them, by deter)7iined means;* 
but they cannot substitute means of different species ; or, as 
their action is determined to one thing by natural law, they can- 
not select another end, or other means, equally good, or better, 
but must, circumstances being the same, always do the same 
thing, in the same specific manner and degree, and by the same 
means; for they can know only the singular, and can appre- 
hend and retain only concrete relations ; they are not capable 
of transmitting improvement as a species, are not perfectible, 
either in their knowledge, or their mode of action. 

" Determinating ad unum" means limited or determified to 
one mode of acting, without any real choice or rational empire 
over the agent's own action ; when the object is actually pre- 
sented, it cannot remain really indifferent as to action or non- 
action, or be free to choose the object, or choose the contrary, 
but is necessitated by the object to do what it does. 

There is, indeed, order in the action of all natural agents; 

* " Coguitio et appetitio animce rationalis, sunt illimitatae ; dum, e contra, 
materia determinata est ad unum; anima autem belluina est materialis." Ra- 
tional cognition and appetite, are unlimited; but matter is determined to one 
thing; its capacity to receive and contain, is determinate and limited; of such 
is the brute soul, which is material. 

t ' ' Natnra determinata est ad unum ; sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. 
Voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam, quasdam enim 
sunt naturaliter, qusedam voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius 
voluntati qua? est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae 
est determinata ad unum. Semper naturae respondet unum, proportionatum 
naturae: naturae enim in genere respondet aliquid unum in genere, et naturae in 
specie acceptas respondet unum in specie; naturae autem individuatae respondet 
aliquid unum individuale. Eorum igitur voluntas principium est, quae possunt 
sic, vel aliter esse. Eorum autem quae non possunt nisi sic esse, principium 
natura est." (Div. Th., 1 p., qu. 12, a. 1, et 1, 2 p., qu. 10, a. 1, ad. 3.) 
Nature is determined to one thing; the will is capable of opposites. The will is 
the opposite of nature, as one cause is the opposite of another, for, some things 
are natural, some things are voluntary. There is also one mode of causing, 
proper to the will as supreme over its act; a different one agrees with nature 
which is determined to one thing. There is always one object corresponding to 
nature, proportioned to nature: to nature in general, corresponds some one 
thing in general; to nature taken as a species, answers a species of object; to 
individual nature, corresponds an individual thing. The will, therefore, is the 
principle of those things that can be either one way, or another; nature is the 
principle of those things that can be only one way. 



GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 227 

the intention of it, however, is not referable to them, but to an 
intelligent cause which is above them, and anterior to them.* 
Order and unity, attained by appropriate means, are manifest 
in the crystal, the mineral, the vegetable, the brute animal, in 
all objects around us; but the true cause and design of it, we 
cannot ascribe to those objects. For order, as such, can be 
intended and formally effected only by an intelligent cause; and 
the concurrence of irrational agents in producing it, is only 
instrumental and mechanical. 

Hence, none but an intelligent cause can per se produce 
order; for order essentially implies judgment; man, by the 
exercise of reason, produces order in thought, word, and 
work ; but the order that is in his physical nature as a sub- 
stance, is from God: "Oido recta? rationis est ab homine, 
ordo naturae est a Deo." 

To investigate this order with the design which it evinces, 
as manifested in the works of creation, in the means appor- 
tioned and directed to ends which are discernible in * all of 
them, constitutes what is termed the study of final causes. As 
before remarked, the final cause is the highest and the most 
noble of the causes ; for, it bespeaks the intelligent principle 
that gives motion, direction and efficacy to all the other causes, 
since they are subordinate and subject to it, and are, there- 
fore, dependent on it in operating. Hence, its objects fur- 
nish the mind congenial and elevated knowledge, since they 
acquaint it with the ends for which the different works of cre- 
ation are destined, as shown by their action ; and, by conse- 
quence, no study depending on the mere light of reason, can 
give us more perfect views of the author of their existence. 

When Bacon and others say that the study of final causes, 
according to the manner in which they are discernible in the 
nature of things around us, is arrogant, and tends to atheism, 
their fear and warning come, perhaps, from misguided reverence 

* • ' Ovis fug-it lupum ex quodam arbitrio quo existimat eum sibi noxium ; sed 
hoc judicium non est sibi liberum sed a natura inditum." (Div. Thorn. 1 p., 
qu. 59, art. 3.) The sheep flees from the wolf by a certain choice in which it 
esteems the wolf hurtful; but this judgment is not free, but is implanted in it by 
nature. 



228 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 

to God ; " semulationem Dei habent, sed non secundum scien- 
tiam."* All things are parts of the volume which creation 
forms, and it is open before us that we may read, and learn to 
know the existence and the perfections of its Author, as shown 
in his works. As the bees of Mount Hybla sip honey from 
the very flowers that give to reptiles deadly venom, so, that 
which teaches wisdom to the well meaning, may be turned to 
evil aims by the ill-disposed. 

In the operations of natural law, there is never mere acci- 
dent, or purely fortuitous event ; for, irrational agents have no 
action except in obedience to the law of their nature, imposed 
on them by the author of their being. Their action, though 
various, is orderly; their mechanism, though complex, has 
unity, and nature never fails either in the coordination of her 
means or in the attainment of her ends; "natura nunquam 
deficit in necessariis." Hence, such study of the creatures 
around us not only tends to knowledge that is true, and high, 
and wise, but at the same time gives us conclusions that are 
infallibly certain. 

* ' ' They have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge. ' • (Rom. x.) 
See page 56. 



END OF ONTOLOGY, OR GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 



PAGE. 

Absolute 20 

Abstract and Concrete 18, 19 

Accident 26, 182 

Accident, Proper and Common . . r 181 

Accident, Fallacy of 56 

Accident, Separable from Subject 180, 183, 196 

Accidental Cause 204 

Act, the Pure 124 

Action, Immanent, Transient 187 

Actio in Distans 2ir 

Acts Specified by Objects 71, 154 

sEstimativa Potentia 86 

Analogy 21, 162 

Analogy Can Found Demonstration 54, 137, 162 

Analogy not Parity 22 

Analysis 48 

Appetite, Appetition 166 

Appodictic Demonstration no 

Apprehension 16, 64, 108 

A se, Per se {note) 178 

Assent, Consent 72 

Attention 18, 126 

Attribute or Property 25 

Authority of Learned Men 132 

Being, Notion of 151 

Being, Degree or Grade of 202 

Beauty 173 

Begging the Question . . 57 

229 



230 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Brute Soul 90 

Categories, the Ten 23 

Causation, Principle of . . .' 199 

Cause, Kinds of. 200 

Cause, Efficient, Final 200 

Cause, Material, Formal 206 

Cause per se, per accidens 204 

Cause, Exemplary 211 

Cause, Univocal, Equivocal 211 

Certainty (et seqq.) 67 

Certainty, Criterion of 78 

Circle, the Vicious 58 

Comprehension of Terms 18 

Comprehension in Conclusion of Syllogism 40, 214 

Composition and Division 56 

Conceived, What Cannot be is Nothing 22 

Concept 16 

Conclusion of Syllogism a Synthesis 40, 217 

Concrete 19 

Condition, not a Cause 211 

Connotative 20 

Consciousness 82 

Consequence, Consequent, Sequence 36 

Contingent 52, 75, 222 

Contrary, Contradictory 34 

Conversion, Mutation 155 

Creation, Act of 158 

Definition 28, 135 

Demonstration 50 

Determinatum Ad Umim 226 

Difference, the Specific 24 

Dilemma, the 4-6 

Disposition 189, 212 

Disputation 14 1 

Distinction of Reason 1 63 

Divisibility, How Infinite 185 

Division, Rules of . . . 2 7 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 231 

PAGE. 

Double Middle Term 54, 59 

Doubt 66 

Election, End not Subject to 187, 205 

Elicited Acts 166 

End 204 

Enthymeme, the ...,-. 45 

Ens Rationis 1 64 

Equivocal 21 

Equivocal, Univocal Cause 211 

Error .' 63 

Essence, Nature 22, 153, 158 

Evidence 69 

Evidence, in Civil Courts (note ) 129 

Evil 165, 172 

Existence 158 

Extension of Terms 18 

Extension, Definitive and Circumscriptive 184 

Faith, .belief. 70, 74 

Fallacy 55 

Fancy, Same as Imagination 86 

False, Falsehood 63 

Figure 186, 195 

Final Causes, Study of 227 

Finite 213 

Finite Founds Knowledge of the Infinite 213 

Form and Matter, Theory of 206 

Genus 24 

Good 165, 171 

Habit 189 

Hypothesis, only Probable 54 

Hypothetical Argument 43 

Hypothetical Proposition., 33 

Idea, not Image of the Fancy 17 

Ideal to Real, not Valid Illation 219 

Ideas, Objective Reality of. 112 

Ideas, Universal, Founded on Objects 115 

Identity .54, 161 



232 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Ignorance 64, 66 

Imagination, an Organic Power 92 

Imagination, How it is Essential for the Intellect 84, 101 

Immanent Acts, Transient Acts 187 

Impossibility 160 

Induction 52 

Infinite (et seqq.) .' 213 

Infinite, Known from the Finite 214 

Infinite in Fotentia, cannot become Actual Infinite 185 

Instinct 89, 225 

Instrumental Cause 211 

Intellect, not an Organic Power 103 

Intellect, Adequate or Connatural Object of 104 

Intelligence a Virtue or Perfection of the Intellect. .138, 190 

Intend, Intention 225 

Intensity, Greater or Less, Objects Capable of 193, 195 

Intention, First and Second, Terms of. 20 

Intuition of the Absolute, not Natural 214 

Judgment 30, 109 

Known Per se, What it Signifies 220 

Life 187, 188 

Material Cause 206 

Matter and Form 206 

Meditation, What Constitutes it 127 

Memory, Sensile, Intellectual 125 

Mental Term, Verbu?n Me?itis 16 

Metaphysical, the 149 

Metaphysical Truth 61, 164 

Method, Scientific 48 

Mind, Powers of 35 

Mixed Perfection 212 

Motion, of Self, is Life 187 

Mutation *55 

Natural Agent , 1 68 

Nature, Essence 22, 153 

Necessary, Necessity 222 

Nominalists, Realists 115 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 233 

PAGE. 

Objects, how they Specify Acts 71 

Ontological, Psychological 51 

Opinion * 54, 66 

Opposition 33 

Order 224 

Organ, Organic Power 85, 95 

Parity 22 

Particular and Universal 19 

Passion Specified 72 

Perfection, Simple and Mixed 212 

Per se, has Different Meanings {note) 178 

Per se Known, or Self-Evident 220 

Philosophical Knowledge 138, 140 

Possibility 160 

Potential Existence 207 

Powers Pertain to Essential Quality 154, 186 

Premises, of Argument 37 

Probability , . 53 

Probability, in Cognition only 53 

Probability Essentially different from Certainty 53, 67 

Property or Attribute 25, 181 

Property an Accident 181 

Proportion, Analogy of 21, 162 

Proportion Essential to Beauty 174 

Proposition 31 

Psychological, Ontological 51 

Quality, as a Category 186 

Quality Follows the Form, Quantity the Matter 184 

Quantity 184 

Reasoning, Specific Act of {note) 35, in, 132 

Reduplication, Reduplicative, Effect of. 3^ 153 

Realists 115 

Reflexion 19 

Reflex Act, Organic Power Incapable of. 88 

Relation 197 

Science, Scientific Knowledge 132, 140 

Senses, Internal and External .85, 95 



234 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Sensible, the 95 

Sequence i 36 

Similarity 162 

Singular 19 

Soul, Immaterial 91 

Species 22 

Species, "Genesis of" 122, 195 

Spontaneous Act, Spontaneity 168 

Subcontrary 34 

Sublime 179 

Subsist 208 

Substance 178 

Substance, Complete, Incomplete 179, 208 

Supposition of Terms 21 

Suspicion 66 

Syllogism, Canons of 36 

Syllogism, Expository the 42 

Synthesis 48 

Testimony of Witnesses 129 

Transcendentals 20, 119 

Transubstantiation 157 

Truth, Metaphysical, Logical, Moral 61, 164 

Truths, the Primitive 80 

Unity, One 161 

Univocal 21 

Universal I 9 

Universal Ideas, How Less Perfect 12 t 

Will, the Rational Appetite 166 

Will is Free 166 

Will not Free to Wish Evil, as such 167, 205 

Will, its Act Less Evident than that of Intellect 84, 194 

Wisdom i3 8 

Witness I2 9 



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